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AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract. The article considers the challenges and threats to security in Central Asia, it states that one of the external threats is the situation in Afghanistan. Three levels of the real threats are considered – an internal political situation, activation of the fighters in border regions and drug trafficking.

Key words: *Afghanistan, regional security, Central Asia, Taliban.*

АУҒАНСТАН ЖӘНЕ АЙМАҚТЫҚ ҚАУІПСІЗДІК МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ

Светлана Кожирова

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Орталық Азия қауіпсіздігіне төнген сын-қатерлер мәселелері, оның ішінде сыртқы қатерлердің бірі ретінде Ауғанстандағы жағдай қарастырылған. Нақты қауіп-қатердің үш деңгейі – ішкі саяси жағдай, шекаралық аймақтардағы содырлардың белсенділігі және есірткі тасымалы талдауға алынған.

Түйін сөздер: *Ауғанстан, аймақтық қауіпсіздік, Орталық Азия, Талибан.*

АФГАНИСТАН И ПРОБЛЕМЫ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

Светлана Кожирова

Аннотация. В статье рассматриваются вызовы и угрозы безопасности в Центральной Азии, отмечается, что одной из внешних угроз является ситуация в Афганистане. Рассматриваются три уровня реальных угроз – внутривнутриполитическая ситуация, активизация боевиков в приграничных регионах и наркотрафик.

Ключевые слова: *Афганистан, региональная безопасность, Центральная Азия, Талибан.*

Introduction

The new geopolitical situation in Eurasia, at the beginning of the XXI century, has changed a common attitude to as creation of defensive mechanisms against external threat, and the main instrument guaranteeing the international security - the balance of power. A realistic perception of safety came to the forefront. It has, first of all, guarding character: safety is considered as not threatening state. There was a need to refuse traditional definition for idea of safety by its contrast – idea of threat. The understanding of safety on the basis of idea for international cooperation, based on universal values and interests, as well as the concepts of collective, cooperative security have been developed. Quite wide recognition among political scientists was gained by paradox: the bipolar world was characterized by high level of military threat and high level of stability at the same time, while the post-bipolar world differs in the low level of military threat, but also low level of stability. Among military threats, the local conflicts of interstate and inside state character came to the forefront instead of a threat of global war. There is a real threat of the conflict between members of world political process concerning the ways of settlement in the local conflict. Increasing prominence of non-military threats to security becomes new in the modern world: activation of the international terrorism, erasing purely national specifics and demanding the adequate international response, and a drug traffic problem.

New challenges and threats, projecting the negative influence from the Afghanistan territory, undermining existing safety limits, appear in the system of regional security. The crisis factor connected with the forced dynamics of development within confrontational lines between the USA and the Russian Federation is manifested in the region. It has got the prospect for interblock opposition reviving represented by promptly developing union of Russia, China and India against the United States of America and the Western countries under their control. Continuing development of the negative tendencies proceeding from the Afghanistan

territory today represents a bright example of continuing development of a domino effect following the results of which there can be a large regional fragmentation, following the results of which, in it's turn, the terrorism and religious extremism may turn into united, consolidated military the political dominant, threatening Central Asia's security.

There are a lot of regional problems in Central Asia, as well as in any region. They are caused by the different reasons, as of internal nature, so because of the influence of those geopolitical processes which take place in the region and in the world in general.

1. Intraregional threats and challenges which partially have historical roots, and partially are generation of Post-Soviet era.

Firstly, there is a failure to address boundary and territorial problems between the states of the region (first of all, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).

Secondly, there is a hydro-electric problem between the states of the region threatening with emergence of the serious conflict between them. In any case, the state have already divided into two conflicting camps on this matter – on the one hand, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the other – Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with water scarcity.

Thirdly, there is the bared problem of delimitation in the societies of the states in the region on ethnicity and clannishness. Today, the latent ethnic conflicts develop into open hostility.

Fourthly, there is the continuing determination of the state leaders in the region to play on contradictions between geopolitical "players", this fact not only washes away a basis for regional integration, but also reduces the level of regional security, making behavior of the partners to be unpredictable and multiplying a level of mistrust to them.

Fifthly, there is an increasing influence of political Islam in Central Asia. Though increased level of religiousness of the population in the region is an objective trend, an increased num-

ber of followers of Islamic flows, not widely spread in the region earlier, attracts attention.

2. Threats of external character are connected to a 'Big great Game', which is conducted in Central Asia and "rules of the game" having been changed in the world politics and international relations, *modification of power balance in the world in general and on the Euro-Asian space in particular*. The monopolar world with absolute domination of the USA does not exist anymore, but multipolar world does not appear either. Besides, absolutely new actors of the international relations - Multinational Corporation – have appeared, the terrorist and criminal transnational networks, professing the radical ideologies, which do not recognize rules of law and moral and ethical restrictions. Therefore the main question for today is who and how will be able to provide global power balance in modern conditions of "the non-polar world". The new international security system's formation process, in which the policy of "double standards" plays a dominating role, has become a problem, as well as the rule of force and possibility of its use bypassing UNSC [1].

The second problem is the fight for the world resources which becomes more rigid and in which even more often the armed forces act as the main argument. Moreover, even more often from a group of the developed countries there arise attempts of solving the internal economic problems by mainly military-political means.

In this context Central Asia isn't an exception. The main fight between "the centers of force" here is conducted for access to its resources (first of all, hydro carbonic) and the directions of their transportation to the world markets. In fact, that is exactly what defines geopolitics in Central Asia today. It will be defined with the same in the short term, too.

The third problem is the chaos in the Middle East, which has led to strengthening of radical Islamic flows, having no lack of the weapon, human resources and finances. And the most important, strengthening of pressure upon the secular modes of the region creates conditions not only for deepening of Islamization process

in North Africa and the Middle East, but also for activation of extremist groups and their exit out of the region's borders.

Central Asia is one of the objects for these extremist groups' future activity, and the prompt growth of extremism (including religiously motivated), basically in all states of the region is an argument.

Fergana Valley, uniting zones of extremist activity practically in all Central Asian states, is an accumulating epicenter for external threats in the local ground of radicalism. Fergana Valley which is territorially divided between three states has a strategic importance for criminal groups, syndicates, the terrorist and extremist organizations. Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, active propaganda activities are carried out by such destructive associations as "Hizb ut-Tahrir", "The Islamic movement of Uzbekistan", "The union of Islamic Jihad", "Tablighi jamaat", etc., activity of which has direct impact on deterioration of the situation in Central Asia.

The fourth are the threats and challenges emanating from Afghanistan. There are three real threats being recognized.

Firstly, inability of the Afghan national forces to ensure safety in the country and prospect of a further aggravation of a military-political situation (most likely, it is possible to predict emergence of civil war on an ethnic basis).

Secondly, activation of not numerous, but real terrorist groups which are based now in the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan – Uzbek, Uygur, Chechen, Kyrgyz, Tajik, etc., having the homeland of the origin in Russia and the states of Central Asia, and their inevitable replacement on the territory of Russia and the states of Central Asia with transfer of military operations activity to the North of Afghanistan.

Thirdly, an unsolved problem with drug trafficking from Afghanistan; existence of the criminal groups connected with this drug trafficking in the states of Central Asia and in Russia, which consist of representatives of power bodies and partially politicians, and, above all, growth of number of drug addicts practically in all countries of the region.

The problems of Afghanistan, in the context of the permanent risks and threats, emanating from its territory, for the world community, have been quite widely and closely observed by the international experts and researchers. The Kazakhstan historiography of a problem is presented generally by S. Akimbekov's works, with detailed complex analysis of each segment of the Afghan statehood: political environment of the country and its subsequent influence on the course of the conflict processes; maintenance of the ethnic political balance, necessary for leveling the opportunities of geopolitical fragmentation in the country, the issues of civil opposition within the country, its prerequisites and the reasons which turned the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan into one of the most conflict knots of modern times. There are articles of such Kazakhstan scientists as K. Syroyezhkin and M. Laumullin, devoted to a problem of strengthening of regional security in the context of influence by development of a situational environment in Afghanistan, and also to the questions of political settlement in Afghanistan.

The Russian historiography of the problem is presented by works of such famous orientologists as V. Korgun, N. Plastun, M. Arunov, A. Knyazev and some others. In his works and articles, V. Korgun gives the developed characteristic of existing complex of inside and foreign policy problems of the country, the attention is focused to development of bilateral prospects of the relations between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Russian Federation, prospects of post-Taliban Afghanistan, possible development of a situational environment after withdrawal of forces of MSSB from the region.

N. Plastun is focused, generally, on a perspective of military political prospects of Afghanistan, considering the country as the reference regional point for the international relations in a foreshortening of cooperation of IRA with NATO, the USA, having impact on a situation in the Central Asian region. A. Knyazev's works consider questions of civil opposition

in Afghanistan, restoring casual chain, which destabilized IRA in the middle of the 1990s, threats of the drug trafficking emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and experience of fight against it, as at the internal level in Afghanistan, so the efforts made by the international community led by the UN.

Methodology

The cornerstone of this research is the theory of "securitization", developed by the specialists of the Copenhagen school, in particular, B. Buzan. In the context of the studied problem, the above mentioned theory allowed realization of the "safety" phenomenon complexity, as well as examination of interrelations between various levels and sectors of regional security, in order to understand its essence and, on this basis, identify the possible directions for formation and development of the corresponding cooperation between the states.

Regional stability and safety depend on the level of regional subjects' interdependence, since the people connected by united cultural traditions and customs, and the structures, united by economic and productive space, are not interested in destabilization of a situation in the neighboring state, as in the modern globalized world it will lead to negative consequences in all region. Nevertheless, a single aspiration to mutual aid is not enough, as there is a need for development of effective and acceptable for all forms and methods regulation of the relations in the sphere of counteraction to some threat or another.

Methods of content analysis helped to define the general structure and problems of the research, to allocate a complex of the practical problems influencing an internal and regional situation, to learn the points of view from religious and oppositional leaders about the future of IRA as the competent subject of the international relations and geopolitical reality. The research implemented the methods of event analysis, which allowed structuration of situational environment.

The results of the research:

1. Internal political situation in Afghanistan

The history of Afghanistan made the next turn with Presidential elections of 2014. But, obviously, the changes in domestic policy of the country, as well as in that large-scale geopolitical opposition, which happens round Afghanistan today, are far beyond the last. During elections, the main issue was not resolved - the Western coalition did not manage to create effectively working democratic system [2]. Each elections lead to political tension and create impasses which then the international community needs to solve with enormous efforts. Though the government is formed, an absence of consent between the President and the Executive Chairman on the main issues of foreign and domestic policy, preservation of contradictions between them, carries out to tightening of terms in solving many problems, vital for the country and society. Naturally, it causes discontent among the population and part of political elite in Afghanistan. For example, Omar Daudzai, the former Minister of Interior Affairs, declared that the present government quite often was called "two-headed", that testified to still not overcome political crisis. "The big mistake of National unity government consisted in politicization of law enforcement agencies, division of the ministries between two blocks and division of the authorities into two parties - heads and deputies", - O. Daudzai declared. He also expressed his concern about the fact that according to earlier adopted agreements, within a year the government will manage to call national meeting (Loya Jirga) for modification of the constitution and transformation of the head of executive powers post to the prime minister's position [3].

Turned out to be a consequence of rough military political events of the 1970s – the beginnings of the 2000s, fragmentation of government institutions of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has aggravated specific feature of Afghan social and political structure: constant strive of regions and ethnic communities to the

maximum independence from the central power located in Kabul. The settled environment of breeding communications by the beginning of the twenty first century was completely destroyed.

Within the long civil conflict in IRA, a set the Pushtun leaders and local field commanders preferred full independence within own tribe or the district to the fight for the united Afghan state. In this sense, many Pushtun tribes actually solidarized with ethnic minorities in the fight for local interests, in contrast to state interests. Even during the constitutional Loya Jirga, in December, 2003 – January, 2004, it was obvious that leaders of all main ethnic political forces and groups in the majority are supporters of the opinion that regional interests have to prevail over attempts for creation of a certain pan-Afghan identity. The country remains arranged by the principle of tanzim, the simple set of military political groups under nominal control of the central government. This basis of traditional statehood, as S. Olimova, the famous Tajik researcher, noted on one of the conferences, it is possible to explain both durability, and stability of the Afghan regionalism, which basis at the level of mentality is the regional self-identification, as one of the parts of personal identity, subject to possibility of practical changes only in case of large historical shocks. Administrative division into districts in Afghanistan never coincided with ethnic moving, as its basis consisted of natural and geographical factors, land use types, the markets and communications, but not ethnic territories. Today, the central government in Kabul controls only Kabul and a number of areas in Kabul province. The provincial administrations, appointed by Kabul government, have not got sufficient will for implementation of their decisions. The situational environment is aggravated with the fact that real regional leaders are discharged from power levers.

Firstly, for the years of civil opposition many local ethnic leaders, including influential Mujahideen field commanders, have got powerful authority on the breeding environment on places, having created on this basis pseudo state

associations with high degree of autonomy, and secondly, Kabul's appointees have no real levers on a situation at the local level, in addition, being perceived not always positively by local population. The leaders, who were brought up from structure of the formalized government institutions, become potential opponents of the government, continuing to take their place in social hierarchy and, thus, having all necessary possibilities of influence on the situation. Therefore, any elections are connected not with the competition of ideologies, and with opposition of communities. Communities are the main subject of political process in Afghanistan. It has been a consequence of the internal political conflicts and foreign intervention for four decades [2].

Afghanistan is a multiethnic state. Domination of Pushtun ethnos was always one of its features in internal political development. However, during the civil war, ethno-national identity of non-Pushtun ethnic groups gained prompt development; military-political associations were created, in which this or that ethnic group dominated. The most important - these groups are armed and full of determination to protect their interests. In other words, in new historical realities, no one of the ethnic groups can dominate, as earlier, in a political field of Afghanistan, and monopolize the political power. Proceeding from the complicated interethnic relations, the accounting of interests of ethnic groups in the government, gets the great value, its structure is the following: the President who is at the same time the Prime Minister and two of his deputies; the Executive Chairman with two deputies; 25 ministers; two heads (equated to a rank of ministers), two independent departments - Senior department of national security and National bank of Afghanistan. Totally there are 33 persons.

A. Gani, the President of Afghanistan, is Pushtun, his first deputy - Uzbek, the second - Hazara. A. Abdullah, the Executive Chairman, is on mother Tajik, and on father Pushtun, his first deputy - Pushtun, the second - Hazara. Thus, in a higher level, the Tajiks, making the

second by population ethnos of Afghanistan, aren't presented at all.

Ethnic composition of the ministers: Pushuns - 11, Tajiks - 6, Hazaras - 5 (3 Hazaras and 2 Sodots, who are also ranked as Hazaras), Uzbeks - 3, Turkmens - 1. The Panjshir wing of Islamic society in Afghanistan was most dissatisfied with the structure of the government. Indeed, for 14 years, which have passed after overthrow of "Taliban", Panjshir people were not only for the first time completely detached from the management in the ministries of the power block, but their share in the government structure became minimal. According to some information, on this basis the disagreements among Panjshir elite had been raised, which culminated in a protest against A. Abdullah and M. Nur, who were allegedly involved in it [4].

Figures testify that if consider a percentage ratio to population, so it turns out that Tajiks are less presented, too. Though, it should be noted that the ethnic structure of the population of Afghanistan is precisely unknown. The first and last time population census was carried out in 1979, however, figures on ethnic structure of the population were not published. As per some information, the number of Pushtuns, according to census, made 35%, and Tajiks - 33%. These figures were not equitable to the interests of Afghanistan management of that time, therefore, they were not published. Many ethnic groups, such as Pashai, Beluji, Nuristans and others, are not presented in the government.

For the first time in the last four decades, all power ministries are under control of one ethnic group - Pushtuns. Though, it should be noted that the candidacy of the Minister of Interior Affairs (Pushtun) was proposed by A. Abdullah, since N. Ulumi, in the political plan, is in his team.

In general, ethnic Tajiks are most dissatisfied with the structure of the government. Perhaps, not so much because of smaller quantity of ministerial portfolios, as because they, for the first time in years after overthrow of "Taliban", are not presented in a higher echelons of power (though, politically, A. Abdullah repre-

sents Tajiks, however, some part of the Tajik elite, nevertheless, ranks him as Pushtun). At the beginning of February, 2015, formation of pan-Afghan union of Tajiks' solidarity, headed by Latif Pedram, the deputy of the Parliament and leader of the National Congress of Afghanistan became a reaction to such situation. He and his supporters are convinced that the rights of Tajiks in the government of "national unity" has been infringed.

Now the situation in Afghanistan is characterized as the extremely intense, unstable, and the prospects of its cardinal improvement are not visible. According to the local deputies, representing various regions of the country, in a number of provinces, authorities really control no more than 20 percent of the territory. Fighters of the armed opposition by large forces even more often enter direct clashes with government troops, seizing the whole districts; intensify acts of terrorism in large administrative centers, including Kabul, using improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. According to official Afghan sources, today, in 20 out of 34 provinces of the country the situation is close to the critical [5].

