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РЕДАКЦИОННЫЙ СОВЕТ

30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OF INDEPENDENT KAZAKHSTAN

Mukhtar Tileuberdi
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Kazakhstan

This year marks the symbolic 30th anniversary of the development and implementation of Kazakhstan's independent foreign policy.

On July 2, 1992, the President of Kazakhstan signed Decrees approving the Regulations on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and on the Basic Duties and Rights of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Kazakhstan.

Since then, Kazakhstan's foreign policy has demonstrated its success, ensuring stability and security along our borders and favourable conditions for domestic development.

Kazakhstan has established itself as a predictable, reasonable, and responsible actor in the global system of international relations. Thanks to its effective foreign policy, our country avoided being drawn into conflicts with other states. As a result, today we have good relations with all the members of the international community. Overall, Kazakhstan's diplomacy has made a significant contribution to strengthening our statehood.

Since independence, the main principle of Kazakhstan's foreign policy has been multidimensionality and balance. Guided by this agenda, Kazakhstan has become a member of many reputable international organisations, regularly interacting with the UN and its various specialised agencies (UNDP, WHO, IMF, UNICEF, UNESCO, etc.) and strengthening cooperation with other influential multilateral structures such as the WTO, the World Bank, ADB, EBRD, IAEA, and others.

The legal formalisation of Kazakhstan's state border should be highlighted as one of the landmark achievements of our foreign policy. Globally, delimitation and demarcation of state borders is a very sensitive issue, which has been causing tension and military conflicts in many regions of the world for centuries. We managed to resolve the border issue with China, Russia, and our neighbours in Central Asia in a short period of time. This was done while taking into account our national interests. Similarly, we signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which secured its status as a zone of peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Furthermore, our active contribution to nuclear non-proliferation has become the trademark of Kazakhstan. During discussions with our officials, the leaders of various countries frequently express their respect and gratitude to Kazakhstan for voluntarily renouncing the fourth largest nuclear arsenal. Paying tribute to our efforts in this area, the United Nations declared August 29 – the day of the official closure of the Semipalatinsk test site – the International Day against Nuclear Tests. Last year we celebrated the 30th anniversary of this historic event. Kazakhstan continuous to actively promote nuclear disarmament and remains committed to efforts towards the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Building a World Free of Nuclear Weapons by all UN Member States.

The signing of the Semipalatinsk Treaty on the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by Kazakhstan and its neighbours in the region on September 8, 2006, which created the first such zone in the Northern hemisphere, was the manifestation of concrete steps to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. An important addition to it was the Protocol on Negative Security Assurances, which stipulates that countries possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to use them on the parties to the Treaty. Last year, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Treaty made a joint statement on its 15th anniversary, in which they reaffirmed their unshakable commitment to its provisions and called on the United States to ratify the Protocol as soon as possible.

In addition to the efforts to promote the idea of a nuclear-free world, Kazakhstan enjoys the respect of the international community for its meaningful contribution to strengthening global and regional security.

Kazakhstan initiated the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which today unites 27 member states and 8 observer states. The objectives of the CICA are reflected in the very name of the organisation. Motivated by the necessity to adapt to the new realities and needs of the international agenda, its activities expanded to also cover new areas, including epidemiological security, public health, information technology, digitalisation, among other issues.

Kazakhstan's election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2017-2018 can also be considered one of the most historic achievements of our diplomacy. The international community greatly appreciated the responsible and principled position of Kazakhstan in the framework of this mission.

Furthermore, in 2017 Kazakhstan successfully held the International Specialised Exhibition EXPO 2017 on Future Energy, which facilitated the development of "green" technologies.

Another area worth mentioning is Kazakhstan's own unique model of interethnic and interfaith harmony in our society, which we created over the years of independence. The important visit of Pope John Paul II to Kazakhstan in autumn of 2001 was a reflection of Kazakhstan's global role in this field. Held less than two weeks after the tragic terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, which sharply exacerbated discussions of an inevitable "clash of civilizations," Kazakhstan attracted widespread international attention as an example of how a country can actively

promote and ensure a culture of peace and effective interfaith dialogue both on a national and global scale.

Subsequently, our country introduced several popular initiatives in the field of inter-civilizational and intercultural dialogue. The most significant among them is the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, which has been held triennially in the capital of our country since 2003. The seventh Congress will take place on September 14-15 this year, with participation from Pope Francis, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Rus', the Chief Rabbis of Israel, Ashkenazi David Lau and Sephardic Yitzhak Yosef, and other established leaders of various religious communities around the world.

Strengthening multilateral diplomacy and expanding cooperation with international and regional organisations remains the priority of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Here I would like to particularly emphasize Kazakhstan's successful hosting of the summits of the OSCE, OIC, SCO and other organisations in the capacity of the presiding country.

In the realm of regional economic integration processes, Kazakhstan is known to be a responsible member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This union facilitates increased trade, economic and investment ties and the implementation of large-scale joint projects.

Due to Kazakhstan's reputation as an impartial and objective mediator, our country has over the years contributed to the resolution of several diplomatic and international crises, including hosting the Astana Process talks on the conflict in Syria, hosting negotiations in 2013 on the Iranian nuclear program, resolving the diplomatic rift between Russia

and Turkey in 2015-2016, and supporting the launch of the Minsk Process on Ukraine in 2014.

Our country has also become a full member of the World Trade Organisation and a party to the Paris Agreement on combating climate change. Furthermore, climate diplomacy is becoming a new and important area of our foreign policy. We have set ourselves an ambitious task to decarbonize our economy by 2060. To this end, we are developing a Low-Carbon Development Concept. We are consistently promoting renewable energy sources, which should make up 15% of the country's energy mix by 2030. We are also actively involved in the global processes of developing a green economy.

Over the past two years, the COVID-19 pandemic has become a new and unexpected global challenge exposing humanity's vulnerability to biological threats. In this regard, at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed to establish an International Agency for Biological Safety aimed at preventing biological threats and exchanging data on dangerous diseases. The implementation of this important initiative is currently one of the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Priority tasks of the Foreign Ministry also include systematic attraction of foreign direct investment for our country's economy, transfer of advanced technologies and, most importantly, creation of new jobs for our citizens. Our diplomats have contributed to the attraction of about 380 billion US dollars of direct investment to Kazakhstan's economy over the past years. Undoubtedly, the Foreign Ministry, in close cooperation

with other government institutions and national business communities, will continue to improve the strategy and practice of operating in this pivotal area for the country.

Guided by the idea and values of the New Kazakhstan, the Foreign Ministry prioritises human dimension and considers the protection of the rights and interests of our citizens and national businesses abroad one of its key objectives. Kazakhstan's diplomacy is becoming increasingly applied and focused on the specific needs of society and every citizen.

Unfortunately, there is currently an increased degree of volatility and unpredictability in the international arena. New challenges and threats have emerged, including the crisis of confidence and increase in confrontation between various international actors, the erosion of fundamental principles of international law, aggravation of the threat of terrorism, an arms race, and exacerbating hybrid, cyber, trade and currency wars. These new challenges require timely adaptation and adjustment of Kazakhstan's foreign policy.

In this regard, on March 6, 2020, the Decree of the Head of State approved the 2020-2030 Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The key provisions of the updated document are predicated on the principles of a multi-vector policy, sustainability, pragmatism, and protection of national interests. From the first days in the office, President Tokayev clearly underlined continuity in the course of our foreign policy. Our country continues to maintain its multi-vector diplomacy, which has proven its effectiveness, ensuring a positive trend in the engagement of the country with all its international partners. Therefore, our foreign policy priorities remain unchanged.

Kazakhstan has been, is, and will be a reliable partner of the international community.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS – PRINCIPALS OR AGENTS? INTERPARADIGM DEBATE BETWEEN NEOLIBERALS AND REALISTS

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Abstract. The role of international organizations becomes especially acute when nation-states cannot establish consensus with regard to local, regional and global issues. Considering that international organizations are made of members with varying power dynamics, there is often criticism that they represent the interests of power actors and not a true consensus-building platform that would enable solving collective issues. The schools of realism and neoliberalism in the framework of International Relations attribute various roles to international organizations (IOs); while the first regard them as mere instruments of nation-states, the latter views them as crucial international players with autonomous status. This article critically evaluates various issues related to the efficiency and design of international institutions in the framework of this interparadigm debate and with consideration of the UN as a prime example. The analysis illustrates that further research in the field of IOs is imperative for both theoretical model-

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building as well as practical developments in the field. Finding suitable models is a vital concern for all international organizations, regardless of their purpose, size and origin.

ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҰЙЫМДАР – ЖЕТЕКШІ МЕ ӘЛДЕ ЖЕТЕКТЕГІ МЕ? НЕОЛИБЕРАЛДАР МЕН РЕАЛИСТЕРДІҢ ТЕОРИЯЛЫҚ БӨГЕТТЕРІ

Шенин Андрей, Раимжанова Әйгерім

Аңдатпа. Жаһандық немесе жергілікті проблемаларды шешудегі халықаралық ұйымдардың рөлі ұлттық мемлекеттер келісімге келе алмаған кезде өте жоғары. Бірақ әрбір халықаралық ұйым әртүрлі салмақтар мен мүдделердің қатысушыларынан тұратындықтан, оның әрекеттері жеке ойыншылардың мүдделеріне бағындырылуы мүмкін, таразыны компромисстік шешімге емес, субъективтілікке қарай аударады. Осыны ескере отырып, халықаралық ұйымдар теориясындағы екі үлкен теориялық бағыттың сарапшылары – неолибералдық және реалистік – халықаралық ұйымның мақсаттары мен міндеттерін ескере отырып, оның бастапқы құрылымын қалыптастырудың әртүрлі құралдарын ұсынады. Егер неолибералдар халықаралық ұйымдарды халықаралық аренадағы тәуелсіз субъектілер деп санаса, реалисттер оларды тек ұлттық мемлекеттердің мүдделерінің агенттері ретінде қарастырады. Бұл мақалада теориялық ойдың одан әрі даму бағытын анықтау үшін (көп жағдайда БҰҰ мысалында) екі лагерьдің көзқарастарындағы негізгі айырмашылықтарды қорытындылауға тырысады. Қорытындылай келе, кез келген деңгейлер мен міндеттердің халықаралық ұйымдар жұмысында әмбебап идеялар мен оларды жүзеге асыру механизмдерін іздеу қажеттілігі туралы қорытындылар жасалады.

Түйін сөздер: БҰҰ, халықаралық ұйымдар, ұтымды дизайн, неолиберализм, реализм.

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ - ВЕДУЩИЕ ИЛИ ВЕДОМЫЕ? ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ БАРРИКАДЫ НЕОЛИБЕРАЛОВ И РЕАЛИСТОВ

Шенин Андрей, Раимжанова Айгерим

Аннотация. Роль международных организаций в разрешении глобальных или локальных проблем проявляется особенно остро в периоды, когда национальные государства не могут прийти к согласию. Но поскольку каждая международная организация состоит из различных по весу и интересам участников, ее действия

могут подчиняться интересам отдельных игроков, склоняя чашу весов в сторону субъективного, а не компромиссного решения. Ввиду этого, эксперты от двух самых крупных теоретических направление теории международных организаций – неолиберального и реалистского – предлагают различные инструменты для формирования изначальной структуры международной организации с учетом ее целей и задач. Если неолибералы считают МО самостоятельными акторами на международной арене, то реалисты видят их исключительно проводниками интересов национальных государств. В данной статье предпринимается попытка суммировать ключевые различия во взглядах двух лагерей с тем (во многом, на примере ООН), чтобы определить дальнейшее направление развития теоретической мысли. В заключении приводятся выводы о необходимости поиска универсальных идей и механизмов для имплементации их в работу МО любых уровней и задач.

Ключевые слова: ООН, международные организации, рациональный дизайн, неолиберализм, реализм.

Introduction

There is some consensus among experts in international relations theory that the concept of the League of Nations failed because of its inability to prevent World War II. Its ideological successor, the United Nations (UN), was created on the basis of past experience, and was intended to serve not merely as a common forum for discussion, but as an effective mechanism for preventing armed conflict. To achieve its goal, the UN, unlike the League of Nations, must have the necessary authority and resources to exercise a *de facto* dictatorship to prevent war at its most tense moments. But even good intentions throughout the UN's 76-year history raise legitimate questions: "What power should be given to the UN and any other international organization? What should be the effective structure of the organization to achieve its goals? How should the balance of power and trust of the players be ensured?".