Since the moment of Taliban overthrow in 2001, politicians and experts have been constantly specified that the main problem of Afghanistan is low level of living and welfares among the Afghan citizens, this is an exact reason of internal instability. Afghanistan continues to remain economically and socially undeveloped country with a huge number of people affected by a poverty problem. According to the World Bank, 36% of Afghans live in poverty, but in reality the figure can be even higher, since there are no reliable data on households. By calculations of the government of Afghanistan itself, 42% of the population live below the poverty line and 20% balance on the edge of poverty. As noted by USAID, the highest level of poverty (55–75% of the population) is in Badakhshan, Kunar, Balkh and Paktika provinces. The situation is not better in Helmand province, where Taliban acts especially actively. The difficult situation develops, first of all, in the rural

zone, where 79% of the country population of the country lives. About 45% of villagers and nomads live below a poverty line, in the cities this indicator is 27%.

The Afghan economy strongly depends on external donors. For example, in 2009–2010 (the beginning of the Afghan financial year starts in March), external sources' share was up to 70.73% (2.35 billion dollars) for an account part of the budget; only 29.27% (0.973 billion dollars) were shared for the internal income. In the budget of 2014–2015, i.e. 4 years later, the ratio between the external help and the internal income had changed very little. If the general size of the approved budget is 7.794 billion dollars (100%), external help is 5.311 billion dollars (nearly 71%), and only 2.483 billion dollars (29%) constitute the internal income. But at the same time analysts note that internal budget revenues increased in currency measurement by 2.5 times in 5 years.

Except preserving high dependence on external donors, a weak link of the Afghan economy is an urgent need to increase expenses on safety in view of activation of the Taliban movement and transfer of the tasks on ensuring internal stability from the Western contingents to the Afghan security forces. Thus, in the budget of 2013, for financing of power structures and civil tasks there were allocated 1,91 and 1,48 billion dollars respectively, in 2014 – 2,99 and 1,86 billion dollars. In the budget of 2015, a gap between expenses on safety continued to expand – 3,257 billion dollars, and the civil purposes – 1,65 billion dollars (calculation was made at the rate of Afghani to dollars – 57,79:1). Reduction of expenses on non-military spheres and programs financing constituted 12%. Reduction of external dotation due to diminished interest of the West to this country, reformatting of the strategic line by the latter, can become one more probable risk for the Afghan economy [6].

2. Formation of the modern armed forces of Afghanistan began in 2002 after the collapse of the Taliban regime. This process went extremely slowly because of lost army traditions during the Civil War of 1992–2001, when the political vac-

uum was filled by own armed groups of various political forces participating in the conflict. Initially these forming were given the status of the army corpuses, having the registered territorial status. In total, there were 8 corpuses, 6 of which were formed on the basis of "Northern alliance".

In 2002–2003, with the participation of foreign militaries in Afghanistan, the process of disarmament began for the non-governmental armed groups and forming of regular armed forces. Originally, this process went extremely not easy, in 2003 total payroll number of the Afghan army made less than 6000 people, and police forming were practically absent.

By the beginning of 2015, payroll number of the Afghan National Army (ANA) reached 178 thousand people, the number of police forming – more than 150 thousand people. Groups of local police (about 28 thousand people) or the groups of the local armed self-defense, which received the official status, are also among power structures. There is one more interesting detail – a national structure of ANA. According to information from the experts, most of the military personnel of ANA are representatives of the northern people of Afghanistan, over 35% – Tajiks, less than 10% – Uzbeks, slightly higher than 10% – Hazaras, about 5% – Turk-mens, Aimaks and other nationalities. Pushtuns' share is no more than 40%, though traditionally the army of Afghanistan generally consisted of Pushtuns. According to unofficial data, there are mainly ethnic Pushtuns among commanders of crews and higher.

By this moment, ANA has refused a divisional link of subordination and has the following structure: *toli* (company) – *kandak* (battalion) – brigade – corpus. In total there are 7 corpuses in the Afghan army:

201 corpus "Spill" (Kabul), responsible for safety of the Afghan capital and southeast provinces (is considered as the most prepared and efficient division);

203 corpus "Thunder" (Gardez), acting in the territory of regional command (the military district) "Gardez", including the provinces of Host, Paktik, Ghazni;

205 corpus "Hero" (Kandahar), zone of responsibility, includes provinces Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan;

207 corpus "Victory" (Herat), Provinces of Herat and Farah;

209 corpus "Falcon" (Mazar-i-Sharif);

215 corpus (Lashkar-gah).

Each corpus includes at least 3 general brigades, a battalion of a special purpose, a staff battalion, and also divisions of logistics and supports of the corpus.

The number of armed forces of Afghanistan is big enough in comparison with the states, close on population; it is explained by necessity of conducting the fights against terrorist groups within the country.

In the current conditions the state has no sufficient own means for financing the army divisions, therefore, the significant role in the Afghan military construction is played by foreign financial aid. Besides, IRA army is dependent on import deliveries of different types of arms, equipment, and also fuels and gasoline, which are not produced within the country in necessary amounts. These circumstances make armed forces vulnerable in case of changes in foreign policy environment, therefore, Afghanistan is facing a task of increasing the independence of own armed forces from external support.

The modern Afghan army refused the violent mobilization, which existed earlier, the military personnel serves on a contractual basis. The first some weeks of service the staff is trained in army training centers, mainly in the Kabul region, then training process continues in military units, including with the assistance of foreign instructors.

In the conditions of non-conventional military operations against mobile groups of the opponent, the special role in ANA is played by divisions of a special purpose ("commandos"). The group of Special Operations, created in 2011, includes 3-4 brigades. Its center, the Murikhed base, is in the Vardak province. The number of divisions, by 2012, consisted of about 1000-1500 people [7].

3. Infiltration of the fighters from Afghanistan into the countries of CAR

The main threat for the countries of the Central Asian region is the continuing tendency of infiltration by insurgents from separate terrorist forming to the north of Afghanistan, which is safer for them. Their greatest activity is noted in the near Tajik border territory of the Kunduz province, where, according to operational data, from 300 to 1000 fighters of the Taliban are concentrated, whose task is to establish a control over the strategic areas and highways, connecting the north to the central region of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Additional intensity is created by the statements of Taliban leaders about their readiness "to declare" the armed jihad to the foreign, including Central Asian, governments, cooperating with "occupational" forces of NATO.

In this regard the Taliban management undertakes measures for consolidation and coordination of various combat groups, operating in the north of Afghanistan for activation of terrorism in close to Tajik border districts. The fact that their structure consists of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uyghurs, Turkmens, Chechens and other nationalities, including citizens of RK, the majority of which had diversionary training in Pakistan, is a cause for concern.

Three sites on the Afghan-Tajik border (the province Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz) were used for transportation of the fighters. Actually, for today, there are two centers of the increased concentration of extremists. One of such bases is in provinces Badakhshan and Kunduz, another – in provinces Badkhis and Faryab. Thus, in comparison with the last years, there is a degradation of situation in northern provinces of IRA, where now there are more than 600 groups of fighters with a total number about 8 thousand people. They consolidate in the territories and in the settlements bordering Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Seven organizations from natives of Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan work in Afghanistan. According to N. Mendkovich, the expert of the Modern Afghanistan Research Center and the Russian Council on the

international affairs, such organizations as IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), which was renamed into Islamic movement of Turkestan, the Union Islamic Jihad, Jund al-Khilafah, The Caucasus Emirate, Jamaat Bulgar, Jundullah and Ansar al-Aseer, act in the northern provinces. "They are engaged in promotion, urging local youth to be at war on the party of Taliban", – he told.

The expert noted that government forces ensure the safety in large cities and on the highways, and provinces are completely controlled by the fighters. "The pro-government armed groups created by field commanders also work in the country. They support the current authority and assist in establishing security", – Nikita Mendkovich added.

At the end of the 2000s – the beginning of the 2010s, a rise of extremism was noted in Central Asia: acts of terrorism and their preparation were commonly everywhere, including one of the most stable and solvent states of the region – Kazakhstan. The group of young fighters from this republic, among whom there were Rinat Habidolla, Urynbasar Munatov and Damir Znaliyev, declared creation of the Jund al-Khilafah organization ("Soldiers of the Caliphate", also known as "The Kazakh Islamic Jihad"). Units of several dozen people appeared in their hometown Atyrau. In 2010, people from Tajikistan founded The Jamaat Ansarullah organization which was headed by the famous radical Abdullo Rakhimov. A number of actions against the authorities of the Republic were carried out by its forces; in particular, the fighters bear responsibility for explosion in Khujand. The fighters – coming from Russia, were traditionally united by The Jamaat Bulgar group, also known as "Uyghur-Bulgar Jamaat", responsible for a number of terrorist acts in Tatarstan. Today, the practice of "export of terrorism" was adopted even by conservative IMT. In 2013, the Russian law enforcement agencies brought down a unit of the organization, which conducted preparation of terrorist acts in Moscow. By different estimates, the number of the fighters-foreigners constitutes from 5 to 24

thousand people in all Af-Pak. They get into a conflict zone generally through Pakistan, where formally come to for religious training [8].

People from the countries of Central Asia and the North Caucasus have their base in Mirali (the center of the Northern Vaziristan) - the territory, uncontrollable by the government of Pakistan. The Northern Vaziristan is known by the fact, that there are more than 20 thousand madrasahs in one small province. This place is a concentration of a certain Islamic resistance spirit. Nationals from the CIS countries, by the most often given estimates, about four thousand, all are well trained, armed and ideologically grounded. Last year, a part of them moved to the north, to the province Taloqan, which is closer to Tajikistan. There are similar groups in Kunduz and in the Afghan Badakhshan. The considerable ethnic group is concentrated in provinces Faryab, Badgis and Jowzjan – on the border with Turkmenistan.

If in Kunduz, Taloqan and Badakhshan there are only a strategic overhang and threats to the borders, in Faryab, within the current year, there were frequent clashes on border with Turkmenistan. All this reminds probing of border and search for the most convenient directions for more serious blows - the region gives the groups of Islamists the chance to attack the territory of Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan for the first time in the 1990s and 2000s appears under blow.

Drug situation in Central Asian region

One more problem for Afghanistan is drug trafficking. Distribution of terrorism and drug trafficking in the Central Asian region is in close interrelation, as drug trafficking is one of the main sources for financing the terrorist organizations. For example, by estimates of the world experts in the field of drug trafficking control, production of a raw opium in Afghanistan, since 2001 to the present days, grew up by 44 times. Organized crime groups consider a drug trafficking as a high-profit business with small risk. The drug trade volume in Central Asia is estimated at 350-400 mln dollars a year,

thus opium is also accepted as an exchange currency for the weapon.

In this connection, due to geographical arrangement, "weak" border control and inefficient law enforcement agencies, the countries of CAR become the main transport way for the Afghan drugs export. It should be noted that the border of Afghanistan with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is about 2600 km on the remote district. Along with the official points of the border crossing established in Afghanistan, there are about 500 illegal cross border land access routes along Afghan-Tajik border, which is 1344 km long. Currently, the volume of drug trafficking through Tajikistan is more than 100 tons per year. High level of corruption in power and law enforcement agencies of Tajikistan, which actual merging with drug structures led to transformation of the Republic into the largest transshipment facility for large drug consignments to the CIS countries and further to Europe.

Despite the absence of borders with Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan also becomes the transit country for the Afghan drugs. Opium is directly delivered to the South Kyrgyzstan or is transported by trucks from Tajikistan. Three transit networks pass through Kyrgyzstan and they become the most profitable ones for the Afghan drug dealers. All three ways pass through Tajikistan and adjoin the city of Osh. From there the traffic keeps going in the direction of Russia and Europe, and also the USA.

A certain part of the Afghan drugs passes through the territory of Turkmenistan. In many respects this route from Afghanistan is one of the most effective. Turkmenistan borders on the western part of Afghanistan, where provinces with large-scale opium production are located. Thus, it is the shortest way to the north, the Afghan northern route from the Herat province passes through it. Besides, the land relief between the western part of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan in the most part consists of the hilly desert, which is very difficult to control and rather easy to pass unnoticed.

Drug dealers in the south of Turkmenistan gain significant income, acting under protection

of a Mary clan, one of five largest clans dominating in the political sphere of the country. The state frontier between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan passes through the sparsely populated desert, where dealers can move to any place. Drug traffickers constantly change their routes, using corridors in the desert, in the southwest of Turkmenistan between the border with Iran and the Murghab River. Further, drugs pass through the territory of Kazakhstan to the north, to the Russian consumer markets.

Despite the strengthening measures over the Afghanistan border undertaken by official Tashkent, there are still channels for illegal people and smuggling transportation to the Uzbek territory.

So, according to operational data, the organized groups of ethnic Uzbeks, performing a transportation of people, weapon and drugs, operate on Uzbek-Afghan border. The specified criminal groups have accomplices among customs employees and border services of the Republic of Uzbekistan, who provide them certain assistance for financial compensation.

Transportation of drugs on the territory of Uzbekistan is performed in three main directions: 1) in the south through the Surkhan-Darya area from Tajikistan and Afghanistan; 2) in the southeast through the Samarkand and Syr-Darya areas; 3) in the northeast through Fergana Valley and the Tashkent area. Thus the next destination for a drug trafficking is the Makhtaarsky region of the Southern Kazakhstan, the area through which their transportation to Kazakhstan and Russia is performed.

Discussion on the results

The conflict in Afghanistan, in the beginnings of the XXI century, provides the multilayered phenomenon reflecting, imposing on historically existing traditional intra Afghan ethnic political collisions, the neighbors' struggle for regional hegemony and control over important geopolitical space, as well as the arising global cultural and civilization rivalry. The central axis of the conflict is seen in an attempt of part of the international community, the developed

European states, united in the military-political block of NATO, and the countries which adjoined them, to give the adequate response in Afghanistan to a transnational network of the Islamic radicalism, which threw down a terrorist challenge to the USA on September 11, 2001.

In the center of antagonism there were, on the one hand, armed forces of the international coalition (ISAF) operating under the mandate of UNSC, and on the other hand, the radical Afghan Islamists united in the Taliban movement, supported by a transnational terrorist network of the Al-Qaeda organization. The antagonism of these forces is conducted in various areas inside and outside of Afghanistan: in military-political, diplomatic, social and economic, ethnocultural, etc. The conflict in Afghanistan leads to the high number of casualties among civilians and military personnel of the coalition, to enormous financial expenses; negatively influences all international situations. Metastases of the Afghan conflict extend on neighboring states, other conflict zones in the Middle East, in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, in North Africa, in the countries of "the Islamic world" infected with radical Islamism. The conflict prevention in the Central Asian states is extremely important and complicated. In each countries of the region, along with internal security strengthening, a range of measures of social and economic and humanitarian character is being set, urged to choke off the internal support for the extremists, transferred from the outside. Thus, in the process of solving this problem, in either case the key issue is the task of preventing the extremists from diverging from Afghanistan to the neighboring countries. Emergence of the fighters and extremists who passed Afghanistan, Iraq and, Syria in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan or other states, certainly, may be negatively reflected in internal political stability of the countries in of the region.

People from the CSTO countries are getting ready to return to their home countries after training by "The Islamic state" fighters in Afghanistan, they can begin activities for desta-

bilization of a situation in the states, Nikolay Bordyuzha, the Secretary General of the CSTO, said in interview to IIA Russia Today at the end of October, 2015. "We have information that there are already some armed groups from our states in the territory of Afghanistan, who simply wait for command to start active work on destabilization of a situation in our countries", – Bordyuzha declared. "The Islamic state" is already a serious problem for Central Asia. Consolidation of forces among people from Central Asia - fighters in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq contributes to it. Many analysts in CA tend to consider that the threat for regional security will increase. Thus, certainly, the main conflict factors in CA have internal nature, and external impact can serve only as the catalyst.

Now there is a situation of theoretical possibility for reproduction of so-called "ISIS model" by extremist groups in Central Asia – namely, a resolute throw from the territory of Afghanistan to the neighboring republics for creation of the

caliphate in the region and capture of oil and gas resources.

Some western authors believe that mass media inflate a terrorism problem for the political reasons. Local experts, on the contrary, estimate activities of such organizations as considerable threat. Terrorist groups participate in drug trafficking, try to create a network in the countries of Central Asia, in recent years, there is even information on a throw of the whole terrorist groups planning acts of terrorism from the Afghan territory. So far it is early to say that the terrorist organizations of Afghanistan and Pakistan pose direct and obvious threat for the regimes of Central Asia. Practically, all states have sufficient number of security forces to fight back the direct armed aggression of the terrorist groups from the contiguous territory. However, against the background of internal problems the terrorism may turn into the additional destabilizing factor.

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ГРПТИ
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AFGHANISTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL ASIA

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Abstract. This article analyzes the situation that defines the place of Afghanistan in constructing of regional security complexes in Central Asia. Realities of the recent days show, that Central Asia states see a potential actor of insecurity in Afghanistan. The methodological basis of the research is mainly critical and geopolitical analysis. It allows to understand what is the significance of Central Asia and who is interested in providing its security. All Central Asian states are concerned about the security situation in Afghanistan. The future withdrawal of ISAF forces is seen as leading to destabilization, with negative consequences for Central Asia including the potential spillover of militant activities, the spread of radical Islamist ideas, increased drug trafficking and the possibility of a refugee crisis. Global context of the situation allows to tell about necessity of joint activity in Central Asia, Russia, China and the western countries in prevention of security threats in Eurasia.

Key words: *Afghanistan, Central Asia, Security, Central Asia, Threats, Peace*

ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯНЫҢ АЙМАҚТЫҚ ҚАУІПСІЗДІК МӘСЕЛЕСІ
ТҰРҒЫСЫНДАҒЫ АУҒАНСТАН

Таисия Мармونتова, Асма Нажиб, Айжан Серікбаева

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Орталық Азияның аймақтық қауіпсіздік жүйесін құруда жетекші орын алатын Ауғанстанның жағдайына талдау берілген. Соңғы кезеңдегі жағдайларға

орай Орталық Азия мен АҚШ Ауғанстанды тұрақсыздықтың әлеуетті факторы ретінде қарастырады. Зерттеудің әдіснамалық негізі ретінде сыни және геосаяси талдау алынған. Бұл Орталық Азияның маңыздылығын және оның қауіпсіздігін қамтамасыз етуге кімнің мүдделі екендігін түсінуге мүмкіндік береді. Ауғанстандағы жағдай Орталық Азия елдерін алаңдатып отыр. Алдағы уақытта ISAF күшінің шығарылуы Орталық Азиядағы қауіпсіздік мәселесіне кері әсерін тигізетін әскерилер қызметінің күшеюі, радикалды ислам идеясының таралуы, есірткінің заңсыз айналымының артуы, босқындарға қатысты дағдарыстың пайда болу ықтималдылығы тәрізді тұрақсыздық мүмкіндігі ретінде қарастырылады. Жағдайдың ғаламдық сипаты Еуразия қауіпсіздігіне төнген қауіп-қатерлердің алдына алуда Орталық Азия, Ресей, Қытай және Батыс елдерінің бірлесе отырып жұмыс жасау қажеттігін көрсетеді.

Түйін сөздер: *Ауғанстан, Орталық Азия, қауіпсіздік, төнген қатер, бейбітшілік.*

АФГАНИСТАН В КОНТЕКСТЕ РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫХ ПРОБЛЕМ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ

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Аннотация. Статья посвящена анализу ситуации, где Афганистан занимает ведущее место в построении региональной системы безопасности в Центральной Азии. Реалии последних дней показывают, что Центральная Азия, Штаты рассматривают Афганистан как потенциальный фактор нестабильности. Методологической основой исследования является критический и геополитический анализ. Это позволяет понять значимость Центральной Азии и кто заинтересован в обеспечении ее безопасности. Все центральноазиатские государства обеспокоены ситуацией в Афганистане. Будущий вывод сил ISAF рассматривается как возможность дестабилизации с негативными последствиями для Центральной Азии, включая усиление деятельности боевиков, распространения радикальных исламистских идей, увеличение незаконного оборота наркотиков и вероятности возникновения кризисной ситуации с беженцами. Глобальный контекст ситуации позволяет говорить о необходимости активизации совместной деятельности Центральной Азии, России, Китая и стран Запада в предотвращении угроз безопасности в Евразии.

Ключевые слова: *Афганистан, Центральная Азия, безопасность, угрозы, мир.*

Introduction

All Central Asian countries are concerned about the lack of security in Afghanistan. This is a potential threat to the countries of Central Asia. The most dangerous threat is the active work of militants, the spread of Islamist organizations, the increase in illegal drug trafficking and refugee crisis related with the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force. Despite these common fears, there are many differences in the policies of Central Asian states

toward Afghanistan, and a variety of views in the region on the future of international stabilization efforts and further prospects for increasing ties and trade with Afghanistan. In order to fully understand the interconnected relationships between Afghanistan and Central Asian states, first necessary to explore the broader geopolitical context, including Central Asian states' involvement in collective security arrangements in the post-Soviet space, the importance of ethnic affinities, and the extent of each

state's vulnerability to spillovers of instability from Afghanistan

Central Asian experts consider that the reason of armed violence in Afghanistan, are the instability of the country, ethnic conflicts, the division on religious and ethnic groups and the criminalization of society. Relying on international organizations, the Central Asian countries trying to improve their relations and to cooperate in the field of security. But nevertheless, the Central Asian countries do not have the great potential for resolving the situation in Afghanistan. Also countries amplify relations in business spheres. Central Asian states have appeared over the past several years, triggered by concerns about the implications of the future withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan as well as the search for regional solutions to the problem of stabilization in the country.

Mainly, the objective of the study and analysis of the work are the risk and growth of terrorist organizations, an increase in drug trafficking, the role of the European Union, the US and Russian influence, the financial assistance to Afghanistan [1]. The security problems of Central Asia and their link with Afghanistan at the beginning of XXI century were mentioned in different works of various researchers, specializing in this region. Among American authors it is necessary to point out Martha Brill Olcott [2] and Frederic Starr, who, indicating the link of Afghanistan with the other republics of Central Asia, put forward an idea about creation of regional forum "Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development". It should be a union headed by Afghanistan, which might become a model for regional subjects on the issues of democratization and development under the supervision of USA [3].

Russian researchers such as V.V. Naumkin [4], D.B. Malysheva [5], I.D. Zvyagelskaya [6], E.M. Kuzmina, A.F. Klimenko conducted a study in order to consider specific aspects of the threat in Afghanistan, Afghanistan's economic cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, they also noted the factors of religious extrem-

ism, which can affect the Central Asian countries [7]. The war between USA and Taliban and its influence to the international situation was mentioned by the authors of collective work "International relations in Central Asia" edited by A.D. Bogaturov (International relations in Central Asia, 2011) [8]. Russian specialist on Afghanistan V.G. Korgun touches upon some aspects of the impact of the situation on the region in his book "Afghanistan at the beginning of XXI century" [9]. Among Chinese authors apart from Tzyan'zhun [10], there should be mentioned the work of Zhao Huasheng, director of the Centre of Researches on Russia and Central Asia under the Fudan university in Shanghai [11]. He regards the SCO as countering threats to security in Afghanistan. So, Murat Laumullin from Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies considers Afghanistan as a center of terrorism and drug development [12].

Research methods: The methodological basis of the research is mainly critical and geopolitical analysis. It allows to understand what the significance of Central Asia is and who is interested in providing its security. It also allows determining the role of Afghanistan in the possible destabilization of the region. Central Asia since the beginning of the XXI century attracts more attention of the main geopolitical players. Firstly, there are enormous reserves of natural resources, primarily energy resources such as oil, gas, coal, uranium, as well as hydro energy resources. Secondly, the region has an important transitional significance, because there are various communications on and off its territory, including the most important oil and gas pipeline. Apart from that this region is a joint in a way, situated at the junction of three civilization plates – Russian, Chinese and Islamic world.

Results: To understand the relationship between Afghanistan and the five Central Asian countries, it is necessary to consider some factors that are the foundation of the policy of these states. These factors include the broader geopolitical context, Central Asian states' involvement in collective security arrangements in the Post-Soviet space, the importance of ethnic af-

finities and the extent of each state's vulnerability to spillovers of instability from Afghanistan. An examination of these factors also needs to be accompanied by a summary of Central Asian states' contributions to military and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan [1].

It's necessary to pay attention to the interconnection of Afghanistan with the countries of Central Asia and evaluate their place in saving peace and security in Eurasia [13].

Dr. Kassenova analyzed the factors shaping Central Asian policies towards Afghanistan. According to her research Kazakhstan does not share a border with Afghanistan and is, therefore, less vulnerable than some of the other Central Asian states to security threats and challenges coming from Afghanistan. This, coupled with the lack of ethnic affinity between people in Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, has allowed a calmer and less biased approach to developments in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan has always been a major supporter of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty (CST) arrangements, and could be said to be reliant on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for its security needs. Nevertheless, it has sought deeper cooperation with both the USA and NATO as part of its multi-vector foreign policy.

Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgyzstan does not share a border with Afghanistan but has weak, porous borders with Tajikistan. While it is, therefore, moderately exposed to Afghanistan's security dynamics, it is not immune to external threats, as shown by the IMU's incursions into southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000. The Kyrgyz population has a negligible ethnic affinity with the Afghan population. Kyrgyzstan has participated in CST arrangements and could be characterized as being dependent on Russian military and economic assistance. It has expressed an interest in further developing its CSTO capabilities and a preference for a strategic partnership with Russia.

Tajikistan: Tajikistan shares a 1200-kilometre-long border with Afghanistan and could, therefore, be described as the Central Asian state most vulnerable to spillovers of instability from

Afghanistan. It also has the strongest ethnic affinity, with ethnic Tajiks of Afghanistan comprising more than a quarter of the population. In addition, there are significant links between Tajikistan's complex domestic politics – including the suppression of the political opposition and drug trafficking – and Afghanistan. There remain multiple connections to Afghanistan that were developed during the 1992–1997 civil war in Tajikistan, although at the level of political elites they have been weakened by growing distrust and a decline in mutual understanding in the 2000s. Overall, in addressing Afghanistan-related concerns, Tajikistan is mostly dependent on Russian military and economic assistance and interested in developing CSTO capabilities. However, like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan is trying to maintain a multi-vector foreign policy to retain autonomy and benefit from multiple assistance sources.

Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan shares a 700-kilometre-long porous border with Afghanistan. In the 1990s Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian state that refused to officially recognize any threat coming from Afghanistan. It insisted on a policy of neutrality and attempted to develop business ties with the Taliban, primarily focusing on development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. Over the past several years, Turkmenistan's sense of vulnerability to spillovers of instability from Afghanistan has increased. There has also been a certain shift away from isolationism in Turkmenistan's foreign policy and it has joined several regional cooperation frameworks, including the Istanbul Process and the Almaty Process. While there is very little affinity between Turkmens in Turkmenistan and those in Afghanistan, the Turkmen Government recently reached out to Turkmen leaders across the border.

Uzbekistan: While Uzbekistan shares a relatively short 210-kilometre-long border with Afghanistan and has considerable border protection capacities, it has also internationally publicized its concerns about security threats coming from Afghanistan. The Uzbek Govern-

ment is particularly worried by the activities of the IMU and its determination to transform Uzbekistan into an "Islamic Khalifat". The government has unsuccessfully sought to draw on CST arrangements in dealing with threats coming from Afghanistan. It has twice suspended its membership of the CSTO, in 1999 and 2012, and has also sought deeper cooperation with the USA and NATO. Although ethnic affinity between Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and those in Afghanistan is low, there are well-established ties at the level of the elites. For example, the Uzbek Government has supported General Abdul Rashid Dustum, the leader of the Uzbek community in Afghanistan. In the 1990s Uzbekistan provided assistance to Dustum and the anti-Taliban United Front (often referred to as the Northern Alliance), and at the same time made attempts to develop business relations with the Taliban by joining the TAPI project.

On the eve of the military campaign in Afghanistan, led at first by the United States and then by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the states of Central Asia had complex attitudes towards Afghanistan. On the one hand, they were concerned about the potential spillover of already existing instability from Afghanistan, which had materialized in the form of incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Tajikistan in 1999 and Kyrgyzstan in 2000. On the other hand, Turkmenistan – and, to some extent, Uzbekistan – had sought some kind of accommodation with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, attempting at the same time to gain economic benefits from the stabilization of Afghanistan and the building of a gas pipeline to South Asian markets [1, p. 3].

Being the part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), Central Asian states support NATO and US operations in Afghanistan promoting the transportation of supplies. In 2009 the USA got permission from Central Asian states to use their territories to transport non-lethal supplies [14]. That was especially actual when Pakistan blocked the southern route in November 2011 in response to NATO attacks

on Pakistani border checkpoints [15]. In this regard, three-quarters of the non-lethal surface shipments to Afghanistan were transported via the NDN in 2011 [16]. Next year, three Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – gave permission to use their territory as a transit zone for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Already in 2013, more than 80 percent of all traffic from Afghanistan carried out by these countries, and about 4 percent of all equipment was transported [17]. Kazakhstan also uses the Aktau port for NDN. Furthermore, the Central Asian countries receive part of the military equipment. In August 2012, according to the report of the General Secretary for South and Central Asia, it was decided that some military equipment have been taken out from Afghanistan may remain in Central Asia [16, p. 46]. Germany and the UK also take into account the existence of such military equipment [18]. However, in this case, the Western allies trembled about the predisposition of Central Asia countries to repressive regimes [19]. For this reason, the list of such equipment is very limited and includes such subjects as night vision goggles, trucks, mines detecting equipment and unmanned aerial vehicles that does not change the regional military balance [20]. Central Asian states have an important transit role, but none of them has a military part. In October 2010, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan will send several officers at the headquarters of ISAF in Afghanistan, but Kazakhstan's Senate rejected the relevant law, citing public opposition to sending troops in Afghanistan [21]. Its decision the Senate argued by disparity of prices and costs and also attracting undue attention of Islamic extremists versus rapprochement with US and NATO. Central Asian countries have also provided humanitarian assistance and economic and technical assistance to Afghanistan. Of the five Central Asian states, Kazakhstan is a major factor. Kazakhstan financed the construction of the school in Samangan province and hospital in Bamyan province, as well as repair work on the road between Kunduz and Talukan

[22]. It also provided grain and other foodstuffs, and allocated \$ 50 million in college scholarships for 1,000 Afghan students in 2010–2020 [23]. Uzbekistan built 11 bridges on the road between the cities of Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul, providing a continuous connection between the northern and eastern parts of the country. With the financial support of the Asian Development Bank, it also built an electric transmission line and a 75-kilometer railway line linking Termez in southern Uzbekistan to Hairatan and Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan. Uzbekistan also comes to Afghanistan fuel, construction materials, metal products, fertilizers and food [24].

As for the case of Central Asia, the region also can be defined unique in terms of their sociocultural, traditional values. At the same time the Soviet period brought more than cultural and traditional commonness for the region, called Soviet civic and political culture. The Soviet period of Central Asia is described as one of educational advancement and modernization of society in the region, which had vital significance for political system and power structure. The Soviet past inherited the region with interdependency on Russia from political, economic, education and even cultural perspective. Therefore, it is hard to discuss security challenges of Central Asia without Russian participation. The next important fact regarding regionalization in the region is connected with the role of China as well, which has increased in economic area. Avery Goldstein wrote that "China has rapidly become a key actor on the regional scene, and even if Beijing traditionally promotes bilateral relations, it is now experimenting with new regional platforms. The CA region is today understood as a driver of China's ensuring its "peaceful rise" (heping jueqi) in order to allay international concerns" [25]. Therefore, while analyzing the region, one can conclude that regional institutions of Central Asia either led by Russia or China. It shows the interdependency of Central Asian countries from China and Russia on political and economic terms.

As for the case of Central Asia, it has created regional institutions such as Shanghai Coopera-

tion Organization (SCO), Collective Security Organization (CSO) and Central Asian countries also became members of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Central Asia, this region is defined as common and unique from social cultural context. However, from political and economic perspective Central Asia region is hard to define as independent. Cultural, traditional and language commonness in Central Asia is even higher than in other regions, but current inter-state relations indicate that Central Asian states are far from regional integration. The main reason is that the region is in the middle of powerful states such as Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. The history of the region is interlinked to Russia, China, Turkey and Iran and it would be also wrong to envisage independent policy of Central Asian countries in regional scope. Moreover, Central Asian cultural, economic, political and security issues are connected with its powerful neighbours. Therefore, while analyzing regional institutions of Central Asia one can notice that regional organizations SCO, CSO and OSCE include other member states which are beyond the Central Asian region

At the same time, neither Shanghai Cooperation nor CSO includes all Central Asian countries, only Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are full-fledged members of two regional organizations. It means, both of these organizations serve as a platform only for three Central Asian countries to discuss common security challenges with China and Russia, whereas Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are left behind from regional scope. In the analysis of regional security issues in the region, one can note that all Central Asian countries acknowledge challenges such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, security threat from Afghanistan, migration flow, human trafficking, organized crime and drug trafficking are common concern of all Central Asian countries.

However, when one analyzes SCO annual meeting agendas, the security activities dominate. As far as Central Asia is bordered with Afghanistan, security issues connected with

counter-terrorism and combating drug traffic are prioritized in regional scope. In this regard, Julie Boland emphasized that, the SCO has made progress on counter narcotics issues as well, to complement its Afghanistan-focused efforts. The RATS signed a Protocol of Cooperation with the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) on September 27th, 2010 to combat drug trafficking, trans-border drug crime, and subsequent terrorist related financing [26, p. 13]. In high security issues connected with border management, counter-trafficking counter-terrorism and radicalism, SCO can be considered more operative. In the frame of SCO countries of Central Asian countries have been participating security exercises on counter-terrorism, drug trafficking which develops capacity building of member states. Importance of regional approach in the scope of SCO also derives from the NATO deployment in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. According to Stephen Aris "SCO's elites are increasingly focused on developing a regional approach to Afghanistan" [27, p. 6].

Afghanistan is not rich in large supplies of natural resources. Despite this, during the XIX - XXI centuries, the Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies in NATO dictate their own rules, using their policies and military operations. The reason for such interests in Afghanistan is in its geopolitical location between Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and China. Being on this territory of Afghanistan could easily manage and control other countries in this region. The situation in Afghanistan especially affects on Central Asia. At first, three out of five countries of Central Asia such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have the common borders with Afghanistan. Secondly, among 4 largest ethnic groups two like Tajiks and Uzbeks are the titular ethnic groups of the neighbouring countries. Thirdly, the main routs of drug trafficking from Afghanistan go through Central Asia. And fourthly, Afghanistan is a firm base to spread radical Islamism into Central Asia. Therefore any changes of the situation in Afghanistan

have a great influence on Central Asia. The role of Afghanistan is in the possible destabilization of the region.