The multiple questions of operation and power definition cover not only the UN, but also other international organizations (IOs), from the European Union to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Each mechanism-voting, legal framework, authority, autonomy, funding is the cause of extensive debate among theorists and practitioners of international relations.

The main debate is between the proponents of the largest theoretical trends - realist and neoliberal approaches to the system of international relations and the place of international organizations in it. The former, recognizes only nation-states as global players, giving IOs only a secondary role. The latter stand on the opposite side of neoliberal institutionalism, arguing that IOs not only play a crucial role, but also have enough potential to solve common global problems.

In this article, the authors intend to identify the key contradictions that impede the development of a unified theoretical approach to the effectiveness of IOs (primarily such as the UN) in solving global collective problems. Studying the issue through the prism of theoretical research will make it

possible to outline the current problems of IO organization and identify ways to improve organizational effectiveness.

Realism vs. Neoliberalism

Both the realist and neoliberal paradigms of international relations each have a number of distinguished scholars on their side: John Mearsheimer, Robert Keohane, Barbara Koremenas, Kenneth Abbott, Michael Barnett and Martha Finamore, whose authoritative opinions tirelessly tip the scales in thier own favour.

The "father" of structural realism is commonly referred to as John Mearsheimer, one of the classics of international relations theory. His ideas that states are the key players in the international arena, while international organizations are only their instruments - agents of influence - are at the core of the realist mainstream. According to his vision of the situation, IOs only broadcast their own interests of states, and have no significant autonomy to solve international problems [1]. At the same time, other authors suggest that the legitimacy of IOs comes from their ability to address collective demands [2].

Neoliberals argue that IOs can both influence global processes autonomously and have the influence and resources to promote initiatives such as "free trade," "sustainable development," and "public goods" for all [3]. The UN is an ideal example of supporting neoliberal views - an organization whose budgets and decisions are based on the decisions of nation-states, but which also has broad autonomy to implement a range of initiatives [4; 5]. For example, the UN fights poverty, fights apartheid, protects children's rights, supports decolonization, and raises environmental and gender inequality issues to the top of the global agenda. Its work involves numerous bureaucratic procedures, collegial decisions, piles of reports, and contradictory actions by member countries. At the same time, however, it still reflects basic global needs and the attempt and possibility to meet them [6].

The complexity of theoretical concepts in relation to international organizations is that it is almost impossible to combine regional or global institutions into a single category. As the collective of authors led by B. Koremenos pointed out even the largest institutions have significant differences: they can be open or closed for entry, take decisions unanimously or by majority vote, have strong centralized management bodies or constitute a consultative platform [7]. Each mechanism or feature of the organizational structure can significantly affect an institution's ability to make effective decisions.

Therefore, it is not surprising, realists argue, that nation-states spend enormous resources and time on forming *a controlled* organizational structure of the IO to achieve international trade, economic and national security goals [7]. Moreover, the issue of security is the focus of attention, since the increase in power of one state within the IO inevitably poses a threat to another, or in other words inevitably leads to a "security dilemma," which, according to realists, is resolved either through a balance of power or through hegemony. A striking example here is the process of voting in the UN Security Council with the veto power of only five countries, while countries with no less economic, political and military

weight than conventional France, Britain or Russia have long appeared in the political arena. This alone makes it impossible to talk about the independence of the UN Security Council, an argument that is actively used by realists. Even cases of surprising unanimity, such as the resolutions on the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus or Afghanistan, are rather exceptions that confirm the rule, since they have never directly affected the interests of veto-wielding countries. [5].

Neoliberals, on the other hand, express the hope that states can still make collective decisions on the basis of IO with a focus on the overall benefit, provided that the organization of the institution encourages cooperation rather than outweighs the benefit in favor of only one party [8]. One of the best examples is considered economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region - APEC and ASEAN. Dent writes that despite the crises of 1997-1998 and a number of economic difficulties, the countries were able to build a really effective economic cooperation between both developed and developing countries [9]. What is particularly interesting about these two structures is the low level of institutionalism and the focus on national interests, which contradicts the usual constructs of Western MIs (such as NATO or the EU). APEC member countries deliberately deprived the secretariat of leverage and resources, and deliberately did not create mechanisms for effective dispute resolution.

Experts believe that rigid frameworks and rules would inevitably lead to the dominance of China's agenda (including on Taiwan) or more active actions by the United States, but APEC's "voluntary multilateralism" offers a foundation for a compromise between multilateral cooperation and respect for national interests [10; 11]. Neoliberals believe that common interests can solve not only economic and political issues, but also security issues based on the concept of "collective security," which is the opposite of the "security dilemma" concept of realists.

Rational design of institutions

The effective work of the IOs depends directly on an organizational structure that allows for constructive dialogue to take place. The issues of bureaucracy, organizational efficiency, and decision-making are basic to any organization, whether it is a governmental, non-governmental, or private institution. However, the choice of an effective structure is extremely complex, since none of the existing approaches is universal for all IOs.

Studying this issue, neoliberal theorists introduce a special concept "rational design of institutions" (rational design of institutions), which is aimed at reducing bureaucracy and minimizing the risks of deception [7]. The authors focus on five "columns" of organizational structure: membership rules, a clear framework for the issues discussed, a focus on problem solving, flexibility in decision-making and control mechanisms. For example, if a situation requires a decision to be made as quickly as possible, the IO structure should provide for the possibility to involve the maximum number of stakeholders in the discussion without restrictions on formal membership (the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic may serve as an excellent example). On the other hand, some issues may require

such significant financial resources or power capacity that the discussion risks being prolonged indefinitely. In such cases, the IOs should find a way to link several different issues to each other in order to encourage the involvement of all stakeholders in resolving them through shuttle diplomacy. A good example of the evolution of the institutional framework is the transformation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the WTO over several years, which was the result of intensive negotiations over several years, taking into account the different economic and political interests of all participating countries [7].

On the other hand, a relatively unfortunate example of "rational design" is the UN, whose budget for peacebuilding initiatives is 50% funded by voluntary donations, most of which go to poor countries, which automatically means dependence on rich countries to set the UN agenda [4]. As a result, the UN spends less per year on peacekeeping than the New York City Fire Department or Police Department [5], unable "to unlock its potential for peace building and therefore forced to respond to crises rather than prevent them. [4].

Thus, in their research Koremenos and colleagues [7] emphasize that the effectiveness of the IO depends almost first and foremost on its organizational structure. A flexible and compromise structure will balance the distribution of dividends from joint decisions among the member states, while an ineffective one risks making the organization dependent on rich sponsor countries and destroying the balance of power.

The balance of power and the matter of trust

A key problem hindering the realization of the potential of international organizations is the players' mistrust of each other. When one side doubts the transparency of the behavior and goals of the other side, both players act based on their own rather than common interests [7]. At the same time, when there are more than two parties, the uncertainty in the future of the issue to be resolved increases significantly, because the scope and the number of participants have always been one of the main problems in the creation of MI, especially when some participants are significantly stronger economically or militarily than others. Even in the European Union, there is an obvious imbalance in voting, with individual countries using their informal weight to promote their own agenda with the same formal "weight" of votes.

Neoliberals argue that the difference in weight is resolved in practice through the mechanism of "iteration," which argues that if players are forced to cooperate on a long-term rather than a one-time basis, they will strive for more open and honest action. Thus, R. Axelrod and R. Keohane [12] emphasize that the "shadow of the future" is a guarantee of permanent relationships, long-term planning, reliability of information and feedback. Realists, represented by Mearsheimer [1] point out that there are significant gaps in the arguments of neoliberal institutionalists, because the players can easily ignore future projects and deceive each other for a variety of reasons. For example, because of the unequal distribution of power among the

members of the organization, which affects the decision-making process.

Practice shows that the developed Western states are most often the dominant power in the IO, which is due primarily to their economic power [13]. The UN Security Council, with its limited number of participants and veto power, is a center of multiple contradictions. Nevertheless, it is a positive example of an organization that has reached "surprisingly consensual and effective solutions" in a number of resolutions on the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq, as mentioned above [5; 14].

Researcher C. Elger in his theoretical calculations notes that the dominance of the states of the "global north" in the UNSC, does not allow to unlock the full potential of the organization. Without a fundamental revision of the balance of power in the key decision-making mechanisms "the UN will not have sufficient legitimacy to resolve more and more issues" [4]. [4]. Even the North-South divide is already seriously undermining the UN's effectiveness [15]. And many other IOs (G-7, OECD, etc.) have the same unequal representation among the players, depending on their economic weight and place in the regional political grid [14].

Theorists argue that for each specific IO, a change in the number of participating countries upward or downward may open the way to new opportunities for solving the problem and increase the effectiveness of the decisions made [7]. But at the same time, it may also increase the risks due to irreconcilability of the positions of individual participants on crucial issues or delay in the decision-making process over time. The example of the UN Security Council shows these fears quite clearly.

Legal Framework and Compliance

In addition, even if a decision is made, the question of the binding nature of its implementation and the commitment of all participants to the adopted agreements will inevitably arise. An analysis of the role of the normative framework in the mechanism of functioning is intended to solve this problem. Peterson [16], for example, notes that while General Assembly decisions are binding on a number of internal issues, with respect to external ones, resolutions are more like recommendations, which undermines obedience and increases the chances of withdrawal from the arrangements.

Researchers Abbott and Sneydel [17] note the need for a balance between "hard" mechanisms and "soft" recommendations, using the WTO as an example. While strict legislation reduces transaction costs, increases trust in the institution, and discourages frivolous behavior by nation-states, soft recommendations (e.g., ethical standards) help achieve cooperation and mutually beneficial cooperation [18]. In the case of IOs that do not set strict requirements for compliance with their decisions, there is a risk of seeing neglect on the part of member states.

Models for assessing the effectiveness of IOs

The issue of a model for assessing the effectiveness of a particular IO structure is a separate problem that also divides the theoretical camps. Thus, realists use the

"principal-agent" theory for this purpose, in which IOs used as an agent seek to bring the ever-changing interests of nation-states (principals) to a common denominator. This theory literally follows the realist view of the world, since it is the principals who assign tasks to the agents and, moreover, can, through them, broadcast their own way of solving the problem.

But at the same time, Barnett and Finnemore's research [19] demonstrates that because of their multitasking and abundant resources, IOs are also able to advance their own agenda, independent of the "principals". From this perspective, all decisions made within IOs not only reflect the interests of the most influential players, but also correspond to the interests of the organization itself [20].

In general, realists recognize that IOs represent an important and, in fact, the only mediator between countries with different levels of influence and interests [19]. The participation of even a partially autonomous, relatively neutral actor can increase the legitimacy of individual and collective decisions and give nation-states additional rationales for granting IOs a greater degree of autonomy [17].

But such actions require nation-states to share some of their sovereignty with the IO. Thus, the UN offers a unique function in that it has the power to bring leaders of democratic and authoritarian states to the same table and dictate standards of democratic behavior and force them to seek and develop cooperative solutions. And although the UN bears all the problems of a cumbersome bureaucratic international structure (peculiarities of internal culture, lack of power mechanisms, unequal distribution of power), it remains

a key global player. Even for superpowers, such as the U.S. active work within the UN maximizes "soft power," ensures the legitimacy of actions and maintains a favorable image [5]. For example, when the UNSC adopts a resolution, it invariably declares a commitment to the principles of humanism and humanity, and if any country refuses to support the resolution, it is automatically positioned as a country that rejects these principles.

Proponents of neoliberal institutionalism, in turn, to assess the effectiveness of MI refer to the "game theory", which gives several options for the development of the situation, including with benefits for all participants. At the same time, it is noted that the analysis on the basis of the "theory of games" requires a clear understanding of what the actors will win and how they will bargain [21]. The growth of stakes where the gain from fraud exceeds the gain from cooperation will require a mechanism of punishment and accountability in order to stop attempts to cheat [22].