In 2014, appears vigorous activity of TALIBAN because of the withdrawal troops and became stronger in connection with the presidential elections in Afghanistan. Only in January 2014 there were 16 violent terroristic attacks, which took the lives of 150 people, including Russian diplomat, member of UN mission on assistance to Afghanistan Vadim Nazarov. Since then the activity of militants has increased. Interrupting the presidential elections in April and in June 2014, the Taliban had planned their well-thought-out attacks for capturing cities and localities. Capturing the district of Chakhardara in 2014, the Taliban tried to create their own base in Kunduz province. At the same time, to the withdrawal of NATO troops, they have created pockets of terrorist groups with the number in thousands, where they were terrorists with Islamic organizations in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan [28]. At the beginning of March, 2015 deputy Minister of Defence of Russian Federation Anatoli Antonov stated that groups of terroristic organization IS have already appeared in Afghanistan, they start causing threats to Russia's allies on Collective Security Treaty Organization.

In October 2014, they were formally united with the ISIS. Since then, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the insurgents appear under the banner of intellectual property and attack on civilians of the village [29]. In connection with the strengthening of relations between the Islamists Asia Central heating and ISIS, the number of terrorists is increasing day by day, creating a new threat not only to neighboring countries but also for the whole region and Russia as well.

Unfortunately, the fight against the Taliban is not successful. The reason for this becomes the shortage of military bases to train Afghan security forces; they have to be trained in US military bases located in the territory of Afghanistan. Currently the US troops and their allies from 27 countries of NATO and 14 member-countries count for 13195 people, participating

in a new operation "Resolute support mission". The reasons of US troops in Afghanistan that they might be the basis to carry out any military operations. Definitely, such fortresses would become strong leverage on some neighbouring regions and countries such as Central Asia, China, Russia, India and Iran. And, finally, the bases might be the tool to control the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to India, which goes through the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan. "Turkmengas", Indian GAIL and Pakistani Inter State Gas Systems signed the agreement about this. The definitive number and status of American troops after 2014 were not agreed for a long time, as the former President of Afghanistan Khamid Karzai refused to sign an agreement, bringing forward new terms and criticizing American policy in the region [30]. Luckily, the new president of Afghanistan supported the initiative of America and has signed an agreement on deployment of American bases and NATO contingent in the territory of his country right. So, the threat to the regional security might be not only "Taliban" and other extremists groups, who have taken the withdrawal of International forces as signal to act, but also American bases that remain in Afghanistan without any clear purposes.

For the Central Asian countries, Afghanistan is considered as a potential problem in the region, but at the same time, each state wants to help Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism, to combat instability in this country. The purpose of such assistance, the countries of Central Asia see in future benefit in the economic, geopolitical spheres, in ensuring the security in the region. For example, the geopolitical tug-of-war between the Russia and the USA over control of the Manas airbase outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, illustrates geopolitical tensions in the region, while the controversies over the CASA-1000 electricity grid project demonstrate Central Asian states' own competing interests.

In addition, the advantages and limitations of the geopolitical balance between the great powers, formed the Central Asian policy towards Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has the capacity

and determination to maintain an independent foreign policy, it has pursued deeper security cooperation with the USA and suspended its membership of the CSTO. Kazakhstan has sufficient resources to allow it some room for geopolitical actions, but remains intent on nurturing established bilateral strategic partnerships and multilateral arrangements, simultaneously enhancing relations with both NATO and Russia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been trying to conduct multi-vector foreign policies but their weaknesses in terms of state capacity make them more vulnerable to pressure from Russia.

The cause of common interests and differences in the positions of the Central Asian countries is – ethnic similarities. For example, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan support Tajik and Uzbek minorities in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan do not support their ethnic Kyrgyz and Turkmen minorities. Nevertheless, all the countries of Central Asia supports the Afghan position that effectively affects the stability of the region [31].

Discussions:

Central Asian states have also put forward a number of initiatives worth exploring. For example, one or more Central Asian states could potentially host both an intra-Afghan dialogue and talks among important external players. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – as countries with fewer vested interests in Afghanistan - might be suitable hosts for such an undertaking. In particular, Kazakhstan has significant experience in organizing high - level international forums and would like to raise its profile as an emerging regional power, while Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan would be appropriate choices due to their lack of regional leadership ambitions. Turkmenistan also has an officially neutral status and sufficient financial resources to provide a convenient platform for an Afghan peace and stabilization process. All three states have good relations with Afghanistan's neighbours, including Iran and Pakistan. They are also on good terms with the USA and NATO member states. A number of other projects have been proposed, including the devel-

opment of a United Nations regional hub in Almaty, the creation of a "6+3" contact group for Afghanistan, the Bishkek initiative and an international high-level meeting on confidence building in Afghanistan. Of these proposals, the UN regional hub in Almaty is perhaps the most realistic and promising, but it is subject to a time limit and it remains to be seen whether the Kazakh Government will be able to move quickly enough to make it a reality.

For more than a decade, the importance of Central Asian states to global politics and security has been largely defined by their proximity to Afghanistan, and these states have learned to draw benefits from this proximity. Decreased interest on the part of the USA and EU member states combined with a heightened sense of vulnerability due to a potentially worsening security situation – both within Afghanistan and across the region – has the potential to create a different geopolitical reality, with a greater role for regional powers such as China, Iran and Russia. Another recent game changer is the worsening of relations between Russia and the West caused by the Crimea referendum and developments in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, which makes cooperative frameworks to support regional security difficult if not impossible. It remains to be seen how much freedom of manoeuvre in terms of security cooperation with Western states and NATO Central Asian states can retain in the future. It can be argued that the trend towards greater connectivity between Central Asia and South Asia, which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union, is growing stronger. While cooperation between Central Asian states and Afghanistan - including the use of Afghanistan as a bridge between Central and South Asia – will most likely be stalled by growing insecurity, other opportunities might emerge in the form of better relations with Iran, particularly if international sanctions against Iran are lifted. The Soviet - era isolation of Central Asian states from their traditional neighbours has been broken, and opportunities for business, educational and people-to-people links will only increase. Nevertheless, relations

between Afghanistan and the states of Central Asia will continue to be influenced by the broader geopolitical context, including Central Asian states' involvement in collective security arrangements in the post-Soviet space, the importance of ethnic affinities, and the extent of each state's vulnerability to spillovers of instability from Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether a regional response to Afghanistan - related challenges is possible, and whether such a response in the future will increase the effectiveness of Central Asian states' contributions to reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Conclusions

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, five newly independent Central Asian states emerged into global civil society. The fall of communism brought a great number of topics for research in social science area, which includes: democratization, human rights promotion, nation-building, corruption, power change in Central Asian region and others. When scholars discuss about transition period and post-soviet period of Central Asia, critics focus mostly on low progress in economic and political reforms, power structure and political system, but less attention is given to common problems of Central Asian countries and vulnerability of the region into natural and man – made disasters. For instance, all Central Asian countries have multinational society; they have territorial disputes and the same time three Central Asian countries are bordered with Afghanistan, which also represent security challenge in the region. In general context Central Asia is in the category of the most vulnerable sub-regions to natural hazards due to its geographic and climatic features, whereas the region is prone not only to earthquake, flooding, mudslides but it is also vulnerable to technological and man-made disasters. Central Asia is home to thousands of disaster prone areas and at the same time countries of the region are inherited with territorial disputes, enclaves that can turn out into interethnic conflict and other types of complex emergencies. Thus, it is equally important

to take into account vulnerability of the region for natural and man-made crisis.

So, the aggravation of the internal political situation in Afghanistan, caused by the coalition troops' withdrawal, might have destructive impact on the whole Central Asia. The possibility of Taliban victory in Afghanistan or in some provinces is getting more feasible, which increases the danger of penetration of Islamic insurgents into the republics of Central Asia. This in its turn might be a kick-start of the destructive processes that lead to the crack of state system and chaos in the region on scenario of "Arab spring". Besides, a certain pressure on the situation in the region is being made by the remained American bases and significant military contingent in Afghanistan, which from now on will not fight against Taliban. However, under agreed efforts of Russia, China and the countries of the region, who are integral parts of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Collective Security Treaty Organization, it might be possible to prevent destabilization and to provide security and stable development.

All Central Asian states are concerned about the security situation in Afghanistan. The future withdrawal of ISAF forces is seen as leading to destabilization, with negative consequences for Central Asia including the potential spillover of militant activities, the spread of radical Islamist ideas, increased drug trafficking and the likelihood of a refugee crisis. This is in contrast to the 1990s, when Turkmenistan stated that it did not perceive Afghanistan as a threat, and the other four Central Asian states could invoke their collective security treaty arrangements with Russia. The general common ground allows for regional cooperation among states, as demonstrated by the ongoing Almaty Process, which is led by the UNHCR and which seeks to coordinate efforts to manage mixed migration from Afghanistan. In addition, the Istanbul Process has focused on confidence-building measures between Afghanistan and its neighbours. The participation of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in these processes is a welcome development for regional cooperation and coordination in Central Asia.

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ГРПТИ
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RELIGIOUS INSTITUTES IN AFGHANISTAN: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract. This work presents the report on the carried-out analysis on a status and prospects of functioning and development for religious institutes in Afghanistan. The main emphasis is placed on the most demanded by Afghan society and the world community fields, such as religious education, counteraction to terrorism and extremism, toleration promotion. Statistical data, public statements from Muslim authorities, as well as interview to the officials in the Afghan government, engaged in these issues, have been attracted while preparing the material. Religion is one of little-known areas of public life in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, it has got path-breaking improvements, which generate and maintain optimism in the future of the country.

Key words: *Afghanistan, religious situation, religious institutes, madrasah, mosques*

АУҒАНСТАНДАҒЫ ДІНИ ИНСТИТУТТАР: ЖАҒДАЙЫ МЕН КЕЛЕШЕГІ

Ғабит Қонысов

Аңдатпа. Мақала Ауғанстандағы діни институттардың жағдайы, келешегі мен даму мүмкіндіктеріне жасалған талдау ретінде ұсынылып отыр. Негізгі назар Ауған қоғамы мен бүкіл әлемдік қауымдастық көңіл бөліп отырған діни білім беру, терроризм мен экстремизмге қарсы іс-қимылдар, діни төзімділікті насихаттау мәселелеріне аударылған. Мақаланы дайындау барысында статистикалық мәліметтер, беделді мұсылман тұлғалардың көпшілік алдындағы мәлімдемелері, осы мәселені зерттеумен айналысатын Ауған үкіметіндегі лауазымды тұлғалардан алынған сұхбаттар пайдаланылды. Дін саласы – Ауғанстанның қоғамдық өміріндегі аз танымал бағыттардың бірі. Соған қарамастан, бұл салада елдің келешегіне деген сенімді танытатын және қолдауды қажет ететін айтарлықтай өзгерістер орын алып отыр.

Түйін сөздер: *Ауғанстан, діни жағдай, діни институттар, медресе, мешіттер.*

РЕЛИГИОЗНЫЕ ИНСТИТУТЫ В АФГАНИСТАНЕ: СОСТОЯНИЕ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

Габит Конусов

Аннотация. Работа представляет собой отчет о проведенном анализе состояния и перспектив функционирования и развития религиозных институтов в Афганистане. Основной акцент сделан на наиболее востребованные афганским обществом и мировым сообществом сферы деятельности, как то религиозное образование, противодействие терроризму и экстремизму, пропаганда веротерпимости. При подготовке статьи привлечены статистические данные, публичные выступления мусульманских авторитетов, а также интервью с должностными лицами, занимающимися в афганском правительстве данной проблематикой. Одной из малоизвестных областей общественной жизни Афганистана является религия. Между тем в ней проглядываются серьезные подвижки, порождающие и поддерживающие оптимизм в будущем страны.

Ключевые слова: *Афганистан, религиозная ситуация, религиозные институты, медресе, мечети.*

Introduction

After overthrowing Taliban regime in Afghanistan, reform of madrasah, at the insistence of Americans, became one of the most essential and urgent tasks of the new authorities. Collin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State of that time, spoke concerning these educational institutions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The motive was accurately and clearly formulated – madrasah should not be a hotbed of intolerance and aggressive ideology any more [see e.g. 1].

After more than 10 years, it is possible to sum up some results of the reform. And if in Pakistan the reform has terminated in failure, in Afghanistan it has been carried out. And its results, comparing to other directions of the state construction, allow speaking, firstly, about new quality of religious institutes, and secondly, about the prospects of development and new challenges facing them.

Thus, it is necessary to stipulate that dismantling of the Taliban regime included judicial system, the legislation on marriage and a family, and many others, besides system of religious education. Thus the functions of religious institutes were significantly narrowed.

Methods of the research

The present analysis applies a terminology, which is inherent in theoretical (general) religious studies, where religious institutes act as "a social body" of religion [see e.g. 2 pp. 202-203]. In our case, those are: establishments and the organizations, which are engaged in the religious sermon, religious awareness and education, development and apologetics of Islam in Afghanistan.

The approach applied here differs a little from what is presented in a number of Islam studies and political researches:

Firstly, we consciously did not resort to the theory of secularization, though all actions in the sphere of the state construction can be interpreted as such. This is because during short board of Taliban, an attempt was made to reduce the state and public institutes. Meanwhile, after their overthrow, an activity of the Afghan management was directed on a reconstruction, creation and development of these institutes. For example, modern army and security forces, judicial and legislative authorities, political parties, education system, mass media, etc.

Secondly, during the analysis of a status and prospects of religious institutes, the new reli-

gious movements and groups weren't considered as such.

Thirdly, during the work, the Taliban group and other armed groups were considered as political opponents of authorities in power.

As sources this work has attracted: statistical reports of the Afghan official sources, public statements (hutba) of the most known Muslim authorities, interview to the officials from the Afghan government who are engaged in this issue.

Religious institutes in Afghanistan – status

The system of Muslim religious institutes in the country had an appearance distinctive to late medieval societies. From one side, it provided mainly transfer and reproduction of religious knowledge, functioning of legal system and the state ideology. On the other hand, it corresponded to the level of social and economic development of the country.

As it is known, an attempt of reform in this sphere was undertaken under the monarchy. Reform under the regime of the president Najibullah became the second unsuccessful attempt.

The third attempt of reform for religious institutes began with overthrow of the Taliban regime and continues to this day. The need for development of an alternative to religious extremism became the main incentive motive. The concept of "moderate Islam" acted in that capacity. And the reformed religious institutes in this case act as its direct conductors and popularizers.

Three of the most significant of its components can be distinguished:

First, legal proceedings were fully withdrawn from the clergymen reference. The Af-

ghan leadership accurately and consistently defends state's monopoly for implementation of justice in all territory of the country. These norms are stated in the legislation, are carried out in the capital, the provincial centers and regions of the country under control to the central government. And messages on extrajudicial punishments arrive from the remote points. The success of this part of reform can be referred to the fact that the actual Afghan legislation, though, is far from the best world samples, nevertheless, with accounting of Islamic and actually Afghan legal culture and legal consciousness, meet the requirements of the Afghan society.

The next component is a reform of madrasah. From the very beginning with the full support of the foreign states which had bound themselves to pay the expenses in the social sphere of Afghanistan, the most part of the existing madrasahs passed under control of the state. This allowed pressing problems of logistics to be solved, and financial situation of teachers of madrasahs to be improved.

Curriculum change with obligatory inclusion of secular subjects became a matter of principles for the sponsors of madrasah reform. As reported by the Afghan sources and confirmed by western ones, today the ratio of secular and religious disciplines makes 40% to 60%, in favor of the religious [3, p. 12]. At the same time, there are English, computer literacy and some other subjects among secular disciplines, which madrasahs would not be able to teach without external support.

837 madrasahs with 295203 pupils and 7396 teachers clearly indicate that Afghans send their children to these madrasahs, but not to educational institutions which raise doubts in their reliability [4, p. 5], [see fig. 1 and 2].