In general, neoliberal institutionalists, through "game theory," seek to model different scenarios that will allow participants to achieve positive-sum, increasing-sum, or zero-sum game winning outcomes for all participants. The structure of universal dividends should promote the intensification of cooperation and encourage all players to work out a mutually beneficial solution. But it should not be simplified into one-sided "win-lose" or "black and white" concepts; neoliberal experts call for "Pareto optimality. However, one must take into account that the dividends sought for the member states in the international arena

may differ from the domestic ones, those demanded by the electorate [23]. It is much easier for nation-states to agree to share their resources if they are interested in the agreement, including for domestic reasons, as, for example, happened when countries signed Article VIII of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund [24].

At the same time, "game theory" reveals the need for a balance between questions of "consent" and "coercion". The desire for a collective solution in the absence of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the decision means that the countries have not come to a deep cooperation. Of course, some experts emphasize the empirical difficulties of measuring consent on any scale, but they note the effectiveness of those organizations in which there is a strong secretariat capable of forcing countries to make a compromise decision (the International Monetary Fund or the International Labor Organization) [25].

But much to the regret of neoliberal theorists, today the international arena often and unknowingly applies the principle of the "prisoner's dilemma," which as rules strongly narrows the directions for cooperation (usually to one), while reality actually offers nation-states a wide range of possibilities and potential gains from multilateral cooperation [7]. The application of "game theory" in the study "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" has shown that the main focus of multilateral cooperation is the cooperation of national states. It has shown that the main reason for the failure of cooperation between international actors is the lack

of information, while the problem of balancing "consent" and "enforcement" has moved to second place. And if the first problem in the theory is quite solvable, the second requires initiative and common political will [12].

Conclusion

In general, it is practically impossible to bring the discussion of the effectiveness of IOs under a single denominator - this idea has repeatedly found its enthusiasts and been crushed by the arguments of skeptics. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify obvious contradictions in the theoretical debate and in the practical work of IR.

In theoretical terms, the debate between realists and neoliberals remains unresolved on the most basic question - are IOs still controlled by states, or do they have the potential for truly independent cooperation? Despite the obvious evidence in favor of the state-centered approach of the realists, their concept has always been vulnerable due to omissions in basic suggests and gaps in empirical evidence [26]. International organizations can and do influence the process of international relations, perhaps not with the degree of autonomy that proponents of neoliberal institutionalism see, but still very significantly [7].

Practice shows that the balance of power (i.e., the weight of the players) and the structure (or institutional design) of the institutions remain the key problem points in organizing the effective work of any IO. The IOs remain an important element of international relations, since there are a number of issues which national states

are unable to solve without cooperation within the framework of the IOs, just as the IOs are unable to achieve their goals without the voluntary and decisive support of national states (the formation of the UN budget for peacekeeping initiatives is a vivid confirmation of this). Today the IOs are free to choose their structure and control mechanisms from a variety of theoretical tools proposed by proponents of realist and neoliberal approaches but each one will be effective depends on the goals and objectives of each particular organization.

The example of the UN as an organization that combines both player and platform allow the ideas of both realists and neoliberals to be presented. In its example,

both theoretical camps can defend both state-centric views and the benefits of cooperation. Clearly, for the effectiveness of international organizations to develop, research and discussion in this area must continue.

A key theoretical question for further research is the applicability of theoretical findings and conclusions to other regional or global organizations. Today an important gap and a direction for future research in the theory of international organizations is evident, namely, the universality of ideas and mechanisms for their implementation in the practical activities of IOs of all levels and areas of work.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CENTRAL ASIA IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL POLITICAL TENSIONS: POPULISM AND POLARIZATION

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Abstract. The article analyzes the genesis of political regimes in Latin America and Central Asia, the Latin-American polarization during the period of waves of populism and its impact to Central Asian countries. In the twentieth century, the countries acutely experienced two waves of populism, which coincided with the historical periods of political transitions of the change of power, namely, the transition from oligarchy to mass politics, from authoritarian regimes to democracy, which subsequently created the solid ground for neoliberal reforms. The article notes the left-populist regimes and their anti-elitist orientation, and also analyzes that weak institutionalization, class orientation and a high level of polarization of left-wing populism after the consequences of COVID-19 will finally lead to an institutional crisis, a violation and lose of the balances and a straight shift to competitive authoritarianism in the future.

Key words: Latin America, Central Asia, Geopolitics, Populism, Polarization, COVID-19, Neoliberalism, Crisis of Party System, Left Turn and Democracy.

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ЛАТЫН АМЕРИКАСЫ МЕН ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯ ЖАҺАНДЫҚ САЯСИ ШИЕЛЕНІС ЖАҒДАЙЫНДА: ПОПУЛИЗМ ЖӘНЕ ПОЛЯРИЗАЦИЯ

Айтжан Кулумжанова, Әйгерім Оспанова

Андатпа. Мақалада Латын Америкасы және Орталық Азия елдеріндегі саяси режимдердің генезисі, популизм толқыны кезеңінде пайда болған поляризация, Латын Америкасы елдері талданады.

ХХ ғасырда елдер популизмнің екі толқынын бастан кешірді, олар биліктің ауысуының саяси транзиттерінің тарихи кезеңдерімен, атап айтқанда олигархиядан жаппай саясатқа, авторитарлық режимдерден демократияға көшумен сәйкес келді, бұл кейіннен неолибералды реформалардың негізін қалады. Мақалада солшыл популистік режимдер және олардың анти-эллитарлық бағыты көрсетілген. Мақалада әлсіз институционализация, таптық бағдар және солшыл популизмнің поляризациясының жоғары деңгейі, сондай-ақ КОВИД -19 одан әрі институционалдық дағдарысқа, тепе-теңдіктің бұзылуына және бәсекеге қабілетті авторитаризмге ауысуға әкеледі деген талдау жасалады.

Түйінді сөздер: Латын Америкасы, популизм, поляризация, Ковид-19, неолиберализм, партиялық жүйенің дағдарысы, Орта Азия, геополитика, сол жақ бұрылыс және демократия.

ЛАТИНСКАЯ АМЕРИКА В КОНТЕКСТЕ ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО НАПРЯЖЕНИЯ: ПОПУЛИЗМ И ПОЛЯРИЗАЦИЯ

Айтжан Кулумжанова, Айгерим Оспанова

Аннотация. В статье анализируются генезис политических режимов в странах Латинской Америке и Центральной Азии, поляризация, латиноамериканских стран возникшие в периоды волн популизма. В ХХ в. страны остро пережили две волны популизма, которые совпали с историческими периодами политических транзитов смены власти, а именно переходом от олигархии к массовой политике, от авторитарных режимов к демократии, которая в последующем создала почву для неолиберальных реформ. В статье отмечается левопопулистские режимы и их антиэлитарная направленность. В статье проводится анализ в том, что слабая институционализация, классовая ориентация и высокий уровень поляризации левого популизма, а также КОВИД -19 в дальнейшем приведет к институциональному кризису, нарушению баланса и к сдвигу в соревновательный авторитаризм.

Ключевые слова: Латинская Америка, Центральная Азия, геополитика, популизм, поляризация, COVID-19, неолиберализм, кризис партийной системы, левый поворот и демократия.

Introduction

The first wave of populist regimes swept the countries of Latin America in the 1940s, when the region was experiencing the total collapse of the agrarian capitalism economic model, as well as the accompanying crisis of the oligarchic state legitimacy. And those were the echoes of the polarization of the region within the states, which were gradually invading the political system. If refer to the book of James M. Malloy "Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America", he discusses the situation of Latin American countries in the period between two world wars from the standpoints of the theory of dependence, he says: "populism gradually turned out to be the regional response to the crisis of the catching-up development model" [1, p.6]. The integration of Latin American countries into the world economy through the establishment of agricultural products supplies to Europe and the United States prevented the accumulation of modernization potential, overcoming internal backwardness and entering the path of sustainable development, as it step by step led to excessive dependence of the countries of the region on importers of their products. Perhaps, restrictions in the political sphere also contributed to this. In most countries, the local oligarchy associated with agricultural export restricted the access of the population to political participation. Perhaps these facts led to the restrictions of the political systems in this region as most of the local oligarchy associated with agricultural export programs deliberately restricted the access of the population to political participation in major part of the Latin American region. For example, in Brazil, even in the first years of the "Vargas era" (1933-1934), the number of voters did not exceed 3.5% -6.5% of the country's population [2]. The world economic crisis of 1929, and accompanying the consequences of the Second World War, forced the governments of Latin American countries to curtail the economic model of agricultural export sector and transform into the policy of import-substituting industrialization, which resulted into accelerated urbanization and led to the imperfection of the political system and management of the states. The massive internal displacement of the population in 1950's progressively brought to the appearance of the so-called unoccupied masses in most of the large cities. Representatives of this social cohort most of them mainly were workers, having escaped from the control of the local elite (landowners), began to ensure that their interests should be represented at the national level. They insisted on the expansion of their political, economic and social rights. Under the pressure of the unemployed masses, the process of transition from oligarchy to mass politics dynamically started and such political figures (populist leaders) as Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina, Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico, Jetulio Vargas in Brazil, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador and others appeared and tried to make commitments in restoring the social justice in society. And the new area of populism slowly but surely initiated its process and the vivid shadows of polarization of political climate within the states started its intense development.

Research methods

In this article we used cross-case comparison and synthesized the analyses of the genesis of political regimes in Latin America and their polarization during the period of waves of populism. There were used three analytical

stages that structure the case studies of the article, such as: problem understanding; foreign policy goals and strategies; outcomes. During the research we used case and cross case analyses with its dynamics so that to examine two waves of populism, which coincided with the historical periods of political transitions of the change of power, namely, the transition from oligarchy to mass politics, from authoritarian regimes to democracy, which subsequently created the solid ground for neoliberal reforms. We also provided set of cases to study the influence of the left-populist regimes and their anti-elitist orientation, and also analyzes that weak institutionalization, class orientation and a high level of polarization of left-wing populism after the consequences of COVID-19 will finally lead to an institutional crisis, a violation and lose of the balances and a straight shift to competitive authoritarianism in the future.

The paper analyzes the processes of institutionalization of paternalistic autocracies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The political regimes of these states can be classified as authoritarian, but with their own specifics and varying degrees of democracy. Quite democratic, external political and institutional design of regimes in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, formed on the basis of family-clan relations. Turkmenistan under S. Niyazov was distinguished by authoritarianism, the so-called leader type, where there were practically no elements of real political competition. The changes taking place today under his successor, G. Berdimuhamedov, are generally external in nature, without affecting the institutional essence of the regime. Within the framework of neo-institutionalism, the formal and informal institutions existing in the Central Asian states that determine the nature and essence of the established authoritarian regimes were studied.

The fundamental method of this research is the method of comparative analysis / comparative method, which allows by comparison to identify common and specific features of the institutionalization of paternalistic authoritarianism in the republics of Central Asia, as well as similarities and differences with the political regimes of other former Soviet republics and states of the Near and Middle East. The functional method makes it possible to reveal the mechanisms of influence of the "verticals of power" on the political space and society of the Central Asian states.

Results

An internally oriented, statistic model of development, which implied state regulation of the economy, subsidizing key industries, income redistribution and an expansive budget policy, can characterize the first wave of Latin American populism. It is worth mentioning that the first wave regimes were not only the orientation of their leaders to achieve economic independence, but also antagonism towards the oligarchic elite, that was "a red flag" for the populist regimes of the first wave rise.

But it should be taken into account that the populist regimes of the first wave were not left-wing regimes, their proclamation course towards economic independence and social justice relied not on the working class, which is important to notice, but on multiclass coalitions, and, more importantly, did not seek to carry out deep social reforms. Overall, the populist regimes of the first wave were less successful and they could not ensure the

stability of economic growth 1960s. By that time, the evolutionary cycle had moved to the stage of manifestation of the bottleneck effect that resulted into further aggravation of devastating economic problems. In accordance to the discussion paper series on "Towards the change of the economic paradigm through the experience of the developing countries" by Marcelo Diamand, he says: "A bottleneck can be defined as the insufficiency of an item not very significant in terms of its own value but essential for carrying out an activity of a much greater value. The main bottleneck appears when country lacks the foreign exchange required to maintain its productive capacity fully employed. If the problem is not solved, domestic production is forced to diminish in a magnitude several times greater than the original insufficiency of foreign exchange." [3, p. 5].   In order to rehabilitate a full-scale economic crisis, the political and economic elite of a number of countries made successful attempts at a military coup, which led to the replacement of populist regimes with authoritarian and bureaucratic ones with further prospect of technocrat politicians to power. During that time the political landscape underwent significant political changes, all the forces of the political spectrum – both the right and the left-celebrated the defeat of populism: if the right criticized the populists for poor macroeconomic indicators and political instability, the left called the populist leaders pseudo-reformers who only aggravated social inequality in the region.