Figure 1

جدول ۴-۲۶: تعلیمات دینی

جدول ۴-۲۶: دینی زده کړي

Table 4-26 : Religious Education

Indicator	Unit	1394 2015-16	1393 2014-15	1392 2013-14	واحدونه د مقیاس واحد	شاخص
Islamic Education Memorize of Quran	Number	874	837	779	باب	مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی و دار الحفظ ها / د اسلامی زده کړو مدرسو او دار الحفظونه
- Islamic Schools	Number	711	681	634	باب	- مدارس اسلامی / اسلامی مدرسو
- Memorize of Quran	Number	163	156	145	باب	- دار الحفظ ها / دار الحفظونه
Islamic Education & Memorize of Quran Students	Students	308574	295203	255041	شاگرد زده کوونکي	شاگردان مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی و دار الحفظ ها / د اسلامی مدرسو او دار الحفظونو زده کوونکي
- Islamic Education Schools Students	Students	247867	230548	207277	شاگرد زده کوونکي	- شاگردان مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی / - د اسلامی مدرسو زده کوونکي
- Memorize of Quran Students	Students	60707	64655	47764	شاگرد زده کوونکي	- شاگردان دار الحفظ ها / د دار الحفظونو زده کوونکي
Islamic Education & Memorize of Quran New Students	Students	138310	60981	53053	شاگرد زده کوونکي	جدیدالشمولان مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی و دار الحفظ ها / په اسلامی مدرسو او دار الحفظونو کې نوي شامل شوي زده کوونکي
- Islamic Education Schools New Students	Students	109624	51002	42353	شاگرد زده کوونکي	- جدیدالشمولان مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی / - په اسلامی مدرسو کې نوي شامل شوي
- Memorize of Quran Schools New Students	Students	28686	9979	10700	شاگرد زده کوونکي	- جدیدالشمولان دار الحفظ ها / په دار الحفظونو کې نوي شامل شوي
Islamic Education & Memorize of Quran Graduates	Students	7879	6733	6293	شاگرد زده کوونکي	فارغان مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی و دار الحفظ ها / د اسلامی مدرسو او دار الحفظونو نه فارغ شوي
- Islamic Education Schools Graduates	Students	6876	6031	5926	شاگرد زده کوونکي	- فارغان مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی / د اسلامی مدرسو نه فارغ شوي
- Memorize of Quran Graduates	Students	1003	702	367	شاگرد زده کوونکي	- فارغان دار الحفظ ها / د دار الحفظونو نه فارغ شوي
Islamic Education & Memorize of Quran Teachers	Teacher	6990	7396	7396	معلم ښوونکي	معلمان تعلیمات اسلامی و دار الحفظ ها / د اسلامی مدرسو او دار الحفظونو ښوونکي
- Islamic Schools	Teacher	5742	6001	6001	معلم ښوونکي	- معلمان مدارس تعلیمات اسلامی / د اسلامی مدرسو ښوونکي
- Memorize of Quran	Teacher	1248	1395	1395	معلم ښوونکي	- معلمان دار الحفظ ها / د دار الحفظونو ښوونکي
Islamic Education & Memorize of Quran Staffs	Person	512	637	1074	نفر	کارمندان تعلیمات اسلامی و دار الحفظ ها / د اسلامی مدرسو او دار الحفظونو مامورین
Administration Personal	Person	1724	1749	1864	نفر	پرسونل خدماتی / خدماتی کارکوونکي

Figure 2

جدول ۲۷-۲: تعلیمات اسلامی خصوصی
جدول ۲۷-۴: خصوصی دینی زده کړي
Table 4-27: Private Islamic Education

Province	2015-16 1394			2014-15 1393			2013-14 1392			ولایت
	استاذان	شاگردان	تعداد مدارس	استاذان	شاگردان	تعداد مدارس	استاذان	شاگردان	تعداد مدارس	
	استاذان	زده کړونکي	د مدرسو شمېر	استاذان	زده کړونکي	د مدرسو شمېر	استاذان	زده کړونکي	د مدرسو شمېر	
	Teachers	Students	No. of Islamic	Teachers	Students	No. of Islamic	Teachers	Students	No. of Islamic	
Total	378	7374	28	214	4490	27	249	4459	24	مجموع / تول
Kabul	105	1514	8	67	1268	11	66	896	10	کابل
Balkh	29	465	2	8	101	2	26	327	2	بلخ
Samangan	6	64	1	3	48	1	7	26	1	سمنگان
Nangarhar	65	1705	5	25	330	3	17	244	2	ننگرهار
Herat	130	2374	7	93	2141	6	79	1601	3	هرات
Kunar	7	96	1	3	70	1	34	869	2	کنړه / کنړونه
Badakhshan	---	365	1	---	327	1	---	327	1	بدخشان
Baghlan	23	459	2	10	154	1	8	85	1	بغلان
Takhar	13	332	1	5	51	1	12	84	2	تخار

Source : Ministry of Education

سرچينه : د پوهنې وزارت

منبع : وزارت معارف

One of the characteristics of Muslim religious education in Afghanistan is its multi-ethnicity. In spite of the fact that the vast majority of Muslims are the Sunni, adhering to Hanafi law school, may count on unhindered activity, financial support from the state, including, acting as the state madrasah and institutions educating other religious schools

and the flows, such as, Shia Imamiya, or Salafi.

And the third component is the mosques. Up to recent time, it was possible to say quantity of mosques in this country with large degree of an assumption. But a statistical year-book, for the first time, has published some data by the regions [see fig. 3].

Figure 3

جدول ۴-۴: تعداد مساجد - ۱۳۹۴
جدول ۴-۴: د جوماتونو شمیر - ۱۳۹۴
Table 4-45: Number of Mosques 2015-16

Province	موظفین Functionaries	غیر رسمی	رسمی / دولتی		مجموع مساجد	ولایت
		Informal	Government / Formal		تول جوماتونه	
		جامع و صغیر Comprehensive Incomprehensive	صغیر Incomprehensive	جامع Comprehensive	Total Mosques	
Total	5115	97310	2233	1937	101480	مجموع / تول
Kabul	2003	2784	653	402	3839	کابل
Kapisa	89	1711	56	33	1800	کاپیسا
Parwan	87	1711	24	63	1798	پروان
Wardak	84	2382	56	28	2466	میدان وردک
Logar	87	1982	60	27	2069	لوگر
Nangarhar	154	5240	76	78	5394	ننگرهار
Laghman	60	1854	38	22	1914	لغمان
Panjsher	40	1075	21	19	1115	پنجشیر
Baghlan	97	2650	39	58	2747	بغلان
Bamyan	66	2110	46	20	2176	بامیان
Ghazni	97	5561	70	30	5661	غزنی
Paktika	79	1570	52	27	1649	پکتیکا
Paktya	63	1161	40	23	1224	پکتیا
Khost	82	1943	36	46	2025	خوست
Kunarha	120	1773	19	101	1893	کنړها / کنړونه
Nooristan	79	543	49	30	622	نورستان
Badakhshan	69	2797	69	66	2932	بدخشان
Takhar	101	3171	30	71	3272	تخار
Kunduz	135	2713	56	38	2807	کلندز
Samangan	92	1718	62	30	1810	سمنگان
Balkh	158	2150	73	76	2299	بلخ
Sar-e-pul	93	1644	28	63	1735	سرپل
Ghor	80	3949	44	36	4029	غور
Daykundi	38	1785	6	32	1823	دایکندی
Urozgan	37	3458	25	12	3495	ارزگان
Zabul	70	2365	45	25	2435	زابل
Kandahar	117	1845	67	50	1962	کندهار
Jawzjan	128	1232	51	77	1360	جوزجان
Faryab	122	2500	72	50	2622	فاریاب
Helmand	58	11899	10	48	11957	هلمند
Badghis	77	2284	34	43	2361	بادغیس
Herat	282	13466	114	154	13734	هرات
Farah	91	1446	50	41	1537	فراه
Nimroz	80	838	62	18	918	نیمروز

Source : Religious Affairs and hajj

سرچینه : د ارشاد ، حج او اوقاف وزارت

منبع : وزارت ارشاد ، حج و اوقاف

Official department for religion tries to keep their account, registration and at best to receive control over them, attracting clergymen with an allowance for the personnel and activity of a mosque. Today, according to publications in the Afghan press, a little more than 3000 clergymen receive the salary from the government.

It is important at the same time that materials, available from Kazakhstan, testify that the big group of authorities completely supporting steps of the government in an achievement of peace and creation of the national state was formed among the Afghan clergymen. For example, an imam from one of the Kabul cathedral mosques of Muhammad Ayaz Niazi in the Friday sermon accents that the Quran has no appeal to separate tribes and the people, but appeal to people who believed, to a community, etc. Therefore, Afghans, whether they are Pushtuns, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Tajiks, and so on, are brothers. And it is necessary to be guided by this principle in life [5].

Religious institutes in Afghanistan – problems

In this part it would be desirable to give detailed attention to criticism of a situation in the religious sphere and prospects of its development.

The sharpest and the most reasonable criticism, concerning religious institutes, appears in cases of illegal decisions taken by clergymen. At the same time, the cases where women become victims receive the greatest resonance. Marriages of minors, marriages on coercion, cases when "honor murders" are implemented in "sentences of religious court" are the most widespread. It should be noted as well, that such cases always receive the corresponding moral, legal assessment both from the political management, and from clergymen. Therefore, it is natural that in the course of time such cases occur on the increasing distance from the capital and the provincial centers.

Uncertain prospects of employment for madrasah listeners become another problem aspect. Since the full course of education in madrasah is

14 years, instead of 12 years of usual secondary education and it delays an inevitable problem, which their graduates will face, only for 2 years.

One of decisions has just been implemented within educational process. The subjects allowing a working profession to be received have been entered at the level equivalent to high school. Other option is continuation of education in a higher educational institution as the diploma of madrasah is equated to senior secondary education, and respectively grants such right to the graduate. At the same time, the madrasah graduate is unlikely to become an imam-hatip or a madrasah teacher at the end of the course. For pursuing a career in this field he should continue education to receive bachelor degree. In other words, the madrasah becomes one more source of unemployed youth with senior secondary education.

But achievement of complete state control over religious institutes is seemed to be the most difficult. For example, not all mosques and madrasah agree for state status. It concerns both Shiite, and Sunni establishments. It is possible to predict that the ratio of independent establishments, as well as under the state control ones will remain invariable. Many mosques and madrasah are well supported at the expense of donations by some individuals, and conform to requirements imposed by the authorities. As, for example, the Kabul mosque "Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan" in which Muhammad Ayaz Niazi serves.

New challenges to religious institutes

As it is known, the sector of telecommunications in Afghanistan develops roughly, first of all mobile communication, and the platforms on messages exchange and social networks. According to official statistics by the companies of mobile communication, more than 24 million of sim-cards are distributed among individuals [6, p. 196].

The number of active users of social networks grows. Among which youth makes the vast majority, and if take into consideration the research of the German colleagues from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

GmbH 'Social Media in Afghanistan Measuring the usage & perceptions of the Afghan population' the most popular social networks are four: Facebook, Google +, Youtube and Twitter [7, p. 2].

For this reason there is a risk of the instant, having spontaneous character disorders on religious, ethnic or any other issues. In this regard it is crucial that spiritual leaders acquire virtual space, without giving the chance for monopoly of technically grounded extremists and alarmists to provoke disorders.

In other words, the authorities and religious institutes made efforts to ensure that such incidents with punishment over the young woman named Farkhunde on suspicion in burning the Quran in the center of Kabul in the middle of the day will no longer arise [see e.g. 9].

In addition, observers have noted a growth of propaganda for terrorist and extremist groups through social networks and various messengers. In this regard it is pleasant to observe that such materials are being removed in due time, that is an undoubted merit of intelligence services. Yet, continuous updating of virtual space with materials full of appeals to a non-violence, peace and mutual tolerance is a result of Muslim clergymen activity.

It is clear that the risks will increase with the growing penetration of telecommunication services, but it is possible to note that both security forces and religious institutes keep up with this growth so far.

Discussion

The reform of madrasah, in particular, and religious institutions, generally, did not receive an overwhelming response among researchers. The most part of the works devoted to Afghanistan considers the most crucial issues connected with the risks coming from this country. Therefore, it was necessary, during the research, to look back at theoretical practices of the western organizations and authors. Their critical relation to the situation in this sphere can be explained by the fact that the reform is carried out at the expense of their resources and it is essentially important for

them to receive the greatest return from investments. Though, it is necessary to acknowledge, during the analysis of the western literature on this issue, no appeals to wind up the reform were noticed [see e.g.].

Other block of literature is connected with Pakistan, next to Afghanistan. And here practically all authors, both Pakistani, and foreign, recognize failure of the reforms which began simultaneously with Afghan ones. The resistance to this reform by clergymen, as passive, so active, most often is called to be a reason for that [see e.g., 10].

Therefore, this research has no links to domestic researches. It should be considered as an attempt to attract attention to process which in the average and long term perspective, in case of success, will positively affect stability of the region. And in the return case will aggravate the risks.

Conclusions

Thus, with all the problems on the ground, which objectively complicate the reform of religious institutes in Afghanistan, it is possible to tell that, in general, it is progressing positively. It would be impossible without direct financial support from abroad and the Afghan clergy's resolute unwillingness to repeat the past mistakes. And the main thing, according to increased number of students and expansion of madrasah network, the process is favored by ordinary Afghans.

So in the future it would be necessary to follow up the situation in this sphere. Since the Afghan colleagues face new challenges – appearance and expansion of propaganda among youth and organizations like "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami", "Takfir wal-Hijra", "Tablighi Jamaat", and others. It is being discussed on the national level. Monitoring of the situation, its analysis and linking to current political situation in the region are absolutely essential.

At the same time, the suggested research may be useful as a manual for researchers on Afghanistan, religious experts, engaged with current state of Islam.

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ГРПТИ
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THE MEMORY FROM THE FLAME OF AFGHANISTAN: MEMORIES OF THE AFGHAN WAR PARTICIPANTS

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Abstract. The focus of the article is on the Afghan war of 1979–1989. The analysis is based on the interviews with the Afghan war veterans from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan where they describe the details of their tour of duty in Afghanistan.

The article outlines the results of three-year work of an international group of researchers from the United States, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who publish the book entitled "Memory of Afghan Flame. Interview with the veterans of the Afghan war of 1979–1989". The project included collection of "Oral history" of the soldiers-internationalists who participated in the war in Afghanistan and the production of the documentary. The project was executed by the directors Marlene Laruelle (USA, France) and Botagoz Rakisheva (Kazakhstan) together with the project leaders Muzaffar Olimov and Saodat Olimova in Tajikistan and Igor Biryukov in Uzbekistan.

The project is conducted by the Research Institute of "Public Opinion". Most of the social research in general and Oral history in particular have been conducted to study the Russian veterans, while the experience of those from Central Asia have been mainly overlooked although people from the southern republics of the Soviet Union played a decisive role in Afghan War particularly as interpreters and advisers. Therefore, an international project of Kazakh, Tajik and Uzbek researchers gives the voice to the veterans from Central Asia.

They share their experience that is independent from the current ideological pressures describing the reality of their daily lives as well as those of their fellow soldiers and officers and the relationship with the Afghan people.

Key words: *Afghanistan, Afghan War, soldiers-internationalists, tour of duty, Oral history*

«АУҒАН ЖАЛЫНЫНЫҢ ЕСТЕЛІКТЕРІ»: АУҒАН СОҒЫСЫ АРДАГЕРЛЕРІНІҢ ӘНГІМЕЛЕРІ

Марлен Ларюэль, Ботагөз Рақышева, Гүлден Әшкенова

Аңдатпа. Бұл мақалада 1979–1989 жылдардағы Ауған соғысы тақырыбы көтерілген. Жұмыстың басым бөлігі Ауған соғысына қатысушы – Қазақстан, Өзбекстан, Тәжікстан ардагерлерінің Ауған жеріндегі әскери қызметтері туралы берген сұхбат үзінділерінен тұрады.

Мақалада АҚШ, Қазақстан, Тәжікстан және Өзбекстан зерттеушілерінен құрылған халықаралық топ жұмысының нәтижелері ұсынылған. Атап айтсақ, «Ауған жалынының естеліктері: 1979–1989 жылдардағы Ауған соғысының жауынгер-интернационалистерімен сұхбат» атты кітап шығарылды. Аттас Жобаның негізінде Ауған соғысына қатысушы жауынгер-интернационалистерден «Ауызша тарих» әдісі арқылы сұхбаттар алып, арнайы деректі фильм түсіру көзделіп отыр. Жоба жетекшілері – Марлен Ларюэль (АҚШ – Франция) және Ботагөз Рақышева (Қазақстан). Тәжікстанда жобаға Музаффар Олимов, Саодат Олимова, ал Өзбекстанда Игорь Бирюков жетекшілік етті.

Жобаны «Қоғамдық пікір» зерттеу институты жүргізілді. Ұзақ жылдар бойы «Ауызша тарих» және әлеуметтік жұмыстар ресейлік «ауғандықтарды» зерттеп келген болатын. Кеңес Одағының оңтүстік республикаларының азаматтары аудармашы, кеңесшілер ретінде Ауғанстанда айтарлықтай маңызды рөл атқарғанымен, Орталық Азия «ауғандықтары» туралы ақпарат өте аз.

Қазақстандық, тәжікстандық және өзбекстандық мамандардан тұратын топтың қажырлы да ауқымды жұмысының арқасында Орталық Азия «ауғандықтары» да өз естеліктерімен бөлісті.

Бүгінде олар заманауи идеологиялық ұстанымдардан тәуелсіз, өз тағдырын өздері шешетін тұлғалар ретінде өздерінің күнделікті өмірлері, жауынгерлік тәжірибелері, Ауған халқымен өзара қатынастары туралы сыр шертті.

Түйін сөздер: *Ауғанстан, Ауған соғысы, жауынгер-интернационалистер, қызмет, Ауызша тарих.*

«ПАМЯТЬ ИЗ ПЛАМЕНИ АФГАНИСТАНА»: ВОСПОМИНАНИЯ УЧАСТНИКОВ АФГАНСКОЙ ВОЙНЫ

Марлен Ларюэль, Ботагөз Ракишева, Гүлден Ашкенова

Аннотация. В данной статье затрагивается тема Афганской войны 1979–1989 годов. Большая часть данной работы состоит из выдержек из интервью с участниками афганской войны, ветеранов из Казахстана, Узбекистана, Таджикистана, непосредственно об их военной службе на Афганской земле.

В статье представлены результаты трехлетней работы международной группы исследователей из США, Казахстана, Таджикистана и Узбекистана, итогом которой стала книга «Память из пламени Афганистана. Интервью с воинами-интернационалистами Афганской

войны 1979–1989 годов». Одноименный Проект включал сбор интервью методом «Устная история» у воинов-интернационалистов, участников войны в Афганистане и подготовку документального фильма. Руководители Проекта – Марлен Ларюэль (США – Франция) и Ботагоз Ракишева (Казахстан). Руководители проекта в Таджикистане: Музаффар Олимов, Саодат Олимова. Руководитель проекта в Узбекистане: Игорь Бирюков.

Проект проведен Исследовательским Институтом "Общественное мнение". На протяжении многих лет многие социологические работы и исследования Устной истории были посвящены изучению российских «афганцев». Об «афганцах» Центральной Азии было известно немного, хотя граждане южных республик Советского Союза сыграли решающую роль в Афганистане, особенно в качестве переводчиков и советников.

Благодаря замечательной работе группы, состоящей из казахстанских, таджикских и узбекских специалистов, «афганцы» Центральной Азии, наконец, получили возможность высказаться.

Будучи самостоятельными вершителями своих судеб, далекими от нынешних идеологических установок, они описывают реальность своей повседневной жизни, свой опыт в качестве солдат и офицеров, а также взаимоотношения с жителями Афганистана.

Ключевые слова: *Афганистан, Афганская война, воины-интернационалисты, служба, Устная история.*

Introduction

The international group of researchers from the USA, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has been working for three years to present in this article the result of their research as a book "Memories from the Flame of Afghanistan. Interviews with the soldiers-internationalists of the Afghan war, 1979-1989." [1] The Project of the same name included collecting interviews, by the 'oral history' method, with the soldiers-internationalists, participants of war in Afghanistan, as well as preparation of the documentary film [2]. Marlene Laruelle (USA-France) and Botagoz Rakisheva (Kazakhstan) were the project managers.

Collection of information about the Afghan war from its direct participants, in order to preserve historical memory of one of the most tragic pages in our history became the main objective of the project. In total, 20 interviews in Uzbekistan, 30 interviews in Tajikistan, 20 interviews in Kazakhstan have been conducted.

For several years many sociological works and researches were devoted to the Russian "Afghans", occupying an important niche in significant part of the patriotically focused youth's activities in modern Russia. The project "Memo-

ries from the Flame of Afghanistan. Interviews with soldiers-internationalists of the Afghan war, 1979-1989" has risen, for the first time, an issue about participation of the soldiers from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan. Little is known about them, though citizens of the southern republics of the former Soviet Union played a crucial role, especially, as interpreters and advisers.

This article consists of excerpts from the interviews with participants of the Afghan war, veterans from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan.

The beginning of war

In 1979, the USSR decided to intervene in Afghanistan [3].

Many soldiers tried to avoid mentioning Afghanistan in their letters, so not to make their relatives upset. Afghan tragedy has claimed the lives of almost 15000 young soldiers who never came back alive [4].

Abdulloyev Rakhmatullo (Tajikistan), 1958, an interpreter, years of service 1981–1982, and again in 1986–1988 (Kabul, Kandahar, Qalat, Helmand, Afghanistan):

"Before being moved to Afghanistan I had attended higher-level training courses and ob-

tained many skills (including, mountain training, handling different categories of weapon, transport driving, etc.) We were trained by highly qualified military professionals. There was the deep sense of pride in our commanders, who had been training us before Afghanistan. Almost all soldiers believed in official version for the limited contingent of the Soviet troops to stay in Afghanistan. Many people supported the position of the Soviet Union on Afghanistan. We believed and we believe today that we have provided military, economic, cultural assistance to Afghan people, as well as training for all spheres of their social life. We were not ashamed for our actions in Afghanistan. We have found plenty of friends among Afghan people and still keep in touch for more than 25 years after service. There were discussions among the soldiers about the feasibility of the Soviet troops' staying in Afghanistan, but unofficially. Even if somebody spoke out against, he would be sent back to the USSR".

Abildin Yerzhan (Kazakhstan), 1965, a machine-gunner, years of service 1984–1986, (Baddakhshan, Afghanistan):

"I was tempted, but on the other side, I was scared. My mum, dad, brothers, a sister were at home, I'm the oldest son. During the service I never wrote my family that I was in Afghanistan. They only found out it when I came back home. Also, while leaving to the mountains for an ambush, convoying and other tasks, the main aim was not to surrender. One bullet is always for yourself, so you surely do not surrender".

Kambarov Kamaleddin (Uzbekistan), 1960, Private, a driver-electrical engineer, years of service 1980–1982, (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"I did not inform my family about serving in Afghanistan; I told them I was serving in Germany, because address was a field post. In Tashkent, I wrote my father that I arrived for a new transport, and let him come if he can. I gave him

an address of the military hospital. There my father saw the hospital full of many young people without legs or arms, fully wrapped. I showed him my two legs and arms in the right place. My bandage was already removed, I grew some hair, but he noticed a scar and asked about it, so I answered that I fell down. He did not believe how I could fall down. He came with my aunt, and she said: 'Kamaleddin, you should fall down twice in corridor, so they could discharge you.' I came back to Afghanistan and served for a year and a half, they gave me a holiday. Many soldiers did not come back from holidays - they had jaundice, got married, changed their last name, etc".

Shalov Tukembay (Kazakhstan), 1960, a sniper, a machine-gunner of the 70th Mechanized Brigade, years of service 1979–1981, (Kandahar, Afghanistan):

"Nobody told us anything about Afghanistan. When we had already passed Moscow, in Orenburg (we were flying through Orenburg, then to Aktyubinsk) we heard from citizens that we are moving to Afghanistan. That our people support their revolution, and that was all we knew. We were sent to Kushka, Mary province, Turkmen ASR. In Kushka, a company was formed for departure to Afghanistan. More people arrived from Sverdlovsk region, from different regions, like Moscow military region, and Germany. Southern group of armed forces was formed there. Kazakh, Turkmen, Uzbek guerrillas were originated from there, they were first to enter Afghanistan. That is how, as the saying goes, we have been formed for 10 days there, and then entered Afghanistan.

We were constantly going to the routine fields, resting for day or two and keep going. Sometimes on the raid we might find out about a caravan from Pakistan full of weapons. We were constantly raiding".



Picture 1. – a photograph from personal archive of Shalov Tukembay (Kazakhstan), 1960, a sniper, a machine-gunner of the 70th Mechanized Brigade, years of service 1979–1981, (Kandahar, Afghanistan)

Mardonov Nurmakhmad (Tajikistan), 1963, Junior Sergeant, years of service 1982–1984, (Jalal-Abad, Afghanistan):

"Nobody ever asked us if we wanted to serve in Afghanistan. As far as I know, some people did not want to serve there. There was no information, except official reports, not in the newspapers, nor on television. Everyone tried to avoid talking about Afghanistan."

Tulekpayev Miranbek (Kazakhstan), 1961, Deputy Platoon Commander, years of service (1980–1982), (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"We have been trained for two months and ten days, I think, and then were sent directly to Afghanistan. Others say they did not know where they would get to. I knew! There were some rumors lately – "to Afghanistan, to Afghanistan". Majority of us, who had been selected, were Muslims".



Picture 2. - a photograph from archive of Mardonov Nurmahmad (Tajikistan), born in 1963, junior sergeant, years of service - 1982–1984, (Jalalabad, Afghanistan)

Mavlonov Akramjon (Tajikistan), 1964, a sniper-interpreter, years of service 1984–1986, (Bagram Airport, Kabul, Kunduz, Panjshir; Herat, Kandahar, Gardez, Badakhshan, Salang, Afghanistan):

"We were trained well, and we were ready for serving in Afghanistan. But serving in mountains meant more difficulty. We were trained by the officers, who had served in Afghanistan."

Gained knowledge fully corresponded to the service, however, it was difficult to adapt, because we were mostly going to the field in the mountains. The climate in Afghanistan was not suitable for us. It has been tough because of a lot of rainfall in mountain areas. We have even stayed in Salang for some time, since a helicopter could not arrive due to fog and heavy clouds. Commanders have lost settling. We were left without food and got sick."

Khidirov Erkin (Uzbekistan), 1967, Sergeant Major, Deputy Commander of Motorized Rifles

Platoon, years of service 1985–1987, (Panjshir, Afghanistan):

"I was enlisted in the Soviet Army in November, 1985. Military training was held in Ashgabat, Turkistan military region, and lasted one month and half. Officers – "buyers" have told us about sending to Afghanistan in Termez's regional collection point. I almost had no idea about what is going on in the neighboring country. I thought that the Soviet troops had been ensuring the security of the USSR there."



Picture 3. - a photograph from personal archive of Khidirov Erkin (Uzbekistan), 1967, Sergeant Major, Deputy Commander of Motorized Rifles Platoon, years of service 1985–1987, (Panjshir, Afghanistan).

Kambarov Kamaledin (Uzbekistan), 1960, Private, a driver-electrical engineer, years of service 1980–1982, (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"We were told that soldiers-internationalists had been invited there to protect April Revolution. We had to help Afghan people to protect their southern borders. We were trained under accelerated program, it was tough. We even asked to be sent to Afghanistan as soon as possible instead of suffering here. There had been 30 people in the company, when I arrived to Afghanistan, having served in Germany, Russia, and the Baltic States. They had been sent to Afghanistan with their equipment, and have already finished serving, an order has been issued. When they saw us, they started throwing up their hats. The next day, the short-timers handed over the equipment and left for the USSR."

Negmatov Iskandar (Tajikistan), 1961, an aimer of self-propelled artillery, years of service 1979–1981, (Badakhshan, Afghanistan):

"We were informed about the reasons for the Soviet troops staying in Afghanistan. I think we have fulfilled our international obligation in Afghanistan. Our service was essential. I was proud of upcoming service in Afghanistan. There were no discussions between soldiers. We were just fulfilling our duty to our motherland."

Safarov Abroriddin (Tajikistan), 1966, soldier, years of service 1985–1987, (Badakhshan, Fayzabad, Afghanistan):

"Young men, who were serving with me in Afghanistan, were loyal to their motherland. I did not consider the service in Afghanistan as a positive step in a carrier ladder, or possibil-

ity of gaining some benefits or improving my welfare. I did not think about it at all. There were no such thoughts among the soldiers, too. The Soviet people were mostly thinking about their obligations to the motherland, not about welfare."

Zhumaldikhanov Askar (Kazakhstan), 1959, Head of radio relay station, years of service 1983-1984, (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"Actually, the social structure of the Soviet Union made everybody a patriot of the highest

level. Everybody was saturated with such upbringing, as honesty, truth, justice, 'not a step backward'..."

Kassimov Olimjon (Tajikistan), 1959, an interpreter, year of service 1981, (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"The service in Afghanistan was considered as duty, since we took the oath as officers. Discussions among the soldiers arose after withdrawal from Afghanistan; there were no doubts while staying in Afghanistan."



Picture 4. - a photograph from personal archive of Negmatova Iskandar (Tajikistan), born in 1961, self-propelled guns gunner, years of service - 1979–1981. (Badakhshan, Afghanistan)

Relations with local people

One of the most important moments of the service was relations with local people. The veterans estimated the relations with local people differently. There have been cases when military doctors provided medical assistance to local people. Soldiers delivered basic food items, mended buildings, which suffered from gunfire. The Soviet troops were guarding roads, constructed basic necessities (schools, hospitals, etc). They had guarded and provided functioning of aerodromes in large cities. They were convoying caravans with military and economic cargoes for their own use and for the benefit of the DRA.

Together with the Afghan units and subunits had conducted military operations of a different scale to defeat the armed opposition groups, and also had fought with the caravans delivering weapons and ammunition to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran.

Abeldinova Valentina (Kazakhstan), 1965, a surgery nurse, years of service 1986–1988, (Bagram, Afghanistan):

"We had provided medical assistance to everyone, that is, we helped our soldiers, our troops, and the population, who were living there. We delivered babies, and did the surgery operations, which... if people got into a firefight, and they were brought to us, we did not refuse anyone."

Olimov Murtazo (Tajikistan), 1960, Unit Commander, Platoon Deputy Commander, years of service 1979–1981, (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"The attitude of the local population to the Soviet soldiers was different: in the north –

quite well, in the south or southeast – badly. Especially with the Pashtuns it was not so good. Afghans had treated the natives of Central Asia among the Soviet soldiers more kindly than the others".



Picture 5. – a photograph from personal archive of Shalov Tukembay (Kazakhstan), 1960, a sniper, a machine-gunner of the 70th Mechanized Brigade, years of service 1979–1981, (Kandahar, Afghanistan)

Khaknazarov Murodali (Tajikistan), 1964, an interpreter, years of service 1987–1989, (Jalal-Abad, Afghanistan):

"Local Afghan population had treated our soldiers badly, but it was not obvious, though. But war is war, in some places they welcomed us, but somewhere wanted payback. As if we came to destroy Islam. But there were some special groups, who often met with the population."

Sheraliyev Abdukakhor (Tajikistan), 1966, an interpreter-cook, years of service 1984–1986, (Termez, Mazari-Sharif, Afghanistan):

"I had not faced any conflict cases between our troops and local people. But from conversations and meetings with the local population it became clear that the Afghans did not want the presence of our army on their land. I knew this, because I was engaged in translation. They hated us, but did not express it clearly. There was a case with detained Afghan, when while translating, I realized that he was cheating and not telling the truth. He kept saying: "We support you! Why have you captured a civilian?"

Balkassymov Aslan (Kazakhstan), 1960, mountain-gamekeeper battalion, Deputy Platoon Commander, years of service 1979–1981, (Salang, Afghanistan):

"It is possible to tell, that there were no conflicts with local population. Our 7th company stood downhill from Salang. We lived in peace and friendship with locals, they were good simple people. There was a dermen at our place, where they could ground corn, and bake cornbread. They had their own affairs, we had our own affairs. For example, we helped to restore school – again those constant blow ups. They were mercenaries, too. Perhaps, they don't allow the Afghan people to study."

Koilybayev Marat (Kazakhstan), 1968, Auto battalion, a driver, years of service 1986–1989, (Khairaton, Afghanistan):

"Mountainous area requires spectacular tactics. Generally, it is difficult there. If we drive a car we choose a route. That is interesting, once the cultivating begins – Afghanistan is silent, everyone is engaged in work. Once the cultivating

is finished – attack begins. Harvesting begins – again silence, everyone is engaged in business. Harvesting has ended – it starts again.

How to say "civilians", if there is one nation. I happened to be a guest in Kabul. There were two or three of us on the duty, and one local invited us to visit him. When we were sitting, his brothers arrived. It turned out, that he was engaged in business, the second brother was a policeman, working in militia, the third one – in mountains, a dushman. One family. Me – why, he didn't do anything to me. As I told before: during harvesting – they seem walking peacefully, once harvesting is over, they start shooting".

Saidov Saidislom (Tajikistan), 1963, Head of radio intelligence, years of service 1982–1984, (Bagram, Afghanistan):

"The conflicts happened, but they were imperceptible. Generally they suffered during bombardments. And they tried to do us harm in any way. For example, they could transmit false information through aksakals, and once we had to wait for a caravan eight days on false information. During conversations, they were saying as if we came to destroy dushmans, and are actually occupied with other things".

Kusrayev Murtazi (Uzbekistan), 1968, Private, Squad Leader, year of service 1988, (Kandahar, Afghanistan):

"Local population is not always peaceful. If basmach, loaded up with grenades, bearing a spade, pretending to be a dekhkanin, asked us for some bread, and stewed meat, and then blew up himself (together with our soldiers), what respect

can be here? But there were those who gave a drink of water.

What does it mean to bomb out from "Sushka" from five kilometers height? Bombs could fly across 500-700 meters from the set target and fall down on peaceful shepherds or someone else. When we were going in the field, our CFM (center of fighting management) gave out accurate targeting, that in such square the band will be passing. There was a case when bandits let civilians ahead, and we had to shoot them together with bandits. In one and a half years of service there was only one such case".

Assoyev Gurez (Tajikistan), 1962, Private, a driver-mechanic, years of service 1980–1982, (Bagram, Afghanistan):

"During combat operations the population had been warned in advance. Those, who managed to leave areas of military operations, were in safety, and those, who for some reason couldn't leave it, could be lost. It is war. I know nothing about responsibility for their death".

Sagdullayev Davlyat-Bek (Uzbekistan), 1947, Head of the department of foreign languages, Pedagogical Academy DRA (the 1st secretary, Embassy of the USSR), years of service – 1983–1985, (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"There were miscellaneous talks about the Afghan war. Much blood was spilled there, many people passed through this meat grinder. I was in Afghanistan three times and every time I met those guys who were at war on that side, were at war with us, with shuravs. And I didn't see rage in their eyes, didn't see rage in them".



Picture 6. – a photograph from personal archive of Sagdullayev Davlyat-Bek (Uzbekistan), 1947, Head of the Department of foreign languages, Pedagogical Academy DRA (the 1st secretary, Embassy of the USSR), years of service – 1983–1985, (Kabul, Afghanistan)

Combat operations

The former soldiers also told about combat operations, in which they were directly involved, about raids, ambushes on enemy caravans and sweeping the districts, about support from air.

Filippov Vitaly (Uzbekistan), 1964, a machine-gunner, years of service 1983–1985, (Herat, Afghanistan):

"In the summer of 1984, we were sent to take a caravan and ran into an ambush. An armored vehicle blew up on a mine. I got a mini explosive wound. The shooting, pain, blood. My fingers were torn off on the right hand. A foot of the left leg was broken, crumbled – it was amputated in the Tashkent hospital".