The second wave of populist regimes began in 1982 during the global debt crisis. The increase in interest rates in the United States against the background of the global economic recession, as well as the very structure of short debts made it difficult for a number of countries in the Latin American region to continue servicing external debt, in some cases exceeding GDP. In order to be able to negotiate with creditors on the terms of debt restructuring and solve other economic problems, the governments had to adopt an anti-crisis package of reforms led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was a first shock therapy for Latin American region. In Argentina, Peru and Venezuela, under pressure from creditors and international financial organizations, political leaders who came to power with the promise of continuing the course of ISI were forced to make a sharp turn towards neoliberal reforms, which was negatively perceived by the population.

Discussion of the results

In comparison with the second wave of populism, the third wave of populist regimes emerged at the turn of the XX-XXI in Venezuela and Bolivia in which the protests against neoliberalism finally took non-institutionalized forms. And the neoliberal turn in the region was quite heterogeneous, which is important to notice. In the works by Raul L. Madrid "The rise of ethno populism in Latin America" he notes that due to low polarization and multiple ethnic identification the ethnic parties win by mobilizing their base through exclusionary ethnic are unlikely to be successful [4].

The compilers of the so-called reform index tried to identify early and late, moderate and aggressive reformers among Latin American countries. For example, in the article "Neo-populism and neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected affinities" by Kurt Weyland, he summarizes that neo-populism and neoliberalism strive for winning massive support from the low-class population but

at the same time marginalizing autonomous organizations of better-off cohorts [5]. The dynamic growth of corruption, along with other signs of a public administration crisis during the structural transformations of the 1990s led to the discrediting of government institutions with the gradual "elitization" of the party system or the emergence of new pro-Indian parties, contributed to the blurring of voter identification with traditional political parties. This was expressed in a high level of electoral volatility and absenteeism, which ultimately led to a crisis of the party system and the formation of political vacuum. Due to this vacuum, new anti-systemic political actors have emerged on the political scene, that have decided to fight for power in order to correct the mistakes of neoliberalism and reboot the inefficient political system. And since neoliberalism was considered an economic project of the right-wing forces, these political actors soon began to be perceived as leaders of left-wing movements. Thus, the coming to power of a left-oriented anti-system opposition, as well as the presence of masses subject to mobilization, led to the emergence of left-populist regimes that are considered part of the Latin American left turn. It is worth noting that the left-wing populist regimes in Latin America largely retain continuity in relation to the previous regimes of two previous waves of Latin American populism. Since the leaders of these regimes, as a rule, were political outsiders their main programmatic characteristic was focused on to be anti-elitist and anti-imperialist orientation. The mid-2000s was obsessed with the "left turn" in Latin America in political arena. It characterized the mass "fascination" of the countries of the region with left-wing ideas, which found its expression in the electoral

successes of the left forces in various countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, etc. Leftist governments and presidents set the tone at the regional level, and their domestic political initiatives seemed very promising. However, some time ago, the situation began to change. The year 2016 supplemented the picture with the brightest examples - these are Argentina and Guatemala, where "right-wing presidents" came to power and where Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Peru won the elections. Among the earlier incidents that could once have been mistaken for individual stand-out cases that do not constitute a trend are Honduras, Paraguay and even Chile during the presidency of Sebastian Pinheira. Events in traditionally left-wing states, such as Venezuela or Bolivia, also fit into the "right turn".

The case of Venezuela was particularly indicative, since it was there that the "right-left" conflict was mentioned and in an openly confrontational form. It is obvious that if it were not for the control of the "Chavistas" over electoral procedures and institutions, Nicolas Maduro would have already been recalled through a referendum, and a right-wing politician would most likely have come into his place because there were not enough "leftists" in the Venezuelan opposition, and the socialist ideas themselves were and are already quite tired of Venezuelan citizens, driven by their own government into the deepest economic and food crisis. The crisis of "left" ideas in Latin American region is systemic; it would be unfair to link it only with the coming of the "right" to power in certain states of the region. At the same time, the region-wide integration projects of the "left" that once seemed promising are crumbling in front of our eyes. A striking example of this is ALBA (Alianza

Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América), which united countries with socialist and left-nationalist regimes in 2004. ALBA is the project of U. Chavez, which allowed the leader of the Venezuelan Bolivarian revolution to sponsor almost any ambitious initiatives. The death of Hugo Chavez in 2013 dealt the first blow to the alliance, then there was a crisis in the energy markets, and 2016 finished off the ALBA with a grandiose political collapse in Venezuela due to death of Fidel Castro. It is possible to dispute the role of F. Castro in ALBA, but, we must agree, it is difficult for any organization to exist and develop, having been left first without a main sponsor, and then also without a main ideologue and symbol. In addition, it is becoming increasingly difficult for such organizations to compete with "right — wing" regional initiatives, for example, with the Pacific Alliance -Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru.

If refer to the current situation, so we can see that the vivid victory of the socialist candidate Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in Peru in 2021 gives a slight hint for left tendency in Latin America. The COVID-19 played a fundamental role in it, but the key factor of turning into the left-wing government is more profound. However, going beyond the paradigm of the left and right, the last events indicate an increase of the wave of populism and political polarization in the region again.

Central Asia

After the collapse of the USSR, the system-forming process in the Central Asian states that declared independence became the process of de-modernization, the essence of which was the archaization of political systems, institutions, mechanisms, and values. The process of archaization contributed to the formation of paternalistic authoritarianism/"Bashism" around the figures of the "presidential fathers", which, despite several trends common to the region, has specific features for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan. Within the framework of paternalistic autocracy, the personification of the institutions of power, as well as the ways of exercising authority, is noted. It can be assumed that the transformation of "Bashism" is primarily determined by the nature of the political practices and tools used by "Bashi".

At the beginning of the XXI century, the coup d'etat in Kyrgyzstan and mass protests the current government in Andijan (Uzbekistan) highlighted the importance of Central Asia for security and stability in the region. The natural proximity of the Central Asian republics to the "anti-terrorist front" in Afghanistan and Iran, where the United States and its allies are solving their foreign policy tasks, also programs an increase in the geopolitical role of states, the "southern outskirts" of the former USSR, as well as a steady interest in the personalities of political leaders who have been in power (with the exception of the current President of Turkmenistan G. Berdimuhamedov) since Soviet times.

Near the Russian borders and in the zone of direct geopolitical interests of our country, contradictory, but equally conflict-prone scenarios are unfolding, fraught with undermining Russian positions in the region and even the complete displacement of the Russian Federation from Central Asia.

Even more dangerous is the option of turning the republics of Central Asia into a testing ground for the "Caliphate" - a project of Islamic fundamentalists trying to "revive" the Muslim

empire in the Eurasian space. This prospect is fraught with the dangers of spreading Islam in its militant, radical form to the regions of the Russian Federation with a Muslim population and the escalation of internal Russian conflicts according to the "Chechen" scenario. Thus, the countries of Central Asia can be considered as the "distant" border borders of Russia, where the security and stability of the country is largely ensured. Do not forget about the dangers to the health and future of Russian citizens from drug trafficking that goes through the states in question.

Therefore, the political processes in the Central Asian region need an objective, impartial scientific analysis of the situation that has developed after the collapse of the Soviet state. In the early 90s, all the former Soviet republics found themselves in approximately equally difficult conditions, i.e., faced with the need to solve the framework, from the point of view of generally accepted standards of "world civilization", tasks: transition to a market economy, democratization of society, search for a new ideology, new priorities. This process was influenced by the factors of the traditional culture widespread in the region, and the so-called Soviet heritage, represented, among other things, by the political elite in the form of the former communist party nomenclature, who turned from internationalists into champions and defenders of the "national identity" and "exclusivity" of their peoples in the shortest possible time.

The assessment of the essence and prospects of the development of the political regimes of the Central Asian republics is of great importance here. This problem is also of great importance for the discussion that has developed especially actively in the world political science about the relationship between democracy and authoritarianism in the modern world, about the possibilities and potential forms of transformation of authoritarian political regimes.

The range of distribution of authoritarian regimes is quite wide, and their number is currently very large. The interweaving of various factors, the diversity of living conditions, the uniqueness of the political cultures of different countries give rise to numerous variable forms of authoritarian regimes. Each of them is characterized by its own alignment of socio-political forces in the political arena, methods of implementing power relations, institutional opportunities for citizens to participate in political life, etc.

In the early 90s of the twentieth century, the newly independent states that appeared in the post-Soviet space were considered an integral part of the global movement towards democracy. By the end of the 2000s in Central Asia around the leaders/The "fathers of nations" have formed essentially undemocratic regimes, which can be described as "paternalistic autocracies". At the same time, the mechanism of a kind of political deactualization of institutions and rituals characteristic of traditional societies and cultures was launched. There is a kind of return to the past, where the figures of the "fathers of nations" were perceived as ancient "ethnarchs", therefore, the definition of "ethnarchies" as a system of relations between most of the society and the bearer of supreme power is also applicable to political regimes of this type. In the Eastern European space, this phenomenon has been defined as "batkovschina". And to characterize the institutional essence of the Central Asian states, the term "Bashism" is used. The need

to introduce this term is explained not only by the clan-tribal features of the structure and development of traditional Eastern societies, but also by the combination of power and property, forming special social, political, economic and cultural conditions for their evolution.

The impact of COVID-19 to populism and polarization in Latin America

The COVID-19 has undermined the normal process of functioning of states, which even before that was complicated by various difficulties, including numerous cases of inequality in society, a crisis of public administration, discontent of the population, an economic downturn, and etc.

According to expert Daniel Zovato, in his article "The rapidly deteriorating quality of democracy in Latin America" he says that would be possible that the authoritarian methods of government would strengthen in the Latin American region [6]. Along with this, the trend of growth of nationalist sentiments also increases and there we could foresee a slowdown in the integration processes, which have largely come to naught after the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) lost its role in the region, and many left-wing governments gave way to right-wing ones.

However, it is also impossible to exclude the possibility that the new political and socio-economic reality emerging in Latin American countries will create conditions for strengthening left-wing sentiments. In addition, anti-globalization processes are already being observed in Latin America, and with an impressive degree of probability, the positions of anti-globalist nationalists who advocate the creation of strong, self-sufficient

and stable national states may strengthen their positions. This allows us to conclude that in the coming years Latin America will have to overcome difficulties not only in the economic, social and humanitarian spheres, but also in the domestic and regional fields. The big problem of Latin America is that in the face of the global threat of a pandemic, the region has been politically and ideologically divided into three opposing blocs: authoritarian, left-wing and right-wing governments. It is likely that this is one of the factors that has become key in the reluctance of the states of the region to coordinate efforts to combat the COVID-19 jointly. In addition, such consequences coincided with the decline of importance and integration activity processes on the continent. By the beginning of the pandemic, the priority for the ruling elites was to retaining and strengthening their own power, as well as adapting management systems to new values and goals. In this regard, it is interesting that Mexico and Brazil, the unofficial leaders of the Latin American region, did not dare to take a leading role in the confrontation with COVID-19, but preferred to solve the problems caused by the pandemic only within their own countries. This reduced the importance of the integration of Latin American states to a minimum. The pandemic has only worsened the structural problems of Latin American countries that have been accumulating for decades.

Conclusion

It can be recognized that almost all republics of the former USSR, not excluding Russia itself to a certain extent, are defined today within the framework of such concepts as "managed democracies", "democratic tsarism" etc.

Therefore, the study of the institutionalization of Central Asian "Bashism" is important for assessing the potential for the development of political processes in the Russian state, as well as the possibility of avoiding external and internal political risks associated with paternalistic autocracy.