Khaldarov Sobir (Uzbekistan), 1968, Sergeant of the special troops, years of service 1987–1988, (Kandahar, Afghanistan):

"I have participated in combat operations many times. We destroyed groups of the rebels from Pakistan, intercepted caravans with the weapon in the desert. Dushmans always attacked at night – in two, three o'clock. When we were under close shooting, we took cover in a shelter".

Abdulloyev Rakhmatullo (Tajikistan), 1958, an interpreter, years of service 1981–1982, and again in 1986–1988 (Kabul, Kandahar, Qalat, Helmand, Afghanistan).

"I have participated in operations in the Kandahar and Zabol provinces, in summer operation of 1982 in the Panjshir valley. I have been awarded with government awards of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and after all, we were working with Afghans. Thank God, I wasn't wounded. We bore significant losses in the summer of 1982 in Panjshir. As for the losses from Mujahideens, in most cases they took fallen soldiers with themselves. I think, there were many losses from their side too, as before large operations there was an intensive artillery preparation and BAB (bombing and assault blows) by aviation. Majority of wounded and contused soldiers had been captured in some cases. After interrogation they were trans-

ferred to the Afghan party".

Aminchonov Abdurafik (Tajikistan), 1964, Chief of radio interceptors, years of service 1982–1985, (Kabul, Afghanistan):

"Yes, I have participated in combat operations in 21 provinces of Afghanistan, as an interpreter and a radio interceptor. I have got a number of awards. I have received the Red Star award during Panjshir operation. I wasn't wounded. There were considerable losses from our side, as well as from Afghans. We didn't take captives. The Soviet and Afghan government troops always trusted each other. Almost all operations were joint, or we took at least one Afghan with us in the field.

Mujahideens were prepared perfectly well. All people helped Mujahideens, especially rich men".

Atabayev Kadyr (Uzbekistan), 1946, Chief pilot of the special plane of Najibullah, pilot of the 1st class, years of service 1989–1991, (Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan):

"We were flying to Kabul only at night, at the switched-off headlights, air navigation fires, nothing was switched on, and everything was switched off. We were curtaining off windows, disguising. When approaching the Salang, at the height of 7,800 m, we were picked up by two helicopters, from both sides, with traps. At a certain speed we started descending in full darkness.

We did not say anything through communicators. We only marked the turns - the first, the second, the third, the fourth... Helicopters accompanied us to the land, to the fourth turn at the height of 150 m. It is very low. We had a truncated communication, descended without headlights. The descent began from the pass, onto the single path in Kabul. We descended with the maximum vertical speed. The mode was "little gas", without draft, because exhaust gases do not work and it is not visible if the plane flies. On the fourth turn we brought engines almost to the take-off mode to give to the plane its forward speed. We were giving almost take-off mode in order to land normally. Therefore the crew ought to be interchangeable, mutual understanding was required".

Mamazhanov Dilshodbek (Uzbekistan), 1966, Sergeant, Commander of motorized rifle unit, years of service 1985-1986, (Panjshire, Afghanistan):

"We had colossal losses. During one operation, only 19 people have survived out of 47 in our company. The others were killed and wounded. In total about 100 people from a regiment were lost. It happened on May 5 or 17, 1985 in the Kidjoy Cross. Operation was on release (rescue) of the Afghan officers group. The helicopter with 9 Afghan colonels got shot down. We went to rescue them, it was pan-army operation. There was a major general Isayev – the Commander (the commander of the 108th motorized rifle division). Generally all regiments were there. At first, it was a war at distance there. But they let us approach closely, so it was necessary to call aviation. The aircrafts near us (very close) dropped a bomb. The opponent specially let us approach, it was planned, everything mixed up. It was terrible".

Mirzoyev Saifiddin (Uzbekistan), 1958, an interpreter, years of service 1983–1984, (Herat, Afghanistan):

"Yes, I have participated in combat operations as an interpreter. I have got the state combat award "For services in battle" and "For courage". I have no wounds. We had losses among soldiers and officers. I have no information about losses among the Afghan rebels. We did not captivate them.

We had losses during weekdays as well (not only in the fields). Once, our armored conveyor was shot out by the rebels on the road from the airport to the city of Herat. Two deputies – on equipment (lieutenant colonel) and on political affairs (lieutenant colonel) were killed in this battle, including a driver (the ordinary soldier)".

Negmatov Iskandar (Tajikistan), 1961, an aimer of self-propelled artillery, years of service 1979-1981, (Badakhshan, Afghanistan):

"Yes, I have participated in combat operations. In three-four operations when we were liberating kishlaks from Mujahideens. I was there once as a loader of self-propelled guns, two times as an aimer. In 1980–1981, there were no awards. I got

under attack, and was wounded with shrapnel, they helped me to recover in the first-aid station. There were few losses during operations. I do not know about losses among the rebels. We captivated soldiers, and officers sent them at the destination, but did not tell us."

Politin Oleg Valentinovich (Uzbekistan), 1966, Senior Sergeant, a senior mechanic-tank driver, years of service 1985–1986, (Ghazni, Afghanistan):

"I participated and I got wound in large military operations such as Alikheyl at the beginning of 1986, and Kandahar operations. Escorts of convoys had been on regular basis because our vehicles were (went) generally on the Gazni, Kabul, Kandahar directions. Large, big operations took place on Sakha in the middle of 1986, in May-June. Two operations were across Salang, two operations were Alikheyl, Kandahar, when the general was brought down in 1986, before the demobilization when their training center "dukhovskiy" was bombed out. Generally there were regular departures".

Hadzhiyev Yuri (Kazakhstan), 1962, the nurse of a medical sanitary battalion, years of service 1981-1982, (Shindand, Herat, Afghanistan):

"It is possible to tell, that I know a lot about how many were wounded and dead. Actually we had transferred so many dead and wounded! I can't even tell. But figures, of course, were not what had been disclosed. A lot of people were lost. And there were many missing in Kandahar. At first, when I went to raid for the first time, I considered, for the sake of interest we considered it with guys, how many were dead, how many were pulled out, and then, in three month we already got off, count was lost. And for two years I am not able to tell at all, how many were pulled out during operation, how many people were put, sometimes it was somehow less. A lot of people died, many of them on mines, "benzoviks".

Post-war period

A number of the former soldiers - internationalists carry out an important work by searching

the missing Kazakhstan soldiers being called from the territory of Kazakhstan.

Mukhanov Bolat (Kazakhstan), 1966, border troops, years of service 1984–1986, (the Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan):

"A decision was made literally about three years ago - a certain group was created at the Union of Afghanistan veterans of the Astana city. In general, the Russian Federation, the Committee on soldiers-internationalists affairs, headed by Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev, have been conducting this work for a very long time, they have got a certain database. We started literally four years ago, created the group which was engaged directly with the natives of KazSSR, who were called from the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. At the moment, according to our data, there are 21 persons. This is a number of people whom we have established to be a live, – at the moment, they are within the territory of Afghanistan, and they are alive. In 2008, there was our first business trip, before we had been preparing the base.

We have a number of programs for summer now on expeditions – I hope, we will bring some positive results. Also I wanted to emphasize – unfortunately, I won't tell the names, - the Afghan companions, who actively help us, render assistance in collection of information (the country is

extraordinary, though), provide us information, where, who and how they are now.

We strongly support the former Mujahideens to render us assistance (as field commanders), we closely communicate with them. There is no hostile attitude in our relations, we help each other. They greet us warmly as guests, and they came to visit us repeatedly. We have a mutual understanding with no old offenses. They initially didn't understand our tasks – but have understood now. They help us on collection of information, with locations, and applications".

Conclusion

Interview with soldiers-internationalists of the Afghan war is a unique information – the memories of soldiers-"Afghans" from three countries of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which were directly involved in military operations in Afghanistan during ten years' war.

Veterans feel nostalgic for military service and do not regret that got exactly to Afghanistan, as during service they got new friends who cannot be forgotten. Today, practically all former soldiers-internationalists are engaged in public work, i.e., are members of some organizations uniting and representing their interests.

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POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN TRAJECTORIES OF A COSMOPOLITAN SPACE

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Abstract. In the world of cosmopolitan redefining the very word ‘cosmopolitanism’ has numerous shades additionally associated with social conditions, social and cultural processes and individual behavior. The present study focuses on the condition of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in Kazakhstan. The fact that there are a number of factors which define the dynamic in the post-Soviet Central Asia, such as social and cultural conditions, the world view, a simultaneous influence of various elements, according to the method of ‘concentric circles’ to study the phenomenon of ‘cosmopolitan world’, as well as a behavior, an attitude or a predisposition, which can be acquired to a larger extent through the experience, especially travelling, became a starting point of the analysis. The study concentrates on the relationship between the space and transitional identity in Kazakhstan during the post-Soviet period.

Key words: *cosmopolitanism, interconnectedness, transnationalism*

ПОСТКЕҢЕСТІК ҚАЗАҚСТАН. КОСМОПОЛИТТІК КЕҢІСТІКТІҢ
ТРАЕКТОРИЯЛАРЫ

Сачандана Чаттерджи

Аңдатпа. Космополиттік тұрғыдан пайымдасақ, «космополитизм» сөзінің мәні әлеуметтік жағдаймен, әлеуметтік-мәдени үрдістер мен жеке мінез-құлықпен байланысты көптеген мағынаға ие болып отыр. Аталған зерттеуде Қазақстандағы «космополитизм» жағдайы қарастырылған. Талдаудың бастапқы нүктесі ретінде посткеңестік Орталық Азияның қарқынын анықтайтын бірнеше факторлардың: әлеуметтік-мәдени жағдайлар, дүниетаным, «космополиттік әлем» феноменін зерттеуге арналған «концентрлік шеңберлер» әдісіне сәйкес көптеген элементтердің бір мезетте ықпал етуі, сондай-ақ негізінен тәжірибе, әсіресе саяхаттау арқылы қалыптасатын мінез-құлық, қарым-қатынас немесе бейімділік алынып отыр. Зерттеуде посткеңестік кезеңдегі Қазақстандағы өтпелі бірегейлік мәселесіне баса назар аударылған.

Түйін сөздер: *космополитизм, өзара байланыстылық, трансұлтшылдық.*

ПОСТСОВЕТСКИЙ КАЗАХСТАН. ТРАЕКТОРИИ КОСМОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ПРОСТРАНСТВА

Сачандана Чаттерджи

Аннотация. В мире космополитического переосмысления само слово «космополитизм» имеет множество дополнительных оттенков, связанных с социальными условиями, социально-культурными процессами и индивидуальным поведением. Фокус настоящего исследования – состояние «космополитизма» в Казахстане. Отправной точкой анализа является тот факт, что существует ряд факторов, определяющих динамику в постсоветской Центральной Азии: социально-культурные условия, мировоззрение, одновременное влияние многочисленных элементов, согласно методу «концентрических кругов» для изучения феноменов «космополитического мира», а также поведение, отношение или предрасположенности, которые в значительной степени приобретаются через опыт, особенно путешествия. Исследование концентрируется на взаимоотношении между пространством и переходной идентичностью в Казахстане в постсоветский период.

Ключевые слова: *космополитизм, взаимосвязанность, транснационализм.*

On cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism has become a renewed field of enquiry since the 2000s. A very simple meaning of cosmopolitanism is ‘a way of being in the world’[1] and as a willingness to engage the Other. The idea of cosmopolitanism has evolved from Kantian philosophical tradition [2]. Over time, questions have been raised about Kantian philosophy of Enlightenment and the concept has been reframed in the light of social and cultural contexts that transcend bounded and nation-state formulations. The idea has expanded to include a wide range of social and cultural theories stretched across cultures and disciplines—philosophy, sociology, political theory and anthropology. With such changes in methodological approaches to cosmopolitanism, the term came to denote a social position in which individuals and communities tend to have meaningful attachments. Today, the impression about cosmopolitanism is multiple allegiances to peoples, places and traditions that lie beyond the boundaries of the nation-state [3].

Multiple cosmopolitanisms also suggest ‘cosmopolitan sociability’[4]. There are two strands of cosmopolitan sensibility here: the

older one that subscribes to the nation-state project and is primarily linked to elites, intellectuals and others; and the revised concept that seems to disapprove of the nation-state perspectives and is rooted in sensibilities of the diaspora and diverse socio-cultural groupings. But there are also sociable behavior patterns that go beyond these binary trajectories and have a shared sense of common sensibilities. Here we need to examine Asian discourses about plural loyalties-standing in many circles but having a common ground. This perspective takes researchers beyond the prism of binaries, i.e. exclusion versus inclusion, sameness versus difference and into the domain of cosmopolitan openness.

As the discussion moves to Asian cosmopolitanisms, one needs to consider the varieties that one gets to see here. The South Asian and Southeast Asian settings and perspectives are woven together in Amitav Ghosh’s *The Hungry Tide*, [5] in which the appeal lies in the connecting—across space and time—and a new cosmopolitanism is forged. The implication is imposition of nationalist frames on these historical and spatially interconnected formations and dispensations is erroneous.[6].

Variables of cosmopolitanism in Kazakhstan

Here, I am concerned with Kazakhstan's cosmopolitan setting determined by the relationship between space and transitional identity. There are diverse and multiple engagements that should be looked into. The study tries to focus on such engagements in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, especially in the present millennium when its 'competitive profile' increased, either through eastward integration or through Eurasian partnerships or through collaborative ventures with East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. The interest lies in regional initiatives, especially linked to connectivity corridors and integrating oil-and-hydrocarbon resource based economies like Kazakhstan and Vietnam. In pursuance of its aims to diversify its economy, Kazakhstan has ventured into newer domains like East Asia and Southeast Asia. President Nazarbayev's fascination for successful Asian models was reflected in his much – publicized autobiography *The Kazakhstan Way*: 'My point is that the quest for the best model is still going on around the world. Here in Kazakhstan I'm trying to adopt the good experiences of other countries and get rid of the bad practices of the past.' [7]. The Kazakhs are keeping all their options open: seeking a central role in the New Silk Road initiative of the US, permitting pervasive Chinese presence in their economy, promoting bilateral and institutional ties with the EU, becoming a member of the Eurasian Union and looking for alternatives in Southeast Asia. "Diversification" is the name of the new Kazakh game.

Cosmopolitanism in Kazakhstan attracted widespread attention especially in the context of post-Soviet nation-building. Basically the interest is in the performance of post-Soviet regimes as Kazakhstan. In dealing with the 'appearance' of a post-Soviet set-up, the assumption is about new forms, rather than old forms-a sudden break rather than continuity of past political and social traditions. What is interesting is

the extremely varied nature of these views and also the variety of interpretations about historical and contemporary events. It is the diverse opinions that make Kazakhstan's cosmopolitan setting a unique case study.

Cosmopolitanism, extremely attractive to an international audience, is often posited as the opposite pole of ethno-nationalism in Kazakhstan. Broadly speaking, the cosmopolitans are an internationalist group that comprises of a wide-spectrum of intellectuals in the political, cultural and economic spheres. Most of the cosmopolitans belong to what may be loosely called "the new sector" in Kazakhstan, and have carved a niche in the economy and politics of Kazakhstan. Cosmopolitanism is often labeled as 'cosmopolitan consumerism', whereby the ability of Kazakhstan, with its large market potential, to influence people's attitudes and purchase behavior also has an effect on consumer willingness to buy domestic and foreign goods in Kazakhstan and therefore also affects its integration into world economy [8]. States like Kazakhstan are being advertised as 'brand states', the success of which depends to a large extent on trust and customer satisfaction. So, here we are talking about the state's personality and the preference is increasingly about Kazakhstan's global image as an oil-rich country which can compete with other aspirants like China and Vietnam that have been looking for an entry into Kazakhstan's oil fields since the late 1990's. This brand named Kazakhstan has a completely different take on the management of its resources-and this makes its collaborative stance towards its eastern neighbours more appealing and attractive.

These profiles of Kazakhstan-the national, the regional and the international-make its attractive over others. The national profile is pitched on Nazarbayev's governance which depicts an unusual combination of urban transformation (centred round Astana and Akmolinsk oblast) and a selective treatment of its ethnic groups (preferences being for the titular nation-

ality or the *otanlar*, which is a generic name for those belonging to the Kazakh homeland). But what stands out is the wider milieu of a cosmopolitan Almaty which is the home of educated Russian population and the cultural elite which is juxtaposed to citified Astana that has been recommended by Nazarbayev's government as the 'appropriate site' of the Kazakhs' steppe identity. The variety is also seen in the case of Uyghur neighbourhoods of Almaty, in the frontiers of Akmolinsk oblast reminiscent of Tsarist Russia's Cossack military fortresses, in *gulag* (concentration camp) memorials near Akmolinsk/Tselinograd/Astana and in the Caspian hub Atyrau that is iconized as the oil fountain of the present century and the game changer of Kazakh economy.

The hypothesis of this study is the cosmopolitan environment of diverse settings and not only of capital cities, Almaty and Astana. It is true that the iconic capitals have generated a lot of hope among the rich and the powerful. But, what cannot be ignored is the wider reach of Eurasian and global engagements in which western port cities like Atyrau play a prominent role. TCO and the Kashagan oil project (now dumped by the government) are the rallying point of several western companies as well as collaborative projects that are being showcased in a major way. Also attractive is the Russian environment in northern Kazakhstan with Kokshetau, situated at the junction of the Kazakh-Siberian Railway network and emerging as the regional centre of Akmola oblast with a city *akimat* exercising authority that is beyond the President's control. It thrives as an eco-region with government's development programmes on the priority list.

At the same time, there is creeping disillusionment among Kazakhs about the regime's modernization projects like transfer of capital from Almaty to Astana and more recently the devaluation of the *tenge*. While the euphoria among the capital's elite groups about Nazarbayev's governance persists, there is a wide

variety of relational shifts between Kazakhs and Russians, Kazakhs and Germans, Kazakhs and Koreans, Kazakhs and Mongols and so on. The present study takes into account such variables of cosmopolitanism in Kazakhstan.

Borderlands and the aspect of belonging

The aspect of shared spaces determines the relationship between the cosmopolitan space that Kazakhstan represents and its borderland identities. The Kazakhs' attachment to their homeland is a constant-but the question is whether that territorial reality fits into other paradigms of identity and belonging. Such questions arise in the case of Mongolian Kazakhs and Uyghurs of Semirechie-in both cases the sentiment of place is far stronger compared to the overwhelming global experiences of the mainland Kazakhs. The emotional attachment is far greater in these two cases.

The Uyghurs have a strong attachment to their place of origin, i.e. Semirechie. Compact Uyghur settlements in south east Kazakhstan which straddles the China border denote an autochthonous community with a localized Semirechien attachment. Here, the emphasis is more on the meaningful presence of the Uyghurs as a dynamic Central Asian community originating in the Semirechie region and living in compact settlements in south east Kazakhstan, mainly in the Almaty district.

The sense of belonging is different in the case of the Kazakhs of western Mongolia. Mongolian Kazakhs live in the Western *aimaq* (province) of Bayan-Ulgii, a region that is near Kazakhstan yet separated by small strips of territory that belongs to Russia and China. Similar to the perceptions of Chinese Kazakhs, the attractiveness of better life in Kazakhstan created an urge to immigrate to the ethnic homeland. Alexander Diener argues that some of the earliest migrants were Kazakh elites who lived in Ulaanbaatar and who believed it was important to raise their children in the Kazakh homeland.

These migrants were followed by those searching for economic opportunities as conditions in Bayan-Ulgii quickly deteriorated in the early 1990s. Ironically, the Mongolian Kazakhs have preserved Kazakh culture and language to a greater extent than many Kazakhstani Kazakhs whose first language is often Russian. A significant number of Mongolian Kazakhs chose to return to Mongolia after spending several years in Kazakhstan. Unlike others, they have chosen not to migrate to their Kazakh homeland [9].

The Kazakhs' attachment to their homeland is a constant; what is variable is whether that territorial reality fits other paradigms of identity and belonging. So, it is the element of hybridity that has entered the debate about 'transnationalism' and 'diaspora' which is extremely relevant in the context of Mongolian Kazakhs who trace their origins to Kazakh territories in western China but have been blocked from the other side of the Altai due to the creation of international borders in the 1930's that made Mongolia a Soviet ally and cut it off from Chinese Altai. In the aftermath of Soviet disintegration, the predicament of the bordering regions increased. The factor of emotional attachment was far greater-the emotional connection with specific landscapes is extremely strong rather than cultural association with the Kazakhs. There seems to be a stronger 'place identity' rather than a desire to be part of the global experience. The Uyghurs with a Semirechien attachment have experienced a feeling of 'in-between-ness'. The emphasis here is on the Uyghurs as a dynamic Turkic community having a meaningful presence in the Central Asian region.

Memories of exclusion

Other non-titular nationalities like the Germans and the Koreans who became victims of Soviet deportation share a different psyche. Memory-driven consciousness among the Kazakhs as victims of Soviet deportation come alive in Alzhir Memorial Complex in Malinka village 40 miles west of Astana where a memo-

rial complex-the *Akmola Deportation camp of Wives of Traitors of the Revolution*. The memorial bears testimony to broken families and sorrows of women and children of Kazakh, Uzbek, Azeri, Polish, German and Korean backgrounds who were forced into a life of seclusion in these camps in the 1930s.

There are variations in the psyche of people in other regions of Kazakhstan. The continuity of tribal tradition is the dominant feature in the Akmolinsk oblast. Astana is at the centre of this oblast. Situated beside River Ishim and its tributary Esil it is the *Heart of Eurasia* (with depictions of steppe settlements like Bozok that originated in the medieval period and was transformed into a city 'that never sleeps')[10]. In Almaty, the feeling of attachment prevails among generations with live-in experience. The factor of emotional attachment is strongest in the case of the Uyghurs of Semirechie who live in compact settlements in Zarya Vostoka district of Almaty. Kokshetau, a quaint provincial town in north Kazakhstan is a living memory of Soviet past, immortalized by the regional museum *Istoriko-kraevedcheskie muzei* under the patronage of Department of Culture of Akmolinsk Oblast (*Upravleniya Kultury, Akmolinsk Oblast*) stored with memorabilia belonging to Soviet patrons of music, sports and art. Kokshetau is also immortalized as the native place of the Kazakh ethnographer Chokan Valikhanov who belonged to a noble Kazakh lineage.

Impressions

Such tangled emotions unfolded right in front of my eyes-during my research trips to Kazakhstan during 2012–2015. Initially, like most global observers, my basic interest was in the appearance of cosmopolitanism, governed by ideologies like Eurasianism that have been nurtured for a fairly long time. Both in Astana and Almaty, such voices of cosmopolitanism are heard and seen-very strongly among academic circles and institutions like Nazarbayev University and Lev Gumilev University (in As-

tana), Turan University in Almaty and among limited circles in Kazakh National University (KazNu) and R.B. Suleimanov Institute of Oriental Studies in Almaty patronised by the Ministry of Science and Education. Gradually however, the Kazakh conscience representing diverse sentiments tended to unfold and these unravelled more interesting images about Kazakhstan's past and the present.

The present study takes into account such variables of cosmopolitanism in Kazakhstan. It aims to represent competing narratives about Kazakhstan. Narratives flow from a variety of impressions not just about ethnicity but also a variety of non-ethnic markers of identity (like nomadic tradition), developmental dynamics, relational shifts from the Soviet to the post-Soviet periods and intra-regional complexities.

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² In Kantian philosophy, cosmopolitanism denoted Western prescriptions of allegiance to the world community. Today, it has a resonance in a wide range of cultural, social and political currents throughout the world. But instead of European universalism which has been translated into some kind of European order, revisionist writings have focussed on Asian variants of cosmopolitanism. Gerard Delanty, 'The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol 57, Issue No 1, 2006.

³ Peng Cheah, Bruce Robbins edited *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

⁴ Nina Glick Shiller, Tsypylma Darieva and Sandra Gruner-Domic, 'Defining cosmopolitan sociability in a transnational age. An introduction', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol 34, Issue 3, 2011.

⁵ Amitav Ghosh, *The Hungry Tide*, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2011.

⁶ Mentioned works of P. Cheah and B. Robbins, *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the nation*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'Connected histories: notes towards the reconfiguration of early modern Eurasia', *Modern Asian Studies*, 31, 1997, pp. 735-762 and more in editorial by Sharmani P. Gabriel and Fernando Rosa, Introduction: 'Lived cosmopolitanisms' in littoral Asia, *Cultural Dynamics*, 24 (2-3), 2012.

⁷ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *The Kazakhstan Way*, Stacey International, 2007.

⁸ Liza Rybina et al, 'Patriotism, cosmopolitanism, consumer ethnocentrism and purchase behaviour in Kazakhstan', *Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies*, Vol 1, No 2, 2010.

⁹ The ambiguity has been explained in the following research articles: *One Homeland or Two? The nationalization and Transnationalization of Mongolia's Kazakhs*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009, Diener, 'Kazakhstan's Kin state Diaspora: Settlement Planning and the Oralman Dilemma', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol 57, No 2, March 2005; Diener, 'Problematic Integration of Mongolian-Kazakh Return Migrants in Kazakhstan', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol 46, No 6, 2005.

¹⁰ 'Tsentr Evrazii', www.republika.kz, 5 Iuliya 2012; 'Astana. Retrospektiva', No 73, *Subbota*, 26 Iuniya, 2010 goda. Astana has been promoted by the regime as the "geopolitical center of Eurasia," an image that is inscribed in and through the city's symbolic and urban landscapes. Astana's geopolitical and nationalist rhetoric have been shaped by a number of factors: the environment, lived experience, the spectacle, the sport, the international presence and regional differentiation.



Information About Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies Under President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS) was established on June 16, 1993 by the Decree of President of Kazakhstan. In April 2014, President Nazarbayev issued the Executive Order to relocate the KazISS to Astana.

Since its foundation, the mission of the KazISS as the national research institution is to provide analytical support to the President of Kazakhstan as well as to government bodies of Kazakhstan.

The KazISS enjoys a reputation of the leading think tank of Kazakhstan as it employs a highly professional pool of experts that currently includes six doctors and ten candidates of sciences and PhDs who specialize in political science, history, economics and sociology.

During the twenty-three two years of its functioning, the KazISS have published more than 250 books on issues of international relations, global and regional security. The Institute publishes three journals: the Kogam zhane Dayir in Kazakh, the Kazakhstan-Spectrum in Russian and the Central Asia's Affairs in English. The KazISS has a trilingual website in Kazakh, Russian, English.

Special interest has been triggered by a great number of international conferences, seminars and round tables held at the KazISS on regular basis - including the Annual Conferences regularly held since 2003 – that are participated by most prominent experts from Kazakhstan, Central Asia as well as China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Turkey, the USA and other countries.

KazISS was ranked in four nominations 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report

The Think Tank Index is a part of the "Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program" (TTCSP) at the University of Pennsylvania that has been conducting research on the role policy institutes play in governments and civil societies around the world over the last 25 years. The pool of scholars and practitioners produce the annual Global Go To Think Tank Index that ranks more than 6 000 world's leading think tanks in a variety of categories.

The new Think Tank Index (http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/10/), ranked the KazISS among the top 100 in terms of security, defense and international affairs analysis. For the first time, the KazISS was ranked the 57th among the world's best government affiliated think tanks. In the Central Asian regional rankings, the KazISS retains its position among the top three and it is also ranked the 33d in the energy and raw materials analysis ranking.

All these signifies the increasing role of analytical centers in Kazakhstan. The publications and other materials published by Kazakhstan think tanks are citing abroad more frequently.

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Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты туралы ақпарат

Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты (ҚСЗИ) Қазақстан Республикасы Президентінің 1993 жылғы 16 маусымдағы Жарлығымен құрылған. 2014 жылдың сәуір айынан ҚР Президентінің Жарлығымен Астана қаласына көшірілді.

Қазақстан Республикасының Президентінің жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының құрылған күнінен бастап оның негізгі мақсаты — мемлекеттік ғылыми-зерттеу мекемесі ретінде Қазақстан Президентінің және елдің басқарушы органдарының қызметін ғылыми-талдаулармен қамтамасыз ету.

Осы уақыт барысында ҚСЗИ жоғары кәсіби ғылыми-талдау орталығына айналды. Бүгінгі таңда институтта алты ғылым докторы, он ғылым кандидаты, PhD, саясаттану, тарих, экономика, әлеуметтану салаларының мамандары қызмет атқарады.

ҚСЗИ өзінің 23 жылдық қызметі барысында институт сарапшыларының қатысуымен халықаралық қатынас, ғаламдық және аймақтық қауіпсіздік мәселелері бойынша 250-ден астам кітап басып шығарған. Институт үш мерзімді ғылыми-сараптамалық журнал басып шығаруда: «Қоғам және Дәуір» тоқсандық ғылыми-сараптамалық журналы, «Казахстан-Спектр» тоқсандық ғылыми журналы және «Central Asia's Affairs» тоқсандық сараптамалық журналы (ағылшын тілінде).

Бұл басылымдарда сыртқы және ішкі саясат, халықаралық қатынастар, ұлттық қауіпсіздік, Қазақстан Республикасының әлеуметтік және экономикалық саясаты мәселелері жарық көреді, сондай-ақ материалдарды өзінің www.kisi.kz сайтында жариялайды. ҚСЗИ-дың жеке сайты үш тілде: қазақ, орыс және ағылшын тілдерінде ұсынылған. Институт өзінің негізгі зерттеу бағыттары бойынша семинарлар, ғылыми конференциялар, дөңгелек үстелдер, халықаралық форумдар өткізіп келеді.

ҚСЗИ-дың ғылыми басқосуларына Қазақстанның ғана емес, сонымен қатар, Орталық Азия елдерінің, АҚШ-тың, Германияның, Жапонияның, Иранның, Қытайдың, Ресейдің, Түркияның, Францияның және басқа да мемлекеттердің ғалымдары белсене қатысуда.

ҚСЗИ алғаш рет «қауіпсіздік» және «сыртқы саясат» санаты бойынша әлемдік «ақыл-ой» орталықтарының рейтингіне енді

Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты (ҚСЗИ) Дүниежүзілік сараптамалық орталықтардың 2015 жылға арналған индекс-рейтингінде бірден төрт номинацияда орын алған.

Бұл рейтинг 1989 жылдан әлемдегі алты мыңға жуық «ақыл-ой орталықтарының» қызметін талдау негізінде сараптамалық құрылымдардың жетістіктері мен олардың даму үрдістерін анықтау бойынша Пенсильвания университетінің «Сараптамалық орталықтар мен азаматтық қоғам» зерттеу бағдарламасы аясында жасалады.

Рейтингтің қорытындысы бойынша (http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/10/) ҚСЗИ қауіпсіздік, қорғаныс және сыртқы саясат саласындағы 100 ең үздік зерттеу орталықтарының қатарына қосылды. Сонымен қатар институт алғаш рет үздік мемлекеттік «ақыл-ой» орталықтарының тізіміне енді. ҚСЗИ бұл тізімде әлем бойынша 57-ші орынды иеленіп отыр.

Орталық Азиядағы үздік сараптамалық құрылымдардың арасында ҚСЗИ алғашқы үштікке еніп, өз орнын сақтап қалды, сондай-ақ энергетика және шикізат саясатын зерттеу саласында 33-ші орынға тұрақтады.

Бұл көрсеткіштер Қазақстандағы сараптамалық орталықтардың рөлі артып келе жатқанын көрсетеді. Отандық «ақыл-ой» орталықтарының жариялап отырған ғылыми-сарапшылық материалдарына шетелде жиі сілтеме жасалады.

ҚСЗИ туралы толық ақпаратты төмендегі мекенжайдан алуға болады:

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Информация о Казахстанском институте стратегических исследований при Президенте Республики Казахстан

Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований (КИСИ) при Президенте Республики Казахстан был создан Указом Президента Республики Казахстан 16 июня 1993 г. В апреле 2014 г. Указом Президента Республики Казахстан КИСИ был передислоцирован в г. Астану.

С момента своего возникновения основной задачей Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте Республики Казахстан как государственного научно-исследовательского учреждения является научно-аналитическое обеспечение деятельности Президента Казахстана, руководящих органов страны.

За это время КИСИ превратился в высокопрофессиональный научно-аналитический центр. В настоящее время в институте работают шесть докторов наук, десять кандидатов наук, PhD, специалисты в области политологии, истории, экономики, социологии.

За 23 года деятельности в институте было издано более 250 книг по международным отношениям, проблемам глобальной и региональной безопасности. В КИСИ издаются три журнала: «Қоғам және Дәуір» (на казахском языке), «Казахстан-Спектр» (на русском языке), «Central Asia's Affairs» (на английском языке). Институт располагает собственным сайтом на трех языках: казахском, русском и английском.

В КИСИ ежегодно проводится большое количество международных научных конференций, семинаров, круглых столов.

Особый интерес у экспертов вызывают ежегодные конференции КИСИ, проводимые с 2003 г. и посвященные проблемам безопасности и сотрудничества в Центральной Азии.

В научных форумах КИСИ принимают участие не только эксперты из Казахстана и стран Центральной Азии, но и ученые из Германии, Индии, Ирана, Китая, Пакистана, России, США, Турции, Франции, Японии и др.

КИСИ впервые вошел в рейтинг мировых «мозговых» центров по категориям «безопасность» и «внешняя политика»

Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований (КИСИ) при Президенте Республики Казахстан был отмечен сразу в четырех номинациях Всемирного индекс-рейтинга аналитических центров по итогам 2015 г.

Рейтинг составляется в рамках Исследовательской программы Университета Пенсильвании «Аналитические центры и гражданское общество» по признанию достижений аналитических структур и выявлению тенденций их развития по всему миру с 1989 г. на основе анализа деятельности более шести тысяч «мозговых центров» в мире.

По итогам нового рейтинга (http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/10/) КИСИ вошел в топ-100 лучших исследовательских центров в сфере безопасности, обороны и внешней политики. Более того, институт впервые вошел в список лучших государственных «мозговых» центров, заняв 57-е место в мире.

В рейтинге лучших аналитических структур Центральной Азии КИСИ сохранил свое положение, войдя в тройку лидеров, а также занял 33-е место в области исследования энергетической и сырьевой политики.

Стоит отметить, что данные показатели говорят в целом о возрастающей роли аналитических центров в Казахстане. Научно-экспертные материалы казахстанских «мозговых» центров все чаще цитируются и за рубежом.

Более подробную информацию о КИСИ можно получить по адресу:

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