Unfortunately, the protests and political divisions in Latin America are likely to worsen in the medium term. This is partly due to the fact that, despite signs of economic recovery and the introduction of vaccines against COVID-19, the region's recovery from the pandemic is likely to be slow. The World Bank predicts that regional GDP per capita in 2022 will be 1.5% lower than the level that existed before the pandemic [7]. Investment in the region and economic growth itself can be called into question by investors ' perception of political unrest.

The Colombian presidential election in 2022 is also an event to watch out for. Although presidential candidates have not yet been announced, it is likely that the left-wing senator Gustavo Petro will run for election, as he did in 2018. It will also further strengthen the idea of a left populism in the region again.

The left-right political pendulum of Latin America ultimately shows the growing influence of populist politicians such as Jair Bolsonaro, Pedro Castillo and Gustavo Petro on Latinos who are increasingly desperate for change and disillusioned with political moderates. Latin America is increasingly finding itself in a situation where far-reaching socio-economic reforms are needed to restore public confidence in democracy and institutions. Nevertheless, the election of populists, whether left or right, who promise to correct the mistakes of Latin America, could further undermine democracy in the region.

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PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL IDENTITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: EU EXPERIENCE

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Abstract. In the era of globalization, the most diverse processes of modern life are observed through the prism of 'identity crisis' and 'search for identity'. In recent years, the discussion of identity problems has become the main direction of global studies. Some criticize this process and consider that the globalization requires a global, cosmopolitan culture with blurring national identities. Others believe that global interdependence leads to a new level of regional cooperation by giving opportunities and perspectives. In this article the question arose as whether Central Asia will develop regional identity absorbing suitable from European experience or postpone this idea.
Key words: *Regional Identity, Integration, Central Asia, European Union.*

ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ АЙМАҚТЫҚ СӘЙКЕСТІЛІК МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ: ЕУРОПАЛЫҚ ТӘЖІРИБЕ

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Аңдатпа. Жаһандану дәуірінде қазіргі өмірдің ең алуан түрлі процестері «тұлға

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дағдарысы» және «тұлғаны іздеу» призмасы арқылы қарастырылады. Соңғы жылдары сәйкестілік мәселелерін талқылау жаһандық зерттеулердің негізгі бағытына айналды. Кейбіреулер бұл процесті сынап, жаһандану ұлттық бірегейліктің бұлдыр сызықтары бар жаһандық, космополиттік мәдениетті қажет етеді деп санайды. Басқалары жаһандық өзара тәуелділік мүмкіндіктер мен перспективалар беретін аймақтық ынтымақтастықтың жаңа деңгейіне алып келеді деп санайды. Бұл мақалада Орталық Азия еуропалық тәжірибені бойына сіңіре отырып, аймақтық бірегейлікті дамыта ма, әлде бұл идеяны жоққа шығара ма деген сұрақ туындады.

Түйін сөздер: аймақтық сәйкестік, интеграция, Орталық Азия, Еуропалық Одақ.

ПРОБЛЕМЫ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ: ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ ОПЫТ

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Аннотация. В эпоху глобализации самые разнообразные процессы современной жизни рассматриваются через призму «кризиса идентичности» и «поиска идентичности». В последние годы обсуждение проблем идентичности стало основным направлением глобалистики. Некоторые критикуют этот процесс и считают, что глобализация требует глобальной, космополитической культуры с размытыми границами национальной идентичности. Другие считают, что глобальная взаимозависимость ведет к новому уровню регионального сотрудничества, предоставляя возможности и перспективы. В данной статье возник вопрос, будет ли Центральная Азия развивать региональную идентичность, впитывая в себя подходящее из европейского опыта или отложит эту идею.

Ключевые слова: региональная идентичность, интеграция, Центральная Азия, Европейский союз.

Introduction

Nowadays, in a period of global growing economic interdependence of states the regional cooperation is seen as a key factor of prosperity and achieving faster economic development. Obviously, effective inter-state relations can be based on common values, cultures, visions or even benefits from cooperation. In this case the development of regional identity is the issue that has a great influence on the future not in the short term, but in terms of a long strategic vision.

Analyzing regional identity, it is important to define the concept of region, its main characteristics and features. According to Kazakhstani political scientist Y. Buluktayev, "a region is a group of neighboring states, representing a separate economic geographical territory with similar national composition, culture or socio-political system" [1]. Other researchers pointed out the role of society and consider that region is "a territory whose population seeks

to preserve, develop its identity for achieving economic, social and cultural progress". From these definitions it can be concluded that region unites bordering countries with common current circumstances, economic, social, cultural similarity and coincidence in the future vision. However, historical perspective and common past can be an important factor in determining the region.

Thus, Central Asia is not only a certain economic region within one geographical zone, but from sociological perspective it is also a community with specific ethno-cultural features and a certain level of internal integration [1].

Some western researchers like B. Anderson and E. Gellner also studied the phenomenon of regional identity from the sociological perspective. For instance, B. Anderson considers that the regional identity is based on the idea of "imaginary communities". Since the decline of religious factor in the society and access to the information through the emergence of printed world, the idea of "imaginary community" began to spread [2]. B. Anderson's idea is intersected with Maslow's pyramid of needs. It states that the individuals require to feel the belonging to the group and common spirit.

According to the theory of Ernest Gellner, the early history demonstrated the absence of nation and nationalism in the agrarian history. Despite the cultural boundaries among tribes, that type of society was unable to create ideology that transcends those boundaries. In his opinion, modern societies require the cultural homogeneity and, moreover, have all conditions for creating and strengthening identity [3].

S. Huntington's approach emphasizes the role of civilizational factor on the development of regional identities. He considers that European identity is based on the European culture and Christianity, NAFTA – on the basis of North American community and Protestantism, MERCOSUR – on the Andean Pact of Latin American community and Catholicism, the Arab League – on the Arab civilization and Islamic ideas [4].

Theoretical and methodological base

The scientific research was based on a systematic approach. The regional identity as a research object was observed as a complex system of interrelated elements. The structure-functional method was applied, where each part of the system was observed in detail. In the process of research, we used scientific methods and techniques such as analysis and synthesis, grouping method, comparative analysis, generalization. At the same time the research required the implementation of empirical methods – analysis of documents and sources.

These methods were conducted within the framework of a generalizing systemic approach that helped to study society as a developing system with interconnected hierarchical subsystems. In this context, the study included the analysis of methodological principles and methodology to identify the influence of globalization processes on the cultural component of the state and society

The concept of regional identity in Central Asia

The most obvious transformation in cultural sphere that Kazakhstan faced was during the influence of Soviet Union. In this period, Russia had a great influence almost in all Union's

countries. In fact, the Soviet ideological programs were strong enough to spread norms, standards and values around all countries of the USSR. Moreover, the strong center was considered as the only source of truthful information and connect with external world.

Being the member of Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had to accept several flows of migrants from Russia and different regions of the Union in the period of collectivization and industrialization. In these circumstances, the process of 'russification' got starting point and still remain in Kazakhstani society. For instance, it is seen observing linguistic aspect.

The collapse of the USSR and gaining independence led to a new task of nation-building in Kazakhstan. From one side, our country faced with the internal goal of rebirthing as a nation-state and to become legal part of the world community without losing national cultural identity, from the other side. Moreover, this scenario was similar in most Central Asian countries.

Central Asian countries, including the independent Kazakhstan, feel the influence of globalization on their own experience in developing a civil society and socially oriented market economy. Obviously, most Central Asian countries have faced with a number of internal issues, such as: necessity of building of civic institutions, the development of private entrepreneurship, poverty. These issues can be resolved with the assistance of international and non-governmental organizations which are key actors of globalization processes. Considering this, it is necessary to study the main aspects of cultural globalization and its impact on the development of Kazakhstan and to find the answers to a number of questions.

The civilizational identity has a mixed character, where various factors influence. The example of Central Asia is a demonstrative case. Central Asia refers to Eurasian civilization, while from confessional perspective, the Islamic factor has a prevailing role. If this region is observed from ethnical level, Turkic component dominates. However, historical prism shows the Soviet past and its direct influence.

The existence of "Central Asian" region phenomenon is interconnected with Russian conquest of the XVIII-XIX centuries. The territorial, civilizational and confessional community did not have national identity. Obviously, the region covered tribes and communities without political or ethnic borders. That division into districts, areas had nothing common with modern republics and its territory.

The regional integration can increase due to the need of common efforts to reflect the internal and external threats destabilizing some parts of Central Asia [5]. The increasing trend for global governance made evident that some threats and challenges can be responded by developing the dialogue and cooperation among regional members. The stability and safety of the region can attract new investments and technologies.

In the early XX century, during the period of Russian influence, the role of Central Asian elites increased. At this period the historical and cultural unity of the region was the barrier, that gave start to the process of disengagement. The elites set the goal of nation-building within the framework of the Soviet state through the division of historical and cultural heritage. Moreover, this process was accompanied by finding differences among ethnically, histori-

cally, and culturally close peoples of Central Asia.

Persistent and stable regional integration require the necessity to become the part of regional community among society and consequent construction of cultural community. This point is intertwined with the history of the region and its politics of memory. The demonstrative example is the general writing on the history of Central Asia. In 1990 two rounds of meetings were held among the leaders of the republican institutes of history: the first meeting– in Almaty, the second – in Tashkent. The result of meetings was to begin preparatory work on the writing of one-volume book "History of Central Asia and Kazakhstan from ancient times to present day". However, at this stage this decision was not supported by all members of the meeting, therefore the book was not started and prepared [6].

The political and institutional obstacles of regional identity development are connected with the Soviet heritage and the post-Soviet period. Obviously, the influence of Soviet national policy has not gone without trace, it can be observed in the views, decisions of the post-Soviet ruling elites. It is difficult to define exact period of its durance, however, the current geopolitical definition of the region is a demonstrative example.

According to the study of R. Robertson, globalization is a process of upward influence on social reality in various fields of life (economic and political ties, cultural and information exchange). In this context, the concept of cultural globalization can be replaced with the term 'glocalization'. This concept was developed as a complex of intertwining global and local processes of social development. Moreover, this concept helps to study the impact of globalization on the individuals, their identity and to create a full picture of the essence of global processes.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics were of the increasing interest expressing by external players of the world community. Moreover, the globalization became daily reality, and most countries focused on the local cooperation and local interaction. There is no closer and stronger than these geographical, cultural and historical ties among neighboring countries. It is important to understand that without regional cooperation it is difficult to realize globalization itself.

The permanent and strategic direction of interstate cooperation in the region is seen in security issues coordination, as well as in political, economic, military, humanitarian and other spheres. Some researchers believe that the basis of regional integration can be in joint efforts in the security sphere, that can be deepened through economic cooperation – a key component for regional development and stability.

European model of regional identity

The example of European Union demonstrates the complexity of regional integration that covers several generations and proceeds unevenly. Some researchers pointed out two types of European identity. The first point concerns the formation of a common European identity in the modern frames and borders of European integration, while second type refers to the European space, European culture, or even European civilization that has been formed over the centuries. However, in both cases political and intellectual elites play the driving role in the formation and promotion of European identity among the society [6].

Respect for linguistic diversity is a fundamental value of the European Union, as respect for the individual and openness to other cultures. This value is officially included in the preamble to the Treaty on the European Union, according to which the EU supports "receiving inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanistic heritage of Europe" and emphasizes "reaffirming adherence to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights" [7].

The adoption of linguistic diversity as one of the values of the EU has led to the emergence of linguistic human rights in international law. Moreover, legislative acts confirmed not only respect for linguistic and cultural diversity, but also non-discrimination on the basis of the language, where each official language is endowed with equal rights.

When studying linguistic diversity from the perspective of democracy, the main question arises - what language can be considered the language of democracy? To this question, political philosopher Will Kimlica argues, "the mother tongue is recognized as the language of democracy." So what language can be called the language of European democracy? The German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas argues that English can become the common language for Europe. However, if the European Union pursues a policy for one language, for example, recognizing English as the head, then this will run counter to the origins of democracy, which imply the equal status of all languages, non-discrimination and respect for all languages [8]. Thus, it becomes apparent that linguistic and cultural diversity plays a key role as a value of Europe.

The European Union promotes the development of democratic instruments to regulate the language situation. For example, the Lisbon Treaty introduced the European Civil Initiative (EGI), which creates conditions for EU citizens to participate directly in EU democratic processes. If at least one million citizens in at least one third of the Member States support this initiative, they have the right to put forward legislative proposals, which the European Commission must consider within the prescribed period of four months. The European Commission's "Proposals for the Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council through Civil Initiative" describes the purpose and justification of this democratic innovation as: "This new position is a significant step forward in the democratic life of the Union. It provides a unique opportunity to bring the Union closer to citizens and to facilitate a broader discussion of EU policy issues by uniting citizens from a number of countries to resolve one specific issue".

However, this civil initiative reveals the contradictions of the European democratic vision of creating "united in diversity": linguistic diversity is supported and protected at the EU level, however, linguistic diversity is actually limited. In this case, it is worth noting that Article 4 on proposals for changes in the activities of the EP states that the organizer of a civil initiative needs to register the initiative with the Commission, informing about the subject, purpose and justification of the application "in one of the official languages of the EU".

Thus, this provision of the European Commission threatens the right of citizens to apply to a European institution in their native language if it is not recognized as an official language.

The protection of linguistic diversity and linguistic rights are regarded as fundamental

values of Europe and, therefore, are essential for the concept of European democracy. The idea of linguistic diversity as a distinctive characteristic of Europe from other parts of the world is confirmed in several speeches by the former Commissioner of the European Union for Multilingualism, Leonard Orban [9]. At a conference on multilingualism in Romania on May 15, 2009, he summarized the basic principles of European language policy as follows: "Today we live in a globalized world, and European countries are increasingly integrated among themselves. Although at the global level, some of the "big" languages tend to dominate, Europe is not a melting pot, where differences are blurred. Europe is a common home where diversity is celebrated and where our native languages are a source of wealth and a bridge to greater solidarity and understanding" [10]. One can notice a contradiction in the Commissioner's speech, which consists in the fact that "numerous native languages" can be considered both a source of great cultural wealth and a catalyst for greater solidarity, on the one hand, and an obstacle to mutual understanding and the disappearance of national identity, on the other hand.

Studies show that the European identity does not replace, but supplements and gives new vision to traditional national identity. The European identity has spread unevenly in all European countries; therefore, each national identity has its own way of "Europeanization". Western researchers M. Risse and M. Engelmann emphasize that making European idea as the priority had a great influence on German consciousness. Although it was a political project, but it transformed German identity by giving future perspectives as a key actor in this system [6].

Today, Luxembourg is recognized as one of the successfully implemented models of linguistic diversity. In Luxembourg, linguistic multilingualism can be explained both by the geographical position of the country, and various political and demographic changes since its founding in the X century [12]. According to statistics, Luxembourg citizens are considered the most multilingual citizens of Europe, where 99% speak one foreign language, Slovak (97%) take second place and Latvian (95%) take third place. Multilingualism means knowledge of a second foreign language. Obviously, the second foreign language to be studied in the European Union is English (38%), German (12%) and French (11%), and in connection with the accession of Eastern European countries to the EU, the Russian language and then Spanish.

Linguistic diversity is a symbol of European democracy, but linguistic diversity can also complicate political dialogue and exchange of ideas in a community where there is no single means of communication. Thus, linguistic diversity contradicts the ideals of the "four freedoms" of the EU - freedom of movement of goods, people, movement of services and capital, but despite this, multilingualism is recognized as a fundamental European value, protected by EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and supported by a number of Community initiatives. The practical significance of recognizing linguistic diversity is to turn linguistic diversity into a commodity, a valuable cultural good, and a political tool in the hands of European minorities, through which they can strive for greater European integration. In recent political initiatives in the field of language and multilingualism, the European Commission

emphasizes the importance of multilingualism and the study of languages not only for European culture, but also for all spheres of political and public life in Europe.

It is obvious that European Union started from the development of economic community and later came to the creation of European space with linguistic and cultural diversity. And one of the scenarios of regional cooperation among Islamic states can be seen in the cooperation of the Turkic speaking countries: Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. Nowadays these Turkic speaking countries have established interstate relations. They strive to unite all 27 Turkic speaking peoples of the world, which total number is more than 130 million people. However, it is early to discuss the integrational processes among them.

Therefore, the complex of economic development, historical community and cultural programs determine regional identity and contribute to the integration and strengthening of Central Asia as a united actor.

Conclusion

The formation of regional identity can be forced or accelerated by following factors:
- political benefits from cooperation;
- strengthening national and regional economic security;
- uniting efforts in decision making processes concerning regional problems;
- increasing the overall level of region competitiveness and consequent economic growth of the states [13].

The development of regional identity requires a starting point. Some researchers consider that it is the economic factor. It is the most rational catalyst for regional coopera-

tion, while other factors (institutions, culture and identity) can supplement later.

It is seen that the integrational processes must bring the members rather more benefit and profit than sacrifices and concessions. Moreover, there are some factors that force participants to become the part of the community or organization. In the post-war period the Western European countries alone could not resist the influence of the United States on the world market. These circumstances made countries to unite political and economic efforts and, as a result, gave rise the idea of economic and then full integration [13].

The basis of full integration is in the formation and strengthening regional identity. It is based not on unification, but on the contrary, involves measures on overcoming uneven economic development of states by searching common links of the region, protecting the historical and cultural identity, preserving national identity.

Moreover, the aim of European policy is to promote mutual understanding between European countries by encouraging, in particular, the study of the language and history. Since the formation of the European Communities, the participating countries have contributed to the creation and development of intergovernmental programs for the study of languages, with the main goal of multilingual and intercultural education [12].

One of the factors uniting all five Central Asian states is the religious component, their belonging to the Muslim world. At the same time, it is difficult to consider it as the key factor due to the different degree of religiosity of the population and its role in the society. For instance, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are considered as traditionally Muslim states with those who apply the rule

of Islam. In Kazakhstan, on the contrary, the ethno-demographic composition and the large urbanization of the population show low level of Islam. Mostly, it is increasing in southern parts, where the indigenous population mixed with Uighurs, Uzbek and Kyrgyz. There aren't any Islamic parties in Kazakhstan, there isn't any interference of Islam in political life. However, religious factor should be taken into account in the development of regional identity in Central Asia.

To sum up, based on the analysis it can be stated that the development of regional identity is a complex process that requires time and consistent solutions to support this idea. The European experience is demonstrative example due to different stages of development starting from economic community to the creation of European space with multiculturalism and language diversity. At the same time, it is worth to remember about prerequisites of European integration connected with post-war reconstruction. In this case, Central Asia can choose more consistent and timed way of regional unity where society and political elites achieve appropriate level of consciousness.

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KAZAKHSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN ALLIED RELATIONS: UZBEK EXPERT DISCOURSE

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Abstract. The article analyzes the assessments of Uzbek experts on the state and prospects for the development of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the context of the Declaration on Allied Relations, signed by the leaders of the two states on December 6, 2021.

This study was carried out by analyzing the discourse of the expert community of Uzbekistan regarding the characteristics of bilateral Kazakh-Uzbek relations in the new historical conditions.

It was revealed that at the moment meaningful allied relations have already been established between the two states with the potential for further development, which in the future will only be improved and expanded due to the high degree of coincidence of mutual interests and in accordance with the realities of the international situation.

Key words: *Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Allied Relations, Central Asia, Regional Policy, Security, Expert Opinion.*

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ҚАЗАҚСТАН МЕН ӨЗБЕКСТАННЫҢ ОДАҚТАСТЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАРЫ: ӨЗБЕК САРАПТАМАЛЫҚ ДИСКУРСЫ

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Аңдатпа. Мақалада 2021 жылғы 6 желтоқсанда мемлекет басшылары қол қойған Одақтастық қатынастар туралы Декларация контекстіндегі Қазақстан мен Өзбекстан арасындағы ынтымақтастықтың жай-күйі мен даму перспективалары туралы өзбек сарапшыларының бағалаулары талданады.

Зерттеу жаңа тарихи жағдайларда екіжақты қазақ-өзбек қатынастарының ерекшеліктеріне қатысты Өзбекстанның сарапшылар қауымдастығының пікірін талдау арқылы жүзеге асырылды.

Қазіргі уақытта екі мемлекет арасында одан әрі даму әлеуеті бар елеулі одақтастық байланыстар орнатылғаны анықталды. Бұл қарым-қатынастар болашақта өзара мүдделердің жоғары деңгейде сәйкес келуі және халықаралық жағдайдың шынайылығына сәйкес жақсарады және кеңейеді.

Түйін сөздер: *Қазақстан, Өзбекстан, одақтастық қатынастар, Орталық Азия, аймақтық саясат, қауіпсіздік, сараптамалық қорытынды.*

СОЮЗНИЧЕСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ КАЗАХСТАНА И УЗБЕКИСТАНА: УЗБЕКСКИЙ ЭКСПЕРТНЫЙ ДИСКУРС

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Аннотация. В статье анализируются оценки узбекистанских экспертов о состоянии и перспективах развития сотрудничества между Казахстаном и Узбекистаном в контексте Декларации о союзнических отношениях, подписанной главами государств 6 декабря 2021 года.

Исследование осуществлено с помощью анализа дискурса экспертного сообщества Узбекистана относительно характеристики двусторонних казахстанско-узбекистанских отношений в новых исторических условиях.

Выявлено, что на текущий момент между двумя государствами уже налажены содержательные союзнические отношения с потенциалом дальнейшего развития, которые в будущем будут только совершенствоваться и расширяться в связи с высокой степенью совпадения взаимных интересов и в соответствии с реалиями международной обстановки.

Ключевые слова: Казахстан, Узбекистан, союзнические отношения, Центральная Азия, региональная политика, безопасность, экспертное мнение.

Introduction

On November 23, 2022, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan will mark 30 years of diplomatic relations.

Over the years and past stages of interaction, the parties have demonstrated a meaningful pattern of cooperation. The documents on bilateral relations that have laid the foundation for new ties include the treaties on eternal friendship (1998), strategic partnership (2013) and the joint declaration on further deepening strategic partnership and strengthening the good neighborhood (2017).

It should be noted that the development of "strategic relations with the states of Central Asia" is listed among the priorities of Kazakhstan's foreign policy (Chapter 5, Line 4.2) [1]. In this context, the last five years have been marked by an even greater intensification of Kazakh-Uzbek contacts.

A landmark event in 2021 designed to strengthen and give new impetus to friendly relations between the two countries was the first state visit by Uzbekistan's President Sh.M. Mirziyoyev to Kazakhstan since his re-election as President, which took place between December 5-6.

As a result of the talks, on December 6, 2021, Heads of State K.K. Tokayev and Sh.M. Mirziyoyev affixed their signatures to a Declaration on allied relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

This topic has become one of the most discussed among the expert community. This is indicated by an increase in the number of media articles and social media comments on the topic. So far, the attention of the expert circles of the two countries has been focused on the prospects for a new level of alliance relations in priority areas.

In this context, the aim of the study is to examine the assessments and discussions of Uzbek experts on the potential and possibilities for bilateral interaction in the context of the Declaration on Allied Relations. The relevance of this analysis consists in objectively conveying to the Kazakh sociopolitical and academic circles the Uzbek expert community's understanding of the processes taking place in the relationship between the two countries and in identifying necessary measures that will contribute to strengthening cooperation.

However, to begin with, it seems reasonable to define the very notion of "allied relations". As a rule, the formation of interstate alliances is one of the debated definitions in international relations theory.

In this context, the approaches and positions of the schools of classical realism and neorealism have traditionally prevailed, since some researchers believe that in the context of the international system most states have still been acting on the basis of their own national interests. Consequently, according to these schools of thought, common reasons for the formation of alliances are the collective pursuit of national security.

Thus, for the political realist theorist H. Morgenthau, alliances are "necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multi-state system" [2, p.137].

K.N. Waltz, the founder of the neorealist theory, noted that alliances are a consequence of the anarchy of the international system and the growth of external threats [3]. One of the leading British international studies scholars, M. Wight, also stressed that the function of

the alliance was to "reinforce the security of the allies or to promote their interests in the external world". [4, p.122].

The author of the balance of threat theory, S.M. Walt, defines an alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states". [5, p.1]. In his theory, as opposed to the balance of power theory, S.M. Walt places the concept of "external threat" as one of the central issues. In his view, states seek allies not to balance forces, but to balance threats [5, p.263].

C.M. Walt sees ideology as another factor influencing the formation of the alliance. From this perspective, an important criterion for forming alliances between states is similar domestic political systems and values [6]. However, ideology is also a weak explanation for the emergence of an alliance, as ideology, following the example of the communist bloc of states, could also be a source of conflict [6, p.6].

Research methods

Qualitative research methods were applied in the preparation of the article. In particular, content and event analyses and the comparative method were used. Primary and secondary data were analysed through interviews with Uzbek political scientists, personal observation method and expert comments in academic articles, reports, media and other open internet sources from December 2021 to February 2022. Part of this research was conducted during the international conference "Problems of Regional Security in Central Asia after August 2021" held on December 14, 2021 at the International Institute for Central Asian Studies in Tashkent.

Results

While noting that relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been mostly positive in recent years, Uzbek experts draw attention to a number of the following features of the current bilateral interaction.

First. President Mirziyoyev's state visit to Kazakhstan in December 2021 demonstrated once again that the political relations between the two major states in the region are at the highest level and continue to show a further increase in the legal framework, which provides a solid basis for a transition to a more advanced stage of cooperation.

The experts note that there is a great deal of convergence between the parties in terms of political engagement [7]. In particular, the experience of parliamentary diplomacy gained by the parties is expanding and deepening and becoming increasingly important. In this context, the news of February 9, 2022 on the signing of an agreement between the chairmen of the Majilis of Kazakhstan and the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan on the establishment of an Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Council in full compliance with the Declaration on Allied Relations between the two countries has been positively received in the research discourse. This channel for inter-parliamentary relations should serve the exchange of information, law-making experience and other procedures between members of the higher legislative bodies of the states.

Second. Analysts, stating the proximity of positions in the international arena, note that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also have similar positions on major issues of regional development, and on the track of multilateral cooperation. For example, the parties have mutual

foreign policy support in the framework of the chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the CICA and Uzbekistan in the SCO [8].

Third. Economic cooperation is one of the most dynamic areas of the bilateral agenda. The governments are working towards a goal of $10 billion in mutual trade [9]. Mutual trade in 2021 increased by 33% to $4.3 billion [10].

The dynamics of mutual trade turnover between the two states have a positive trend due to the sale of fuel, agricultural products, textiles, transport equipment, etc. However, this is not enough to achieve the objectives. The strategic focus of economic integration and industrial cooperation should be on the following sectors: transport, agricultural and construction machinery; manufacture of power equipment, construction materials, household and medical equipment, etc. [11].

In the context of expanding industrial cooperation, Uzbek analysts draw attention to the importance of developing inter-sectoral cooperative links between manufacturers. This will lead to an increase in mutual trade [12].

Fourth. In addition, given the geographical location and the transit potential of both states, transport is an important connecting sector, according to experts [13]. It is significant that there has already been an increase in reciprocal transport by road, rail and air [8].

Experts also note that, against this background, the countries can mutually benefit from working together on an infrastructure project between Central Asia and South Asia, such as the construction of the Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway. [13].

Fifth. For Uzbek observers, current economic development issues are closely inter-twined with the rational use of transboundary water resources and the state of the region's ecology. Tens of millions of people and regional stability depend on the wise use of water [14]. This has become prominent against the background of reports from several international institutions about the increasing negative effects of climate change on water scarcity in the region in the coming years [15].

In this context, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are actively working on water issues, including the consequences of the drying up of the Aral Sea. In this regard, it is important that the parties reaffirm their common position on the need to revitalize the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea.

Sixth. The researchers believe that a comprehensive strengthening of security cooperation would contribute to the stability and sustainable development of both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as the entire region.

Thus, in the past three years, more than 10 bilateral joint legal instruments have been in the area of politico-military cooperation and common security issues [16]. In order to coordinate in this area, a mechanism has been established for regular consultations between the security councils of the countries, a format for cooperation through the defense ministries has been established, and joint military exercises are being conducted [16].

A good example of practical cooperation in the field of emergencies is the joint rescue work to eliminate the consequences of flooding of some settlements in Maktaaral district of the Turkestan region in May-July 2020, which involved 205 rescue workers and 123 units of rescue equipment of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Uzbekistan [16].

Seventh. Experts note that close cultural and humanitarian ties are an important factor in the allied and friendly relations of the countries. One of the indications of the intensified cooperation in this area is the direct contacts maintained between scientific and educational institutions in the two countries. Today, about 10,000 Uzbek citizens study at universities of Kazakhstan [8].

Another point to which observers draw attention is the measures taken by the parties to establish contacts in the field of tourism and to increase the bilateral tourist flow. The Silk Road Visa, a single Central Asian visa project being worked on by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will play an important role in this regard.

Discussion of results

An analysis of the Uzbek experts' assessments reveals the following.

First, the allied multifaceted cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan should be seen not only as a bilateral relationship between two independent states, but also in the context of an important factor for regional integration, stability and sustainable development in Central Asia.

As for the impact of the tragic events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan on Kazakh-Uzbek interaction and on regional co-operation, bilateral relations between the allied states should strengthen further, said Farhod Tolipov, director of the non-governmental scientific institution BilimKarvoni. According to the expert, the January events in Kazakhstan provided yet another argument in favor of further unification of the Central Asian countries [17].

Bakhtiyor Ergashev, director of the Ma'No Center of Research Initiatives, while noting that Kazakhstan is a self-sufficient state, capable of quickly overcoming these crisis phenomena, believes that the events will not have a perceptible negative effect on the regional architecture of relations [18].

Second, the urgent tasks and challenges of the new stage: the acceleration of region-building; maintaining the momentum of consultative meetings between the presidents; and the need to coordinate the foreign policies of the two states, including responding to geopolitical challenges.

Third, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have a great deal of untapped potential and untapped reserves, both in sectors of bilateral economic cooperation and in the context of interaction with other countries in the region, which also have enormous opportunities [19].

In addition, Tashkent's acquisition of observer status with the EAEU creates additional directions for bilateral cooperation [7].

Forth, the parties attach great importance to joint projects in the transport and logistics sector, which contributes to an increase in mutual trade turnover and opens up new opportunities for realizing the transit potential of the two countries. With this in mind, it is necessary to move towards a harmonized policy on transport, as well as on customs between the parties.

Fifth, further strengthening cooperation for the rational use of water resources is an important area, according to Uzbek observers. To this end, it is necessary to continue the efforts of the working group to develop proposals on water relations and to accelerate the introduction of the latest water-saving technologies.

At the same time, despite the emerging positive trend in environmental cooperation, experts are aware of the potential for the countries to address a number of challenges jointly in this area. This was evident against the backdrop of the dust storm that engulfed Tashkent and the Tashkent region, southern regions of Kazakhstan in early November 2021. According to Uzbek forecasters, such a natural disaster was observed in Uzbekistan for the first time in the last 150 years [15].

Sixth, a special place in Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan relations is occupied by close cooperation in the politico-military sphere and in regional security issues. In addition, there are a variety of tools available in this important area in the region.

Experts believe that stability and security in Central Asia are inextricably linked to the situation in Afghanistan. One of the key areas here is the need for parties to engage practically with the UN World Food Programme and other international actors for humanitarian and other assistance to Afghanistan.

Seventh, it is necessary to strive for increased ties in education and science, which have great potential for mutual exchange of experience. Thus, opening branches of Kazakh universities in Uzbekistan and branches of Uzbek universities in Kazakhstan and promoting cooperation through joint educational projects and scientific research would be a breakthrough in relations between the two states. For example, it is relevant in the context of post-pandemic development to promote cooperation in the fields of health, pharmaceuticals, technology exchange, epidemiological safety based on the experience of countries in the fight against the COVID-19

pandemic, and Kazakhstan's own vaccine QazVac.

Kazakhstan's experience of public administration reform is of particular interest to Uzbek experts. In particular, the implementation of the Concept of Development of Public Administration in Kazakhstan until 2030, the implementation of the principles of the "Hearing State" and a number of others. There is therefore a practical need for countries to regularly exchange experiences in this area.

Conclusion

Thus, there is now a consensus in Uzbek expert circles about the state and prospects of allied Kazakh-Uzbek relations. Most experts believe that in the current circumstances the relations between the states are developing in a complex way on the basis of a high degree of convergence between the interests of the two countries and are at a critical stage.

In today's increasingly competitive and tense international environment, it is therefore crucial to exploit the huge potential for complementarity between the countries by joining forces and identifying new practically oriented points of growth.

Certainly, the conclusions of the selected experts may constitute incomplete objective assessments, which would make the discussion more acute. Nevertheless, this study is an impetus for further research in the context of identifying specific problematic factors hindering the progressive development of cooperation between the countries. Such a comprehensive study would provide practical help in finding ways to elevate the allied relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to an appropriate level.

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GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE USA AND PRC IN CENTRAL ASIA

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Abstract. The article discusses the implementation of the US foreign policy, proceeding from the fundamental values declared by the state, features of the process of "promoting democracy" at the present stage, and new risks (real and potential) for regional security. The article provides forecasts of further actions that could be taken by the PRC in Central Asia. Additionally, authors provide scenarios of future events in the region based on the analysis and a possible US reaction to those events.

This article is an attempt to analyze the economic interests of China and the United States in Central Asian countries. Today, when there has not been an active geopolitical struggle in the region, it is advisable to consider the economic interests of the world powers Central Asian region and to determine how much those interests contradict or complement each other.

Keywords: *Central Asia, USA, China, Regional Security, Geopolitics, Energy.*

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АҚШ МЕН ҚХР-ДЫҢ ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ ГЕОПОЛИТИКАЛЫҚ ЖӘНЕ ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ МҮДДЕЛЕРІ

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Аңдатпа. Мақалада АҚШ-тың олар жариялаған іргелі құндылықтарға негізделген сыртқы саясатын іске асыру барысы, қазіргі кезеңдегі «демократи-яны ілгерілету» процестерінің ерекшеліктері және аймақтық қауіпсіздікке жаңа тәуекелдер (нақты және әлеуетті) қарастырылады. Сондай-ақ ҚХР-ның Орталық Азиядағы одан әрі іс-әрекеттерінің болжамдары келтіріліп, аймақтағы болашақ оқиғалардың даму нұсқалары АҚШ-тың оларға ықтимал реакциясымен бірге талданады.

Бұл мақала Қытай мен АҚШ-тың Орталық Азия мемлекеттеріндегі экономикалық мүдделерін талдау әрекеті болып табылады. Бүгінгі таңда аймақтағы геосаяси күресте белгілі бір тыныштық орнаған кезде осында шоғырланған әлемдік державалардың экономикалық мүдделерін қарастырып, олардың қаншалықты бір-біріне қайшы келетінін немесе бірін-бірі толықтыратынын анықтаған жөн.

Түйін сөздер: *Орталық Азия, АҚШ, Қытай, аймақтық қауіпсіздік, геосаясат, энергетика.*

ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ИНТЕРЕСЫ США И КНР В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ

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Аннотация. В статье рассматриваются реализация внешней политики США, исходящей из декларируемых ими фундаментальных ценностей, особенности процессов «продвижения демократии» на современном этапе и новые риски (реальные и потенциальные) региональной безопасности. Даются также прогнозы дальнейших действий КНР в ЦА. Варианты развития грядущих событий в регионе анализируются в увязке с возможной реакцией на них США.

Данная статья — попытка проанализировать экономические интересы КНР и США в государствах Центральной Азии. Сегодня, когда в геополитической борьбе в регионе наступило определенное затишье, целесообразно рассмотреть сконцентрированные здесь экономические интересы мировых держав и определить, насколько они противоречат друг другу или дополняют друг друга.

Ключевые слова: *Центральная Азия, США, Китай, региональная безопасность, геополитика, энергетика.*

Introduction

Central Asia is seen as a new geopolitical space, the boundaries of which are capable of expanding or contracting as a result of the action of geopolitical force fields. The force field is determined by the format of the space that a particular state or group of states seeks to control. This study analyzes the process of formation and transformation of the US and Chinese power fields in the Central Asian region as an integral part of the global geopolitical space.

Geopolitical transformations are taking place especially intensively on the Eurasian continent, which confirms the conclusion of H. Mackinder that Eurasia is not just a continent, but an axial space in world geopolitics. At the center of change in this region of the world are the newly independent states formed on the former territory of the Soviet Union. Its collapse allowed the major powers of the world to start looking for opportunities to increase their influence in Eurasia.

The American scientist and politician Henry Kissinger, developing the ideas of Nicholas Spykman, believes that the US political strategy is to unite the disparate coastal zones into a single whole, which will allow the Atlanticists to gain complete control over Eurasia, primarily over the post-Soviet space [1]. According to Z. Brzezinski, the United States cannot allow the emergence in Eurasia of such a state or a coalition of states with the participation of Russia, China and Iran, which could limit or weaken American influence in this region, in connection with which it is called the "Eurasian Balkans". He clearly defines American tasks in the region of the "Eurasian Balkans": *The issue of whether America can prevent the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic power in Eurasia determines America's ability to exercise global primacy.*

Research methods

Research methods was a system of scientific principles, among which we single out the principle of an objective approach to the study of foreign policy and foreign economic problems. To analyze interests, a systematic method was used, which allows us to consider the political, economic and military-strategic interests of the United States, China in Central Asia as an integral, complex organizational mechanism consisting of elements that are in constant interaction and/or confrontation with each other [2]. The need to compare coinciding and antagonistic interests in order to find optimal ways of interaction between the United States and China in relations with the countries of the region is carried out on the basis of a functional method. This method was applied in the analysis of economic and political ties, the level of military and military-technical contacts, the characteristics of the confrontation, as well as the level of military and military-political contacts, the characteristics of the confrontation, as well as the conditions for the formation of a new balance of power in Central Asia.

Discussion

The United States is approaching the definition of its economic interests in the Central Asian republics linking these interests with the European regional strategy and with its economic goals in individual countries in the region. One of the foundations of this US policy is to eliminate the isolation of the Central Asian states from world markets which includes the activation of international eco-

nomic ties between these states and Europe [3]. The strategic goal of the United States is to weaken OPEC's positions in the world energy markets, which should be facilitated by additional independent offers of energy carriers from the countries of the region on the world market.

By assisting the Central Asian republics in expanding their transport infrastructure, the United States is solving its economic and military-strategic tasks. Such objects include the construction of transport communications between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

Various state and non-state funds actively analyze the countries of the region, train their personnel and act as advisers and provide consulting services to support American and European businesses in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan [4]. Currently, the United States has bilateral investment agreements only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Large investments by American corporations in the economy of the republics of the region are concentrated mainly in the Kazakhstani fuel and energy complex, where almost all projects have small amounts of American capital, in other areas of the economy it is not active [5]. Washington does not want to get involved in the complex and financially costly problems of the region, primarily water and energy, preferring to watch from the outside the efforts of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia.

On the whole, the United States is the main lobbying center for the idea of creating new energy routes bypassing the Russian Federation. The White House is also active in creating various projects and schemes that provide alternative Russian outlets for Central Asian energy carriers to world markets [6]. At the same time, Washington is trying to keep the countries of the region from transiting through Iran. The United States is promoting the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, which is an alternative to the Russian Caspian route [7]. Thus, in September 2007, US State Department representative D. Sullivan managed to disrupt the meeting in Ashgabat of the presidents of Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the construction of the Caspian gas pipeline.

The problem of Iran also has a serious impact on the US economic and political strategy in the region, largely limiting Washington's capabilities in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (especially), where US interests are concentrated on assisting in the operations of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan [1].

US policy in post-Soviet Central Asia was characterized by constant change.

It can be divided into four periods:

– in the first half of the 1990's priority was given to relations with Russia, Central Asia was perceived as the "backyard" of the Russian Federation. This period coincided with the presidencies of George W. Bush Sr. and the first presidency of W. Clinton;

– in the second half of the 1990's there was an intensification of US policy in the post-Soviet space, strategic rivalry with Russia grew, but the strategic priority of the Russian Federation in Central Asia was only partially contested, the concept of the "backyard" was preserved [8]. This period coincided with the second presidential term of W. Clinton;

- after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the US strategy in the region became quite aggressive. The entry into Afghanistan caused an intensification of politics in post-Soviet Central Asia as well [9].

Rivalry with Russia (and partly with China) peaked during the "color revolutions" and Russia's war with Georgia in 2008. This period coincided with the presidency of George W. Bush;

- during the presidency of B. Obama, attempts were made to establish a dialogue with Russia and China. At the same time, the priority of the post-Soviet space, which was originally associated with European affairs, has decreased [10]. Afghan politics has gone through a drastic change from increased fighting (the start of Obama's presidency) to plans for troop withdrawals and growing awareness of the possibility of defeat.

In the future, one can predict further complication of the Afghan problems and the associated growth of US, Russian and Chinese interest in post-Soviet Central Asia. In this regard, the possibility of strengthening the contradictions of these powers in the region is growing. However, realizing that the Afghan problems pose the same threat to the West, Russia and China, the key players can agree on positive interaction. If Obama is re-elected, perhaps the chances that the Americans will look for ways to reach an agreement with other great powers will increase [2].

The United States recognizes that at the present time "forward movement is suspended" in matters of democracy; at the same time they declare their "presence" and "interaction with the governments and civil society of countries".

It is quite clear that Washington is not talking about any rejection of the traditional rhetoric about protecting human rights, strengthening the influence of civil society institutions in Central Asia and expanding religious freedoms [11]. Moreover, the Washington administration quite often expresses concern about the situation with human rights in the entire space from the Caspian Sea to the border with China.

Additionally, the problems that constantly cause American concern are related to the spread of terrorism, prison conditions and the state of the penitentiary system as a whole. Recently, especially in the light of terrorist attacks in Europe, as well as wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the United States has expressed concern about the radicalization and reproduction of crime taking place in the prisons of the Central Asian republics, which, as you know, is accompanied by many related problems [12]. These include the quality of the administration of justice, the reform of the judicial and legal and penitentiary systems, the improvement of mechanisms for amnesty, rehabilitation and resocialization of convicts, employment, etc.

Washington's intentions to build a more open society "so that people can find a constructive way out of their problems" and "are not forced to find destructive ways out for themselves" have not changed much. Nevertheless, the United States will be forced to reconsider its attitude towards the inhabitants of prisons as potential members of illegal armed groups.

The United States, for all its geopolitical might, cannot remain indifferent to the activation of other players in the region, which can be divided (given the organizational and geopolitical isolation of South and Central Asia indicated by the Americans) into "external" ones (PRC, Russia, Turkey, Iran, etc.) and "internal" (India and Pakistan).

During the years of the anti-Taliban operation in Afghanistan, the dependence of the region under consideration on large-scale eco-

nomic ties with China has increased [13]. In terms of trade volume with the five Central Asian republics, China has already surpassed Russia (even despite the increased activity of the latter). As the media emphasize, Washington has "mixed" feelings about this and is showing ever more keen attention to issues related to the principles of Chinese investment and its clearly different from Western economic and legal standards, the attitude towards the local (non-Chinese) labor force, quality of projects, etc. As for the Chinese-led SCO, it continues to be a loose structure with a low level of cohesion, and its effectiveness leaves much to be desired.

Washington has many questions about the decision to create the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and more than a dozen other, less influential financial structures. Calling the investments of the key countries of this bank (in particular, the PRC) "very useful for the countries of the region", the United States nevertheless publicly expresses concern about its internal rules, methods of making managerial decisions, the role of the Board of Directors, standards in the field of labor rights, environmental protection environment, protection of intellectual property, etc. Such fears of the United States are based on the experience of their participation in the creation and support of the standards of the largest international financial institutions that have been operating for decades.

However, given Beijing's caution with regard to propaganda actions, the emergence of "permanent concern" in Washington in connection with the creation of the AIIB can be considered unlikely.

Another scenario involves the build-up of US resources, as well as the liberalization of the principles and vectors of activities of pro-Western financial institutions [14]. Any forms of cooperation between these institutions and the AIIB (up to the participation of key US allies in this structure), the creation of new Asian banking "clones", the interaction of creditors, etc. are also acceptable.

It is hard to disagree with one of the authors that the Central Asian republics do not trust the PRC in the field of border security, and economic relations with this power are considered as unequal. In addition, many among the Central Asian intelligentsia believe that the PRC leadership has a wrong approach to assessing the Uyghur problem, and in the near future this may cause instability on the eastern borders of the Central Asian region.

It should be noted that rivalry for partnership with China and the struggle for control over trade and transit routes to and from China has intensified among the neighboring countries in Central Asia.

Recognizing the particular vulnerability of its western borders due to their great length, weak fortifications, the unpredictability of the actions of other powers, the dubious loyalty of the indigenous Muslim population, etc., Beijing relies on maintaining stability outside the country [15].

China needs neighboring countries with peaceful, predictable and secular regimes. However, at present, the CA countries are considered by the political formation circles of the PRC as breeding grounds for Islamic radicals. Beijing is also unhappy that they express sympathy for the separatist forces in Xinjiang and consider them vulnerable to manipulation by other great powers.

If we follow the logic of the most conservative part of the Washington establishment,

then in order to counter Beijing and realize the national interests of the United States in the region under consideration, it is necessary to provide the United States with asymmetric economic advantages, sign new agreements on trade preferences (which exclude China from receiving them), and prevent China from acquiring advanced military technologies, build up the potential of US allies on the periphery of China, increase the combat capability of the US Armed Forces in Central Asia, etc. [16].

According to well-known analysts, at present the presence of the PRC in Central Asia is not a threat to American interests. Nevertheless, the expansion of Beijing's influence in Central and South Asia may have serious consequences for these interests. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that "abroad, Washington is faced with a wide range of complex security problems, and at home - with severe financial restrictions on military spending" [3].

China is currently the world's second largest consumer of energy after the United States. The PRC has not met its needs with domestic resources since 1994, and by 2015 it will import 50% of its energy consumption. For these reasons, the import of hydrocarbons lies at the center of Beijing's economic interests in the Central Asian republics, and a number of economic projects of the Celestial Empire in the region, for example, the Kazakh-Chinese Atasu-Alashankou pipeline, are aimed at solving the problems of supplying the PRC's domestic market with energy.

The second economic interest of the PRC in the region is its transformation into a market for Chinese goods, especially those produced in its western, relatively undeveloped

and poor part [17]. Today, China's trade with the Central Asian countries is only a small share of its foreign trade, but it is growing, including not only raw materials, but also engineering products, electronics and other high-tech products. Chinese investments in the countries of the region (with the exception of the energy sector) are relatively small, concentrated in the textile, mining and food industries. China is gradually addressing some of these problems by connecting its rail network to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan [18]. And at the political level, he is trying to influence the authorities of the states of the region in order to create a safer and more attractive climate for his investments.

Conclusion

The long-term economic goal of the PRC in the region is its transformation into a free market, more precisely, into a source of raw materials for the Chinese economy and a market for Chinese goods [1].

With the collapse of the Arab East (spring revolutions), the traditional corridors for delivering oil and gas from the Middle East to China, the world's largest consumer, are becoming increasingly dangerous and unstable. Under these conditions, the role and cost of safe land-based energy corridors from Central Asia and Russia to China increases sharply. The commissioning (2009) of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas transport pipeline changed the strategic priorities of the Central Asian (CA) countries – gas exporters. Over the year and a half of the operation of the pipeline, Turkmenistan has exported more than 10 billion m3 of natural gas to China, including more than 5.7 billion cubic meters in the first five months of 2011 alone [4].

All the Central Asian republics pursue a generally balanced foreign policy; while they take into account the interests of Russia, the United States and other centers of power. The Central Asian capitals are based on the still existing common desire of Moscow and Washington to cease the activities of radical extremists and to terminate drug production and trafficking, as well as their unanimity in their approaches to solving many pressing issues of international security (all this in modern language is called the principle of compartmentalization, according to which allows active confrontation of states on some issues and productive cooperation on others). It seems that in the future it is this unanimity that will be able to ensure the strengthening of the regional security system, which will meet the national interests of all the states involved in Central Asia [5].

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